D.C. v. Heller

  • October 18, 2010
    The Supreme Court's landmark rulings on the Second Amendment provided little guidance to lower federal courts on how to interpret challenges to gun control regulations, authors of a new ACS Issue Brief maintain.

    In "The Standardless Second Amendment," Tina Mehr, an attorney fellow at the Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office, and Adam Winkler, a professor of law at UCLA School of Law, note, "Traditionally, the Supreme Court articulates a standard of review for lower courts to apply to laws burdening fundamental rights."

    But in D.C. v. Heller, where the Supreme Court found that owning a gun is an individual right protected by the Second Amendment, and then held that the right applies to the states in McDonald v. Chicago, the high court "declined to establish a clear standard or test for the Second Amendment," they write.

    Since Heller and McDonald, lower federal courts have dealt with more than 200 cases challenging gun control regulations, and while the courts methods for interpreting the laws have varied, most have been upheld as "public safety exceptions," that do not violate the Second Amendment, Mehr and Winkler write.

    But as the authors note, Justice Stephen Breyer's dissent in McDonald includes a prescient observation. Breyer predicted confusion among the federal courts, writing, "Does the right to possess weapons for self-defense extend outside the home? To the car? To work? What sort of guns are necessary for self-defense? Handguns? Rifles? Semiautomatic weapons?"

    See the authors' Issue Brief here. For more discussion on Second Amendment rights and gun control regulation, watch video of a recent ACS panel discussion here.

  • March 4, 2010

    By Adam Winkler, Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law. Professor Winkler signed an amicus brief filed in McDonald v. City of Chicago supporting incorporation through the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

    [Part I of "Supersizing the Second Amendment?" is available here.]

    So why do I still say that gun control advocates are also seemed to be big winners?

    Because the Justices seemed to think that, regardless of incorporation, state and local governments would retain wide leeway to enact gun control. The only words used as much as "fundamental" and "implicit in ordered liberty" in the argument were "reasonable regulation."

    Numerous Justices expressed their support for the idea that the Second Amendment did not prohibit reasonable regulation of firearms. Justice Kennedy said that lawmakers still "have substantial latitude and ample authority to impose reasonable regulations." Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg said that she "thought that Heller allowed for reasonable regulation." Justice Scalia didn't use that catchphrase, but went out of his way to say that Heller "was very careful not to impose" severe limits on the federal government "precisely because it realized that" gun violence "is a national problem."

    There are two ways to think about "reasonable regulation." The first is what I've long endorsed: the Second Amendment should be governed by the formal "reasonable regulation" standard uniformly used in state constitutional law. Forty-two states have constitutional protections for the individual right to bear arms and all of them apply a deferential standard by this name. Under that test, any regulation will be allowed to stand so long as it doesn't effectively destroy or nullify the individual's right to have a gun for self-defense. Some types of weapons can be banned so long as individuals have access to others. Applying this test, almost all gun control survives.

  • March 3, 2010

    By Adam Winkler, Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law. Professor Winkler signed an amicus brief filed in McDonald v. City of Chicago supporting incorporation through the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

    Yesterday, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in the latest big gun case, McDonald v. City of Chicago. The Court will decide whether the individual right to keep and bear arms recognized in 2008's D.C. v. Heller extends to the states. I was at oral argument and there seemed to be two big winners: gun rights advocates and gun control advocates.

    The gun rights folks, like the NRA, seemed poised to win the case. Of the five Justices who voted with the majority in Heller, all appeared to be inclined to hold that the right to bear arms is a "fundamental" right such that it applies to state laws. (Well, not all of the five: Justice Clarence Thomas said nothing, extending his streak of silent oral arguments that dates back to 2006.)

    Just like in the Heller oral argument, Justice Anthony Kennedy, the swing vote, showed his cards. "If [the right to bear arms is] not fundamental, then Heller is wrong, it seems to me." Chief Justice John Roberts said, "I don't see how you can read Heller and not take away from it the notion that the Second Amendment, whether you want to label it fundamental or not, was extremely important to the framers in their view of what liberty meant."

    As Paul Clement, representing the NRA said, the question of whether the right to bear arms was fundamental or not was "remarkably straightforward." The fact that Clement was there at all was a surprise. The NRA was not formally a party to the suit. More striking still was that Clement was representing the NRA. After Clement, then serving as Solicitor General, filed a brief in Heller suggesting that D.C.'s handgun ban might be constitutional, gun rights activists branded him a traitor. Now he is their lawyer.

  • February 24, 2010
    Guest Post

    By Lawrence Rosenthal, Professor of Law, Chapman University School of Law. Professor Rosenthal filed an amicus brief on behalf of the U.S. Conference of Mayors in McDonald v. City of Chicago in support of Chicago.

    In its 2008 decision in District of Columbia v. Heller, a closely divided Supreme Court, applying what the majority characterized as "the original understanding of the Second Amendment," invalidated D.C.'s prohibition on the possession of handguns. Relying on eighteenth-century sources, the Court defined the Second Amendment right to "keep and bear arms" as "the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation," and held that a prohibition on handguns was unconstitutional. The Court cautioned, however, that the Second Amendment is only a limitation on the powers of Congress, and reserved decision on the question whether it also applied to state and local governments by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court noted that its nineteenth-century decisions had refused to apply the Second Amendment to state and local laws, but added that these cases "did not engage in the sort of Fourteenth Amendment inquiry required by our later cases."

    The Court will now confront the applicability of the Second Amendment to state and local laws in McDonald v. City of Chicago. At issue is the constitutionality of Chicago's handgun ban. Chicago and its amici rely on the approach to incorporation of the first eight amendments within the Fourteenth that the Court has taken for nearly a century - asking whether a particular right is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Under this approach, many of the rights in the first eight amendments have been incorporated within the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause - but not all.

  • February 19, 2010

    The widely anticipated Second Amendment case pending before the Supreme Court is creating strange bedfellows, reports Jess Bravin in The Wall Street Journal. Bravin writes that, "as gun-rights groups battle each other over how to argue the case, ... some left- and right-leaning legal theorists unite over how to interpret the Constitution."

    As noted at ACS's Supreme Court Preview for the Court's current term, some progressive advocates support incorporation of the Second Amendment to the states in McDonald v. Chicago. They see McDonald as an opportunity to revive the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause, which was neutered by the Supreme Court in the 1873 Slaughterhouse Cases. Since then, incorporting rights to bar infringement by state action has been a burden carried by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, which speaks merely to deprivations of rights, as opposed to the broader language of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.

    As to the Second Amendment, the Supreme Court left the question of incorporation for another day in the 2008 D.C. v. Heller decision, which -- for the first time -- recognized the right to bear arms as an individual right, rather than a right bestowed upon members of a militia collectively. And that day will be before the Court soon in McDonald.