Fifth Amendment

  • October 10, 2011
    Guest Post

    By Joanne Mariner, Director, Hunter College Human Rights Program


    Anwar al-Awlaki, recently killed by a drone strike in Yemen, was a talented terror propagandist. “Intelligent, sophisticated, Internet-savvy, and very charismatic” is how a Yemeni counterterrorism official described him last year.

    The real question, though, is whether his role was much more than that, as the U.S. government has claimed. Al-Awlaki, President Obama said on the day of the strike, “was the leader of external operations for al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula,” a man who had taken charge of “planning and directing efforts to murder innocent Americans.” It was al-Awlaki’s operational responsibilities, not simply his oratorical skills, which were said to have sealed his fate.

    But it’s worrying that no one without access to classified information can meaningfully respond to the president’s assertions. Whatever evidence supported the government’s decision to kill al-Awlaki is secret; indeed, even the process by which this evidence was assessed has not been officially explained.

    Unlike the verdict in a criminal case, where the evidence against the defendant has been subject to challenge in adversarial proceedings before a court, the decision to kill al-Awlaki rested on undisclosed and untested grounds. For the American public, with no access to the underlying intelligence, this essentially means taking the administration’s claims on faith.

    One doesn’t have to reflect long on recent history to conclude that this is a problem. It was untested and erroneous intelligence that purported to justify the 2003 invasion of Iraq. It was also, though somewhat less notoriously, faulty intelligence that led the CIA in 2004 to kidnap German-Lebanese citizen Khaled el-Masri and hold him for five months in a secret prison in Afghanistan. And according to several federal judges it was shaky and unreliable intelligence that underlied the Bush administration’s decision to hold innocent men like Turkish citizen Murat Kurnaz in military detention at Guantanamo for years.

  • May 14, 2010

    The Obama administration's inclusion of Anwar al-Awlaki, an American citizen and terrorism suspect, on a target list for killing by the CIA, is garnering attention from legal experts and media.

    The New York Times reports:

    The notion that the government can, in effect, execute one of its own citizens far from a combat zone, with no judicial process and based on secret intelligence, makes some legal authorities deeply uneasy.

    To eavesdrop on the terrorism suspect who was added to the target list, the American-born radical cleric Anwar al-Awlaki, who is hiding in Yemen, intelligence agencies would have to get a court warrant. But designating him for death, as C.I.A. officials did early this year with the National Security Council's approval, required no judicial review.

    "Congress has protected Awlaki's cellphone calls," said Vicki Divoll, a former C.I.A. lawyer who now teaches at the United States Naval Academy. "But it has not provided any protections for his life. That makes no sense." 

  • November 24, 2009
    Guest Post

    By Jay Austin, Senior Attorney, Environmental Law Institute; Director, Endangered Environmental Laws Program

    This fall's Supreme Court calendar features only one environmental law case - a bit of a relief compared with last term, when the Court heard five environmental appeals and the "green" side lost all five. Yet that case, Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection, is a sleeper with the potential to reshape both the Court's Fifth Amendment takings jurisprudence and its traditional deference to state courts' interpretation of state common law.

    What's wrong with "beach renourishment," the innocuous-sounding practice of replenishing sand along storm-eroded coastline, as authorized by Florida statute and carried out at great public expense? According to petitioners, it deprived their property of its "oceanfront" character, by widening the public side of the beach and replacing the traditional dynamic boundary that tracked the mean high water mark with a new, fixed line. They sued in state court - first to enjoin the renourishment program, then for monetary compensation, claiming a taking of their property rights.

    The Florida Supreme Court disagreed. In a lengthy opinion that cites Florida case law and authorities dating back to Blackstone, it held that "under Florida common law, there is no independent right of contact with the water"; and that the statute adequately preserves the owners' other rights, including their right of access to the beach and the water. Absent an identifiable lost property right, there could be no taking and no compensation owed. Two Florida justices dissented, and petitioners appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.

  • October 6, 2009
    Guest Post

    By Susan A. Bandes, Distinguished Research Professor at DePaul University College of Law and Author of The Passions of Law

    Miranda v. Arizona and the cases implementing it tend to favor clear and unequivocal rules for the guidance of police, prosecutors, courts and suspects. In Edwards v. Arizona, the Court adopted a bright line rule mandating that once a custodial suspect has invoked his right to counsel under Miranda, he cannot be questioned again "until counsel has been made available to him, unless the suspect himself initiates further communication, exchanges or conversation with the police." While some of Miranda's bright line rules have been diluted or blurred, the Edwards rule has become increasingly rigid. In Arizona v. Roberson the Court held that once a suspect had invoked his right to counsel, he could not be questioned about any crime. In Minnick v. Mississippi, it held that the prohibition remained in force even after the suspect had been provided counsel, unless that counsel was present at questioning.

    In yesterday's argument in Maryland v. Shatzer the Court pushed the advocates to articulate a bright line rule that would limit Edwards without sacrificing its clarity. It considered limits based on passage of time, different crime, break in custody, and the distinction between pre-conviction and post-conviction status. On one point, the Court was in accord: some limits need to be set. It cannot be that "a defendant who invokes [his Fifth Amendment right to counsel] anywhere at any time is forever immune from being questioned by the police" about any crime.

    Justice Alito posed the extreme hypothetical: a suspect is questioned about joyriding in Maryland in 1999. He invokes his right to counsel under Miranda and is then released from custody. Ten years later he is taken into custody and questioned about a murder in Montana. Is the 2009 questioning barred by Edwards? Shatzer's counsel, public defender Celia Davis, maintained that Edwards would be violated in this situation. If so, Edwards' days are numbered.