At The Atlantic, Andrew Cohen discusses “secession by attrition” in which a collection of senators are “starving the federal courts of the trial judges they need to serve the basic legal needs of the litigants who come to court each year seeking redress of their grievances.”
Writing for Daily Kos, Jon Perr criticizes Politico’s recent piece “Obama now outpaces George W. Bush on judges,” for its misleading message. While the Obama administration has made some “headway” against Senate Republicans’ egregious obstruction of the president’s judicial nominations, Perr reveals how Politico’s data shows that President Obama’s nominations have been “confirmed at a lower rate than President Bush’s.”
Yesterday, President Obama signed two executive orders that “will prevent retaliation against employees who disclose compensation information and will require businesses to include race and gender information when reporting compensation data.” Keli Goff at The Root comments on this critical step towards ensuring workplace equality.
At the Daily Journal, Richard L. Hasen discusses Justice Clarence Thomas’ concurring opinion in McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission and the "faux judicial restraint" of the chief justice’s “gradualism.”
Michelle Olsen at Appellate Daily notes a recent petition to the high court requesting oral argument in a case involving threats made on Facebook.
President Obama announced this morning that he will propose legislation calling for significant changes in the NSA’s telephone metadata program. This is good news, indeed.
The enactment of these proposals would strike a much better balance between the interests of liberty and security. They would preserve the value of the NSA’s program in terms of protecting the national security, while at the same time providing much greater, and much needed, protection to individual privacy and civil liberties.
The proposals are based on recommendations made by the president’s five-member Review Group, of which I was a member. To understand why we came up with these suggestions, it is necessary first to understand how the program operates.
Under the telephone metadata program, which was created in 2006, telephone service companies like Sprint, Verizon and AT&T are required to turn over to the NSA, on an ongoing daily basis, huge quantities of telephone metadata involving the phone records of millions of Americans, none of whom are themselves suspected of anything.
Even though the program to-date has functioned properly, history teaches that there is always the risk of another J. Edgar Hoover or Richard Nixon.
* This post originally appeared on The Huffington Postand is the third part of an ongoing series. The first part can be read here; the second part can be read here; the fourth part can be read here; the fifth part can be read here.
In my last post, I explored the pros and cons of the NSA's bulk telephony meta-data program. As I reported, after considering all the competing interests and perspectives, the Review Group concluded that, in light of the availability of other means by which the government could achieve its legitimate objectives, there was "no sufficient justification to allow the government itself to collect and store bulk telephony meta-data." The Review Group therefore recommended that the meta-data program, as currently constituted, "should be terminated as soon as reasonably practicable."
At the same time, though, the Review Group found that access to telephony meta-data can be useful to the government in its effort to identify terrorists operating inside the United States. The challenge was to figure out how best to preserve the legitimate value of the program while at the same time reducing its risks to personal privacy and individual freedom.
To strike a better balance, the Review Group recommends several important changes in the program as it currently exists.
First, and perhaps most important, the Review Group recommends that the government should not be permitted to store the telephony meta-data. The Review Group reasoned that taking the meta-data out of the hands of government would substantially reduce the potential for government abuse. The Review Group therefore recommends that the telephony meta-data should be held by private entities. That is, the meta-data should be held either by the various telephone service providers themselves or, upon a showing that that solution would make effective use of the meta-data impossible, by a private organization created specifically for that purpose. This approach would both prevent the government from having direct access to the database and ensure that an independent set of eyes could monitor the government's access to the information.
All in all, 46 recommendations were offered, among them the private, non-governmental retention of all personal communications data, accessible only through individualized court orders approved by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC); the first-ever appointment of a “public interest advocate” to argue on behalf of civil liberties and privacy concerns before the FISC, which currently has no adversarial process; the ceasing of “back door” access points in hardware or software; and the incorporation of privacy protections for non-U.S. citizens.
Also of note was the enumeration of guiding principles. For example, the panel endorsed a dual understanding of “security” – national security, on the one hand, and Fourth Amendment personal security on the other. The report also said the idea of “balancing” these two interests has “an important element of truth” but is “inadequate and misleading”:
[S]ome safeguards are not subject to balancing at all. In a free society, public officials should never engage in surveillance in order to punish their political enemies; to restrict freedom of speech or religion; to suppress legitimate criticism and dissent; to help their preferred companies or industries; to provide domestic companies with an unfair competitive advantage; or to benefit or burden members of groups defined in terms of religion, ethnicity, race, and gender.
The panel also endorsed a “broad principle for the future: as a general rule and without senior policy review, the government should not be permitted to collect and store mass, undigested, non-public personal information about US persons for the purpose of enabling future queries and data-mining for foreign intelligence purposes.”