cruel and unusual punishment

  • April 24, 2012

    by Jeremy Leaming

    From time to time, perhaps once a decade, syndicated columnist George Will can say or write something that does more than trumpet right-wing talking points. A recent piece on the Supreme Court’s consideration of whether sentencing juveniles to prison with no chance of parole violates the Constitution is an example.

    Writing about cases involving juveniles who were sentenced to life in prison for crimes they committed when they were 14, Will says the judges involved had “no discretion to impose any other” sentences, and that such mandatory sentencing bars courts from taking into consideration our “society’s sense of cruelty.” This kind of thinking, however, as Will notes can undercut so-called originalism, a method of interpreting the Constitution favored by conservative judges. Toward the end of his column, Will writes that “even the ‘originalist’ Scalia, although disposed to construe the Constitution’s terms as they were understood when ratified, would today proscribe some late-18th-century punishments, such as public lashing and branding.”

    Instead of obsessively trying to figure out what the Constitution’s framers thought when they crafted the document, competent judges today consider societal developments, which are informed by science. In fact, Will writes that the high court “has accommodated what science teaches.” He cites high court opinions from 2005 and 2010 that took into account studies on the differences between youngsters and adults in limiting the use of the death penalty in cases involving juveniles.

    In 2005’s Roper v. Simmons, the justices relied in part on the differences between children and adults in concluding that the death penalty would not be imposed for crimes committed by those under 18, and later in Graham v. Florida that life sentences without parole would not be dealt to juveniles convicted of non-homicide crimes.

    Will argues that the social science should be relied on by the high court in finding that teenagers committed of violent crimes, including homicide, should not be imprisoned forever. “Denying juveniles even a chance for parole defeats the penal objective of rehabilitation,” Will writes.

    In a March 13 guest post for ACSblog law professor Kristin Henning also notes that scientific research “on adolescent development bolsters the commonsense understanding that teenagers lack self-control, are vulnerable to environmental pressures, and have fewer life experiences on which to draw in evaluating the consequences of their actions.”

  • June 4, 2010
    Guest Post

    By James Liebman, Simon H. Rifkind Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. Professor Liebman was a law clerk for Justice Stevens, 1978 - 1979. His following post is adapted from comments he made at a recent ACS event examining Justice Stevens' judicial career.
    Thank you for having me, even if I do get the role of the oldest clerk standing.

    I'll mention two of Justice Stevens' legacies, which might be described as "something new and borrowed (or shared)" and "something old and blue."

    By "new and shared" I refer to a jurisprudential innovation Justice Stevens joined Justice Stewart in developing to interpret the Eighth Amendment. The work of dozens of cases over decades, I can only briefly summarize it here.

    The Eighth Amendment presents the starkest counter-majoritarian dilemma: It obligates judges to invalidate penal laws and verdicts that impose "cruel and unusual punishment," but gives them only those four infinitely ambiguous words to use to figure out how to meet that obligation. The temptation to suffuse decisions with the judge's own religious, moral or political views is palpable.

    In a dozen cases going back to the mid-1970s and culminating in the Graham v. Florida (juvenile life without parole) decision two weeks ago, the Court came up with a solution. Justice Stevens is the only Justice who joined all of those decisions that remain good law, and in 2002 he wrote the crowning example of them - Atkins v. Virginia, invalidating the death penalty for mentally retarded offenders.

    This better solution is for the justices to inform their Eighth Amendment judgments by relying on literally thousands of decisions of coordinate democratic institutions made nationally, over years, to reveal a "modern consensus" as to the appropriate punishment for particular crimes or offenders.

    Under this approach, the Court takes a current head count and reviews the recent trends in (1) penal laws enacted by all state and federal jurisdictions; (2) how frequently sentencers actually impose a permissible punishment; and (3) the judgments of other democratic nations. Although the Court reaches its own conclusion, it does so in the shade of - and in every case so far, has done so consistently with - the decisions of these other democratic institutions.

    Justices Stewart and Stevens took this innovation a step further in addressing the constitutionality of the death penalty for murder. In their jointly authored opinion in Gregg v. Georgia, they concluded that the death penalty for murder is neither always constitutional nor always unconstitutional. They then read the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause - what looks like a substantive limitation - to impose procedural requirements that in effect enlist the nation's 50-odd criminal justice systems in generating a democratic consensus on the murders for which death is appropriate.

  • November 9, 2009
    The Supreme Court heard oral argument in two Florida cases involving whether life sentences for juveniles, with no chance of parole, violate the Constitution's ban on cruel and unusual punishment. The Associated Press reports that the justices appear "sharply divided" over the issue. The news service notes that Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg said that "because of immaturity, you can't really judge a teenager at the point of sentencing," but that Justice Samuel Alito seemed to side with Florida, which is arguing that that the juveniles' punishment does not raise constitutional concerns.

    In analysis for SCOTUSblog, Lyle Denniston writes that Chief Justice John Roberts "made a strong - and repeated - effort on Monday to recruit a majority of the Supreme Court in favor of giving juveniles more chance to use their age to challenge life-without-parole prison terms, as an alternative to a flat constitutional bar against ever imposing that sentence." Denniston explains that Roberts' "alternative would apparently be a declaration that the Constitution's Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment required judges to take the offender's youth into account in setting any sentence for term of years, then judge whether that sentence was ‘proportional' both for an offender of that age and for the particular crime."

    Sullivan v. Florida involves the sentence of Joe Sullivan, who as 13 when the state sentenced him for life without parole for a sexual assault conviction. Graham v. Florida involves Terrance Graham who was sentenced at 17 after violating his probation. The Washington Post reports that nationwide more than 100 people "are serving life sentences without parole for crimes they committed as juveniles that did not result in a death ...."

    In a guest post for ACSBlog, Harvard Law School Professor Charles Ogletree analyzed the cases and concluded, in part, that the Supreme Court should affirm its "reasoning put forth in Roper v. Simmons, which struck down capital punishment for juveniles. Roper established what every parent knows and what science confirms: adolescents are fundamentally different from adults in maturity and judgment."