Fidelity to the Constitution

  • April 30, 2012

    by Nicole Flatow

    Pop quiz: What is the central constitutional provision at issue in the Supreme Court’s review of the Affordable Care Act? If you said the Commerce Clause, you’re one step ahead of many of the tea partiers who protested outside the Supreme Court during oral arguments.

    Responding to questions from staff at the Constitutional Accountability Center, tea partiers bearing signs that read “Obamacare is unconstitutional” couldn’t name any part of the Constitution that they believe the law violates.

    “Well, I should know better. I should be able to answer that question and I can’t,” said one protester in a video produced by CAC, “Tea Party vs. The Constitution: ObamaCare Edition.”

    “If you read the Constitution, there’s nothing in there about health care,” said another.

    Others, when told that the Commerce Clause is what authorized Congress to pass the law, said the Commerce Clause was “added later” and was not part of the original Constitution.

    And when the interviewer tried to correct them by pointing out that the Commerce Clause is in Article 1, Section 8 of the original Constitution, one protester responded, “There’s no use in arguing about that because I don’t think either of us know for sure.”

    Watch the full video, including facts from experts who know what the Constitution actually says, below:

  • April 11, 2012

    by Nicole Flatow

    When Fifth Circuit Judge Jerry Smith asked the Department of Justice for a three-page single-spaced memo defending its support for the long-established principle of judicial review, Attorney General Eric Holder did what was asked and responded.

    He refrained from pointing out, as Jeffrey Toobin did, that Smith’s behavior during the hearing on a challenge to the Affordable Care Act was a “disgrace,” or as Orin Kerr did, that it was “highly inappropriate” for Smith to ask the DOJ to defend political comments by President Obama about the Supreme Court’s review of the health care law totally outside of the scope of the record in the case.

    But in his dreams [and in The American Prospect], constitutional law professor Garrett Epps envisions a different kind of letter Holder might have sent, in which he refuses to respond on the basis that the Fifth Circuit has absolutely no jurisdiction in this case over the President of the United States:

    Dear Judge Smith,

    … This letter is a truthful response to this court's order and the issues of jurisdiction and judicial ethics it raised. Because it is truthful, it will never be filed with any court. Nonetheless, I will take this imaginary opportunity to state that the proper response to your order is a regretful refusal to comply on the grounds that it was made in excess of your jurisdiction, that it raises serious issues about your fitness to serve the United States in a position of honor and trust, and that it tends to bring discredit on the federal judiciary.

    Epps goes on to explain that the very same decision that established judicial review, Marbury v. Madison, also established that “federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction” and any attempt to go outside that jurisdiction deprives them of their power.

    While presidents are political actors who have criticized the courts since Thomas Jefferson, judges are expected not to act as naked partisans, he explains.

    He continues:

  • March 30, 2012
    Guest Post

    By Rebecca L. Brown, Newton Professor of Constitutional Law at the USC Gould School of Law


    During Tuesday’s argument, Justice Scalia asked whether the individual mandate, even if “necessary,” was also “proper.” He may well have had good reasons to focus on this language, and the Necessary and Proper Clause, to which it refers.

    In 2005, Justice Scalia wrote separately in a Commerce Clause case to emphasize that conduct can be regulated if it is “an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity….”  He added, “where Congress has the authority to enact a regulation of interstate commerce, it possesses every power needed to make that regulation effective.” The question in the case, Gonzales v. Raich, was whether the federal drug laws could reach the cultivation and possession of marijuana for personal use as authorized by state law. Justice Scalia wrote that, when the federal government puts in place a comprehensive regulatory scheme that falls within the power to regulate interstate commerce (such as the interstate drug laws) then it may also impose additional requirements, even over matters that it could not regulate in isolation (such as wholly intrastate, non-commercial activity, like the growing of marijuana)—if those additional requirements are “necessary and proper” to effectuate the larger federal scheme.   

    Many of us read that plausible analysis to suggest an analogous approach to the Affordable Care Act. Congress has unquestioned authority to regulate the interstate and commercial matters of health care and insurance. In turn, as Justice Scalia made clear in Raich, additional rules that are necessary and proper to the functioning of the overall system of regulating those markets can be constitutionally adopted by Congress-- even if those additional rules might be of questionable validity if passed in isolation. 

    There is no dispute that the individual mandate is necessary, even essential, to effectuate the congressional policy of requiring insurers to offer coverage without regard to pre-existing conditions. Without the individual mandate, people would be free to wait to buy insurance until they needed expensive medical care, which would undercut the role of insurance as a pooling of risk. Assuming, then, that Justice Scalia would maintain consistency with his prior views, many thought that he could be counted on as a vote to uphold the individual mandate.

    But, apparently realizing the import of his prior opinion, Justice Scalia on Tuesday laid the groundwork for backing away from it. While conceding that the individual mandate is “necessary” to the federal scheme, he questioned whether it is also “proper.” Why might it not be proper? In an exercise of utterly circular reasoning, Justice Scalia suggested that it might not be “proper” because it goes beyond the limits of Congress’s limited powers.   

  • March 26, 2012
    Guest Post

    By Alan B. Morrison, Lerner Family Associate Dean for Public Interest and Public Service Law; Professorial Lecturer in Law. Morrsion filed a brief on behalf of former IRS Commissioners Mortimer Caplin & Sheldon Cohen urging the Supreme Court to dismiss the challenges to the individual mandate in the Affordable Care Act on the ground that the Anti-Injunction Act deprived the courts of jurisdiction to hear the case. This post is part of an ACSblog online symposium around oral arguments in the Affordable Care Act case.


    There was one thing that was clear on opening day of the battle over the Affordable Care Act:  all of the Justices seemed to want to reach the merits of the constitutionality of the individual mandate.  Their problem was how to get there and how to write an opinion justifying that result.

    Before getting to the argument, there was one surprise: there was no line for seats in the lawyers section as late as 9:15.  Apparently, everyone thought that everyone else would be there, and so almost no one showed up.  But that is almost certainly not going to be the case when the merits come up at 10:00 a.m. on Tuesday.

    Listening to the whole 90 minutes, not a single Justice expressed any concern that prudence would caution against deciding a case in which no taxpayer would owe a penny until 2015, perhaps because they saw the enormity of the issues and how important the Government says it is to decide these issues now.  It surely can’t be because the merits issues are easy or not politically-charged.  Rather, the Court seems to assume that it will have to decide the issues some time, and it might as well do it now, with all the arguments made in more than 100 briefs filed on all sides.

  • March 26, 2012

    The Following is an excerpt from Harvard Law Professor Charles Fried’s testimony during a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing on the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act.* Prof. Fried was former solicitor general under President Ronald Reagan. This post is part of an ACSblog online symposium around oral arguments on the Affordable Care Act.


    I come here today not as a partisan supporter of the Obama Administration’s health care legislation. I am not an expert in health care economics or policy, and I am sure there are many arguments for and against the wisdom and feasibility of this legislation. I do not enter into that debate. I am an expert on constitutional law, which I have been teaching and practicing for many years and on which I have written books and articles, most to the point my 2004 book, SAYING WHAT THE LAW IS: THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT. I also am not one who believes that Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution is in effect a grant of power to Congress to regulate anything it wishes in any way it pleases. There are limits to what may plausibly be called commerce. I agree entirely with the decision in United States v. Morrison that section 13981 of the Violence Against Women Act cannot be brought within Congress’s power to regulate commerce. Indeed I sat at counsel table with Michael Rosman when he successfully argued that case. Though gender-motivated violence is despicable, cowardly, and in every state in the union criminal, a man beating up his wife or girlfriend is not commerce. Neither is carrying a gun in or near a school, as the Court correctly held in United States v. Lopez. The arguments to the contrary required torturing not only constitutional law but the English language. But the business of insurance is commerce. That’s what the Supreme Court decided in 1944 in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n and the law has not departed from that conclusion for a moment since then. One need only think of the massive regulation of insurance that is represented by ERISA to see how deep and unquestioned is that conclusion.

    If insurance is commerce, then of course the business of health insurance is commerce. It insures an activity that represents nearly 18% of the United States economy. (In this connection recall Perez v. United States, which held that a very local loan sharking operation was within Congress’s power to regulate commerce.) And if health insurance is commerce, then the health care mandate is a regulation of commerce, explicitly authorized by Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution.