Elena Kagan

  • July 1, 2010
    Guest Post

    By Howard M. Wasserman, Associate Professor of Law, Florida International University College of Law

    Elena Kagan took on the judge-as-umpire/ball-and-strike meme yesterday in response to a question from Sen. Klobuchar and knocked it out almost as successfully as she could. No transcripts to be found, but here is the video and some thoughts.

     

    1) Kagan said it was apt in saying that judges, like umpires, should not have a "team in the game," should not come onto the field rooting for one team over another.

    OK answer, although she lost points for not using the Twins in her hypo in response to a question from a Senator from Minnesota.

    As I have argued before, to the extent this is what the metaphor means, it does no work. No one believes a judge should be "rooting" for one party over another and we don't need an analogy to baseball to drive the point home. Besides, no one seriously believes an umpire "roots" for one team or that a judge "roots" for one party.

  • July 1, 2010
    Guest Post

    By Geoffrey R. Stone, Edward H. Levi Distinguished Service Professor of Law, the University of Chicago Law School. Professor Stone is a member of the ACS Board of Directors.
    Senator: Are you now or have you ever been a legal progressive?
    Nominee: What's a "legal progressive"? I'm not sure I know what you mean by that term.
    Senator: I take it that's a "yes."
    Nominee: No, it's not a "yes."
    Senator: Is it a "maybe"?
    Nominee: I suppose it's possible.
    Senator: Good! You admit it's possible. Well, then, are you now or have you ever been a member of a legal progressive-front organization?
    Nominee: I don't know. If you give me an example of such an organization, I can tell you whether I've ever been a member.
    Senator: Ha! It's not that easy.
    Nominee: So it would appear.
    Senator: Have you ever provided material support to any legal progressive-front organization?
    Nominee: Sigh.
    Senator: Are any of your work associates, neighbors, friends or acquaintances - past, present or future - involved in any way with any legal progressive-front organization?
    Nominee: Senator, this is ridiculous.
    Senator: Good! Now we're getting somewhere. So, tell me, have you ever read any judicial opinions by Thurgood Marshall, William Douglas, Earl Warren or William Brennan?
    Nominee: Of course.
    Senator: They were legal progressives, right? Right?
    Nominee: If that's what you want to label them.
    Senator: Well, then, how would you label them?
    Nominee: I'd say they were Justices you don't like very much.
    Senator: Ah, ha! Do you know a man called Barack Hussein Obama?
    Nominee: I'm proud to say that I do.
    Senator: You admit that he's a legal progressive, right?
    Nominee: He can speak for himself.
    Senator: Did Thurgood Marshall call you "Shorty"?
    Nominee: He did. It was a term of affection, at least I hope it was. Certainly, it was descriptive.
    Senator: Wasn't it really your secret code name as a legal progressive co-conspirator?
    Nominee: Senator, I've never had an alias, and I have no idea what you're talking about.
    Senator: I have in my hand a list. . . .

  • June 30, 2010
    Guest Post

    By David Kairys, a law professor at Temple University, visiting professor at University of Miami, and leading civil rights lawyer. Kairys is the author of Philadelphia Freedom, Memoir of a Civil Rights Lawyer, and his other books include his co-authored leading progressive critique of the law, The Politics of Law.
    After the first two days of the Kagan confirmation hearing, I doubted I would have anything to add to my reaction to the Sotomayor hearing - It's Hard to Watch. The senators and the nominee seem once again locked in a debate over who has the most passive vision of judging, and the rules and assumptions of the debate are generally embedded in and promote conservative ideas about the substance and process of law.

    But Senator Sheldon Whitehouse (D., R.I.) riveted my attention on day three with his determination to show that Kagan and he share an intense commitment to following precedents. Kagan, who is doing quite well and will be deservedly confirmed, has been articulating as strong a regard for "deference" to prior decisions as I have seen in any confirmation hearing, or in any Supreme Court opinion, law review or scholarly conference for some time.

    Conservative justices, including former Chief Justice William Rehnquist, have been for a few decades ignoring precedents - and openly doubting the importance of precedents - as they have pretty much devastated liberal precedents whenever they can find five votes that have a different view.

    Justice O'Connor was tellingly honest about this in her majority opinion in Adarand v. Pena, the 1995 case invalidating an affirmative action plan for federal contractors although a prior case approved a similar plan only several years before. She said, "Remaining true to an intrinsically sounder doctrine established in prior cases better serves the values of stare decisis than would following a more recently decided case inconsistent with the decisions that came before it."

    I responded to this in a law review - "If stare decisis has any significance at all, it would seem to be that decisions with which the current justices disagree have some authoritative or binding effect" - and proposed that the definition of stare decisis be revised to comport with the new conservative understanding.

  • June 30, 2010
    Guest Post

    By Howard M. Wasserman, Associate Professor of Law, Florida International University College of Law
    Some themes and thoughts that jumped out at me from Day Two, the first substantive day, of the Kagan Hearings, where criticism of Justice Thurgood Marshall gave way to talk of Jews eating Chinese food on Christmas.

    1) Sen. Grassley is interested in law school curriculum reform. He pressed Kagan on why Harvard requires International Law as a 1L class, but not Con Law; after all, isn't Con Law so much more fundamental to our system than International Law? The subtext of course, was that Kagan believes international law is more important than our constitutional law--or worse, should be a part of our constitutional law. But the phrasing bordered on an accusation of lack of patriotism--you have more love/respect for the law of other countries than our own beloved (perfect) Constitution.

    Kagan (pictured with Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Patrick Leahy) gave what I thought was an interesting answer, explaining: 1) We require Legislation/Regulation course that gives 1Ls the background about the structure of the legal and governmental system; 2) Con Law is so complex that students are better able to grasp it as 2Ls and 3Ls; and 3) More students are going to do international litigation or international business transactions in their careers than are going to litigate commerce clause issues. Grassley's response was something to the effect of "Isn't Con Law fundamental to our system and shouldn't something so fundamental be a part of the 1L curriculum?" Maybe next round she can explain that there are only so many hours in the 1L year.

    2) "I would need to research that more" is this year's "I can't decide in the abstract" and "I can't opine on an issue that might come before the Court" (although we have heard some of the latter). This highlights that justices are not walking constitutional law experts who can answer every minute question off the cuff; answers to specific questions require thought and research.

  • June 14, 2010
    Guest Post

    By Erin Louise Palmer, Professorial Lecturer, American University Washington College of Law

    In a 1995 book review, Supreme Court nominee Elena Kagan stated that confirmation hearings are a "vapid and hollow charade, in which repetition of platitudes has replaced discussion of viewpoints and personal anecdotes have supplanted legal analysis." She urged senators to engage in a substantive discussion with Supreme Court nominees. Even though Kagan has retreated from this view, commentators continue to urge senators to "let it be known that they will no longer confirm any Supreme Court nominee who refuses to give substantive answers to relevant questions."

    Senators will have the opportunity to engage in substantive discussion with Kagan during her nominations hearings, which are scheduled to begin on June 28, and Republicans have vowed that the constitutionality of health care reform will be a central issue at those hearings. Senators will have the opportunity to frame the debate over the constitutionality of health care reform broadly. As Republican Senator John Barrasso stated on Fox News, "[W]here do states' rights come in, where is the role of the federal government, what can they mandate to the American people, and I'm going to want to hear answers on that." Kagan's answers to these questions will shed light on how she would eventually rule on a case involving the constitutionality of health care reform, as well as the larger issues of states' rights and the role of the federal government.

    Commentators generally believe that Kagan would strike down an attack on the constitutionality of health care reform. For example, one commentator analyzed the views of legal scholars across the political spectrum and concluded that Kagan is unlikely to alter the current composition of the Court. As noted by Randy Barnett, a constitutional law professor at Georgetown Law Center who believes there is a valid constitutional challenge to health care reform under the Constitution's commerce clause, "She's as likely to vote to uphold the law as Stevens would have been."