Employment Discrimination

  • May 10, 2012
    Guest Post

    By Lisa Mottet, Transgender Civil Rights Project Director for the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force


    Though garnering less attention than North Carolina's disheartening constitutional amendment to ban same-sex marriage and President Obama's monumental announcement to support same-sex marriage, another recent piece of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) news deserves significant attention.

    In what is accurately hailed as a game-changing decision for the LGBT community, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ruled in April (Macy v. Holder) that transgender people are protected by Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination in the workplace.

    The precedential decision involved Mia Macy, a transgender woman represented by Transgender Law Center who was all but officially hired by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) when, after she told them she is transgender, she was told the position had been cut due to funding. ATF actually hired someone else and Mia lost her home as a result of the lost job opportunity.

    When ATF discriminated against Mia she became part of the horrifying statistics on employment discrimination faced by transgender people. According to the National Transgender Discrimination Survey: 26 percent lost a job for being transgender; 50 percent were harassed at work; and many others face humiliation, have their privacy breached, and are denied access to appropriate restrooms. Overall, 78 percent have experienced mistreatment, harassment, or discrimination on the job.

  • January 13, 2012
    Guest Post

    By Leslie C. Griffin, Larry & Joanne Doherty Chair in Legal Ethics, University of Houston Law Center


    The EEOC and Cheryl Perich lost 9-0 in the Supreme Court when the Court dismissed schoolteacher Perich’s Americans with Disabilities Act [ADA] lawsuit against Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School. The Court for the first time approved the ministerial exception, a rule that the state and lower federal courts had used for forty years to dismiss lawsuits by “ministers” against their religious employers, including churches, elementary and secondary schools, universities and hospitals.

    One of the arguments in the amicus brief I filed on Perich’s behalf concerned the Court’s leading free exercise precedent, Employment Division v. Smith. In Smith, the Court held that two Native American drug counselors who used peyote in a religious ritual could be denied unemployment compensation benefits because the criminal laws prohibit drug use. The most famous language from Smith is that all citizens are subject to “neutral laws of general applicability” because to permit exceptions from the criminal law “would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.”

    Many supporters of religious freedom detested Smith for its incursion on free exercise. In other words, they believed that religious freedom should trump the law. In contrast, I agreed with Smith’s holding that religious belief should not be superior to the law of the land. I defended Smith because I think our constitutional system depends on a shared system of law. To exempt religious citizens from the laws undermines the rule of law. For the ministerial exception, I argued that, just as Alfred Smith had to obey neutral drug laws of general applicability, so too did Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School and other religious employers have to obey the antidiscrimination laws.

    Chief Justice John Roberts’ opinion for a unanimous Court squarely rejected that argument. Although the Chief Justice conceded that the ADA is a neutral law of general applicability, which presumably could be applied to Hosanna-Tabor under Smith, he quickly distinguished Hosanna-Tabor from Smith:

    a church’s selection of its ministers is unlike an individual’s ingestion of peyote. Smith involved government regulation of only outward physical acts. The present case, in contrast, concerns government interference with an internal church decision that affects the faith and mission of the church itself. See id., at 877 (distinguishing the government’s regulation of “physical acts” from its “lend[ing] its power to one or the other side in controversies over religious authority or dogma”).

    This is a strange argument in the context of the ministerial exception. In terms of religious freedom, the ingestion of peyote is a profound religious ritual with a long American history predating the Constitution. In sharp contrast, the ministerial exception involves cases where employees allege disabilities discrimination, retaliation, pregnancy discrimination, sexual harassment, hostile work environment, unequal pay, race discrimination, gender discrimination, and other civil rights violations. Women clergy, for example, sue for pregnancy discrimination, sexual harassment, hostile work environment and unequal pay. Other ministers sue for disabilities discrimination. Many of these “ministers” have been schoolteachers or non-ordained personnel who did not realize they were “ministers” until their lawsuits were dismissed.

  • January 11, 2012
    Guest Post

    By Sarah Crawford, Director of Workplace Fairness, National Partnership for Women & Families


    The U.S. Supreme Court is hearing oral argument today in Coleman v. Maryland Court of Appeals – a case that could erode the right of millions of state workers to take job-protected, unpaid leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) when faced with a serious illness.

    The FMLA set an important family and medical leave standard that guarantees eligible workers – both women and men – up to 12 weeks of job-protected, unpaid leave to recover from a serious illness or medical condition, including pregnancy or childbirth, or to care for a newborn, a newly adopted child or a seriously ill family member. The FMLA offered leave on a gender-neutral basis rather than creating a special right to self-care leave for medical illness surrounding pregnancy, in part to avoid creating perverse incentives for further discrimination against women.

    Since its enactment 18 years ago, workers have used the FMLA more than 100 million times. The law has helped workers disabled by pregnancy or recovering from childbirth, workers with new babies and dying parents, workers who have had heart attacks and hysterectomies – in short, workers for whom job-protected leave is of critical importance. An adverse decision from the Supreme Court could put access to FMLA self-care leave at risk for millions of state workers. At stake is their fundamental right to take time off to address their own serious medical needs, including pregnancy and childbirth.

    Petitioner Daniel Coleman was working for a Maryland court when his doctor ordered bed rest due to serious illness. Within hours of requesting medical leave, Coleman was fired. He then filed a lawsuit alleging a violation of the FMLA. Contrary to the plain language of the statute, the lower courts ruled that the state of Maryland could not be sued for monetary damages under the FMLA’s self-care provision.

  • July 5, 2011
    Video Interview

    Following a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing last week assessing the impact of recent Supreme Court decisions on corporate accountability, ACSblog spoke with Betty Dukes, the lead plaintiff in one of the most notable cases this term in which the court sided with corporations, Wal-Mart v. Dukes.

    Dukes lamented that the Supreme Court’s decision in Wal-Mart was a vote against the rights of her and her fellow plaintiffs “to have our voices heard.”

    “I feel that my rights have been violated,” she said, alluding to the claims of egregious gender discrimination in the case, “and I want to address [that] openly and honestly in a court of law.”  

    During the Senate Judiciary Committee hearing, Dukes expressed concern that women would be deterred from going forward with their employment discrimination claims against Wal-Mart, now that the court had blocked their ability to sue together as a class and halted a case that started ten years ago.

    "It is not easy to take on your own employer,” she said. “It is even more difficult when that employer is the biggest company in the world. In this country, there are many Betty Dukes who want their voices to be heard when they are denied equal pay and equal promotion. For many of these women, I am afraid that the court’s ruling will leave them without having their due day in court."

    Watch ACSblog’s video interview below, and watch the hearing here.

  • June 27, 2011
    Guest Post

    By Sarah Crawford, Director of Workplace Fairness, National Partnership for Women & Families


    The Supreme Court’s decision in Wal-Mart v. Dukes was deeply disappointing for those who care whether workers can vindicate their statutory rights. Last week’s narrow and controversial decision creates new hurdles for the 1.5 million women who are fighting the discriminatory pay and promotion practices of the nation’s largest private employer and for all workers who seek to challenge systemic employment discrimination in the future. The ruling sets a dangerous precedent that will make it easier for employers – especially large ones – to discriminate against their employees while, at the same time, making it harder for workers to come together to challenge it.

    Wal-Mart’s ten-year strategy in this case was to divide and conquer. Unfortunately, that strategy prevailed before the Supreme Court. The corporate giant convinced a narrow majority to reverse lower court decisions to certify the class of women. The Court was sharply divided on the question of whether the women should be allowed to move forward.