Eighth Amendment

  • April 24, 2012

    by Jeremy Leaming

    From time to time, perhaps once a decade, syndicated columnist George Will can say or write something that does more than trumpet right-wing talking points. A recent piece on the Supreme Court’s consideration of whether sentencing juveniles to prison with no chance of parole violates the Constitution is an example.

    Writing about cases involving juveniles who were sentenced to life in prison for crimes they committed when they were 14, Will says the judges involved had “no discretion to impose any other” sentences, and that such mandatory sentencing bars courts from taking into consideration our “society’s sense of cruelty.” This kind of thinking, however, as Will notes can undercut so-called originalism, a method of interpreting the Constitution favored by conservative judges. Toward the end of his column, Will writes that “even the ‘originalist’ Scalia, although disposed to construe the Constitution’s terms as they were understood when ratified, would today proscribe some late-18th-century punishments, such as public lashing and branding.”

    Instead of obsessively trying to figure out what the Constitution’s framers thought when they crafted the document, competent judges today consider societal developments, which are informed by science. In fact, Will writes that the high court “has accommodated what science teaches.” He cites high court opinions from 2005 and 2010 that took into account studies on the differences between youngsters and adults in limiting the use of the death penalty in cases involving juveniles.

    In 2005’s Roper v. Simmons, the justices relied in part on the differences between children and adults in concluding that the death penalty would not be imposed for crimes committed by those under 18, and later in Graham v. Florida that life sentences without parole would not be dealt to juveniles convicted of non-homicide crimes.

    Will argues that the social science should be relied on by the high court in finding that teenagers committed of violent crimes, including homicide, should not be imprisoned forever. “Denying juveniles even a chance for parole defeats the penal objective of rehabilitation,” Will writes.

    In a March 13 guest post for ACSblog law professor Kristin Henning also notes that scientific research “on adolescent development bolsters the commonsense understanding that teenagers lack self-control, are vulnerable to environmental pressures, and have fewer life experiences on which to draw in evaluating the consequences of their actions.”

  • June 4, 2010
    Guest Post

    By James Liebman, Simon H. Rifkind Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. Professor Liebman was a law clerk for Justice Stevens, 1978 - 1979. His following post is adapted from comments he made at a recent ACS event examining Justice Stevens' judicial career.
    Thank you for having me, even if I do get the role of the oldest clerk standing.

    I'll mention two of Justice Stevens' legacies, which might be described as "something new and borrowed (or shared)" and "something old and blue."

    By "new and shared" I refer to a jurisprudential innovation Justice Stevens joined Justice Stewart in developing to interpret the Eighth Amendment. The work of dozens of cases over decades, I can only briefly summarize it here.

    The Eighth Amendment presents the starkest counter-majoritarian dilemma: It obligates judges to invalidate penal laws and verdicts that impose "cruel and unusual punishment," but gives them only those four infinitely ambiguous words to use to figure out how to meet that obligation. The temptation to suffuse decisions with the judge's own religious, moral or political views is palpable.

    In a dozen cases going back to the mid-1970s and culminating in the Graham v. Florida (juvenile life without parole) decision two weeks ago, the Court came up with a solution. Justice Stevens is the only Justice who joined all of those decisions that remain good law, and in 2002 he wrote the crowning example of them - Atkins v. Virginia, invalidating the death penalty for mentally retarded offenders.

    This better solution is for the justices to inform their Eighth Amendment judgments by relying on literally thousands of decisions of coordinate democratic institutions made nationally, over years, to reveal a "modern consensus" as to the appropriate punishment for particular crimes or offenders.

    Under this approach, the Court takes a current head count and reviews the recent trends in (1) penal laws enacted by all state and federal jurisdictions; (2) how frequently sentencers actually impose a permissible punishment; and (3) the judgments of other democratic nations. Although the Court reaches its own conclusion, it does so in the shade of - and in every case so far, has done so consistently with - the decisions of these other democratic institutions.

    Justices Stewart and Stevens took this innovation a step further in addressing the constitutionality of the death penalty for murder. In their jointly authored opinion in Gregg v. Georgia, they concluded that the death penalty for murder is neither always constitutional nor always unconstitutional. They then read the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause - what looks like a substantive limitation - to impose procedural requirements that in effect enlist the nation's 50-odd criminal justice systems in generating a democratic consensus on the murders for which death is appropriate.

  • March 24, 2010
    Guest Post

    By Maj. (Ret.) Eric Montalvo, Esq., Partner at Puckett & Faraj, PC, in Washington, D.C. and former Marine Corps Judge Advocate General (JAG). Eric currently specializes in national security law, military criminal law, and military administrative law. He has handled several Military Commission cases including U.S. v. Al Bahlul, U.S. v. Hawsawi (the alleged 9/11 co-conspirator), and the case of the U.S. v. Jawad, fighting for and securing the release of one of the youngest Guantanamo Bay detainees in 2009.

    The Supreme Court on Monday declined to review the D.C. Circuit Court's ruling in Kiyemba V. Obama (Supreme Court docket 09-581). The D.C. Circuit Court held that the judiciary may not review executive branch decisions regarding when or where to transfer detainees that it is prepared to release from Guantanamo Bay. This case is now informally referred to as "Kiyemba II." Ten current Guantanamo detainees who have been cleared for release object to being returned to their country of national origin out of fear or concern for their safety and well-being.

    In Kiyemba I, the Court granted certiorari on the question of "whether a federal court exercising habeas jurisdiction has the power to order the release of prisoners held at Guantanamo Bay "where the Executive detention is indefinite and without authorization in law, and release into the continental United States is the only possible effective remedy." In the vacation and remand to the D.C. Circuit Court the Supreme Court held that "no court has yet ruled in this case in light of the new facts, and we decline to be the first to do so."

    The Court's ruling creates uncertainty in the system which is already wrought with indecision and indefinite consternation. The Supreme Court has created an exception to the general rule that a court loses jurisdiction where there is no case or controversy and a court's decision will no longer have an impact on plaintiff. The Court has recognized that some questions may involve proceedings that are frequently repetitive, but come to a conclusion prior to the normal life cycle of litigation effectively depriving the Court of jurisdiction. The Court may assume jurisdiction where there was injury that was "capable of repetition, yet evading review." The classic example of the Court utilizing this exception is in the abortion line cases. These cases present such a circumstance and allow the government to alter the justiciability issue simply by changing the facts in the 9th inning.

  • March 12, 2010

    "His silent presence on the bench has evolved into a weirdly compelling example of performance art," writes ACS board member Linda Greenhouse of Justice Clarence Thomas' persistent silence during oral argument. The fourth anniversary of Thomas' silence from the bench passed quietly last month, but not without being noticed.

    Writing in The National Law Journal, Tony Mauro recently gave new life to a Florida Law Review article entitled "Why Justice Thomas Should Speak at Oral Argument." There, freshly minted law school graduate David A. Karp argued that Thomas' silence permits him to shield anachronistic or even bizarre legal perspectives from criticism. Rather than debuting his opinions during oral argument, the piece notes, where they could be challenged by counsel and his colleagues on the bench, Thomas saves his outlook from public scrutiny until it is proferred in an official opinion.

    One such opinion, released last month, went overlooked until this week. In Wilkins v. Officer Gaddy, North Carolina inmate Jamey Wilkins alleged that he was "maliciously and sadistically" assaulted "[w]ithout any provocation" by a prison guard. The district court judge who initially reviewed Wilkins' allegations dismissed them, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed this ruling in an unpublished one-paragraph opinion. 

  • March 4, 2010
    Guest Post

    By Scott Phillips, associate professor in the Department of Sociology and Criminology, University of Denver. Phillips is author of a recent ACS Issue Brief, Hire A Lawyer, Escape the Death Penalty?

    Since the Supreme Court reinstated capital punishment in the landmark 1976 case of Gregg v Georgia, 1,195 people have been executed in the United States. Texas is often considered the epicenter of the death penalty, accounting for 449 executions. But executions are not evenly distributed across Texas. Harris County - home to Houston - is the true capital of capital punishment. With 112 executions, Harris County has executed about the same number of offenders as all of the other major urban counties in Texas, combined. In fact, if Harris County were a state it would rank second in executions after Texas.

    Perhaps not coincidentally, Harris County is also the largest jurisdiction in the nation to use the appointment method of indigent defense - meaning the judge assigns a private defense attorney to the case. Critics have argued that the appointment method is plagued by five problems: (1) flat fee compensation (defense counsel receives a standard fee regardless of the number of hours worked, so each hour of work reduces the rate of compensation and detracts from private clients); (2) the potential for insufficient support services (defense counsel must receive approval from the judge to hire support services such as investigators and experts); (3) a potential conflict of interest for the defense attorney (defense counsel's personal income depends on remaining in the good graces of the judge to secure future appointments); (4) a potential conflict of interest for the judge (the judge must balance the defense counsel's requests for support services with the county commissioner's requests to control the costs of indigent defense; the judge must also consider the possibility that generous spending on indigent defense could hurt his/her chances of re-election); and (5) questionable appointment practices (some evidence suggests that judges occasionally make appointments for inappropriate reasons, such as whether the potential appointee is a friend or campaign contributor).

    Despite such serious criticisms, researchers have not answered the most basic questions: Do procedural problems produce differences in case outcomes? Is the district attorney (DA) more likely to seek death against defendants who have appointed counsel? Is the jury more likely to impose death against defendants who have appointed counsel? Put differently, is the appointment method merely procedurally flawed or truly a matter of life and death?