Constitutional Interpretation and Change

  • November 19, 2013
    Guest Post
    by Jo-Ann Wallace, President and CEO, National Legal Aid and Defender Association
     
    Fifty years ago, a unanimous Supreme Court held in Gideon v. Wainwright that “in our adversary system of criminal justice, any person hauled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him.” This holding was described in the opinion to be “an obvious truth,” a recognition that Gideon’s clear and powerful proclamation – protecting the fundamental human right to liberty – is one that resonates with us all.
     
    But the mandate was not self-executing, and far too little planning or coordination was undertaken to translate the legal pronouncement into consistent practice. The fundamental constitutional right of the Sixth Amendment was left to fall victim to the inertia of the “machinery of criminal justice” – a counterweight poignantly exposed in Gideon -- and the political realities of each state and county. The failure to act on a federal level has reversed the tides of history to the very problem Gideon attempted to correct. That is: local political entities cannot be solely relied upon to ensure the constitutional right to counsel is properly structured and funded. As a result, the Attorney General declared on the anniversary of the Gideon decision: “It’s time to reclaim Gideon’s petition – and resolve to confront the obstacles facing indigent defense providers.”
     
    The criminal justice system is an eco-system in which the component parts are inextricably intertwined. If police officers arrest more individuals, prosecutors have more cases to process and public defense organizations have more people for whom to provide legal representation. However, while other system actors have mechanisms to prioritize cases or to exercise discretion over which cases to pursue, the Constitution affords public defenders no such “release valve” for controlling workload. This reality exacerbates funding inequities that exist at the state and local levels.
  • November 15, 2013
    Guest Post
    by Hillary B. Farber, Associate Professor of Law, University of Massachusetts School of Law, and author of a forthcoming article on the domestic deployment of drones in Vol.64 of the Syracuse Law Review
     
    Editor’s Note: On Tuesday, November 19, ACS is hosting a panel discussion on constitutional protections of privacy in a time of rapid technological innovation and increasing surveillance, featuring Dahlia Lithwick of Slate, Chris Calabrese of the ACLU, Stephen Vladeck of American University Washington College of Law and others.  We hope that you will join us for this important and timely conversation.  If you are interested in attending, please RSVP here.

    By the end of this decade it is estimated that 30,000 drones will occupy national airspace.  In 2012, Congress passed the Federal Aviation Administration Modernization and Reform Act, which ordered the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to promulgate regulations for the integration of drones into the national airspace. Law enforcement agencies around the country have purchased drones and are testing the new technology. As of May 2013, four Department of Justice (DOJ) divisions had acquired drones: the FBI; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF); Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA); and, the U.S. Marshals Service.  On June 19, FBI Director Robert Mueller told Congress that the FBI has deployed drones for surveillance on domestic soil and is developing guidelines for their future law enforcement use. 

    As compared with manned airplanes and helicopters, unmanned aerial surveillance bears unique risks to society's expectation of privacy. Drones, properly called unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), are practically invisible at altitudes where a manned aircraft could be seen with the naked eye. Smaller UAVs operate almost silently, making them significantly harder to detect. Moreover, UAVs can be equipped with sensory enhancing technologies such as thermal imaging devices, facial recognition software, Wi-Fi sniffers, GPS systems, license plate readers and cameras that can provide high resolution images from significant altitudes.  This type of aerial surveillance presents the potential for intrusion of privacy far more pervasive than the flyover of a plane or helicopter.  Drone surveillance has the potential to enable users to gather unprecedented amounts of information about people and retain it well into the future.
  • November 8, 2013
    Guest Post
    by J. Amy Dillard, Associate Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law
     
    Early next year, the Court will hear argument in Hall v. Florida, a case that many practitioners have awaited since 2002. That year, the Court issued its opinion in Atkins v. Virginia, wherein it held that “the mentally retarded should be categorically excluded from execution.” The 6-3 decision in Atkins marked the great divide between those on the Court who embrace the concept of evolving standards of decency and those who eschew itfor determining which defendants may be put to death and which should be categorically excluded. The Court declined to define the parameters of mental retardation and left that task to the states. Some state legislatures, like Florida, have adopted a constrained definition of mental retardation, relying heavily on an I.Q. of 70 as a bright line.
     
    A fact often overlooked in Atkins is that the majority and Justice Scalia, in dissent, agreed that some people, due to their lack of cognitive capacity, should be excluded from the penalty of death. The majority reached its conclusion after a careful examination of the trends in state legislatures to exclude mentally-retarded defendants from execution. Justice Scalia reached his conclusion after several paragraphs of constitutional hermeneutics, whereby he ascertained that profoundly mentally-retarded defendants were excluded from execution at the time of the framing of the Constitution and its Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. Where the majority and Justice Scalia were at odds was in defining which people fit into the category of defendants who should be categorically excluded from execution. But both the majority and Justice Scalia use the term “mental retardation” as a kind of marker to describe a group of people who must be excluded from the penalty of death.
     
    In 2002, when the Court decided Atkins, the term “mentally retarded” had already fallen from favor among medical and educational professionals, who favored the term “intellectual disability” to describe a person with limited cognitive capacity and limited adaptive functioning. With the publication of the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders in May 2013, the American Psychiatric Association has jettisoned the now-pejorative “mental retardation” and replaced it with “intellectual disability disorder,” a subset of neurocognitive disorders, which include dementia. The APA first embraced the term “mental retardation” in 1961, in an effort replace older, pejorative terms such as “idiocy.”
  • November 7, 2013
    Guest Post
    by Leslie C. Griffin, William S. Boyd Professor of Law at UNLV Boyd School of Law
     
    Yet another appeals court has issued an opinion about a for-profit corporation’s challenge to the contraceptive mandate of the Affordable Care Act. The mandate requires employee health care plans to contain preventive care coverage that includes FDA-approved contraceptive methods and sterilization procedures. This time, the D.C. Circuit ruled in Gilardi v. HHS that the Gilardis, two Catholic brothers who own Freshway Foods and Freshway Logistics and oppose contraception, sterilization and abortion, are entitled to a preliminary injunction because they are likely to succeed on their claim that the mandate violates their free exercise rights as well as the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which prohibits the federal government from “substantially burden[ing] a person’s exercise of religion.” The D.C. Circuit’s action is consistent with the Tenth Circuit’s ruling that the arts-and-crafts chain Hobby Lobby demonstrated that the mandate substantially burdened its exercise of religion, but at odds with rulings against secular, for-profit companies and for the government by the Third and Sixth Circuits.
     
    One aspect of Gilardi is distinctive. Although the Third and Sixth Circuits, ruling for the government, decided that for-profit, secular corporations cannot exercise religion under either the Free Exercise Clause or RFRA, the Tenth Circuit, in support of Hobby Lobby, determined that such corporations are persons who can exercise religion under RFRA. The D.C. Circuit offered a hybrid. Although two judges – Janice Rogers Brown and A. Raymond Randolph – ruled that the Freshway Companies are not persons under either the Free Exercise Clause or RFRA, they nonetheless held that the Gilardis could bring suit because the Freshway Companies are closely held corporations with only the two brothers as owners and shareholders. In that context, the court decided, the brothers suffered a concrete and personal injury and could likely prove that their religion was substantially burdened by the mandate.
     
    The diverse circuit court rulings risk turning the contraceptive mandate issue into a debate over corporate form and institutional rights. If corporations engage in speech under the First Amendment – Citizens United – why can’t they exercise religion?
  • November 6, 2013
    Guest Post
    by Mark Tushnet, William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law, Harvard Law School
     
    Editor’s Note: This Thursday, November 7, the ACS Pittsburgh Lawyer Chapter and the University of Pittsburgh School of Law Student Chapter will host a Supreme Court Preview featuring Professor Tushnet and Professor Jules Lobel of the University of Pittsburgh School of Law.  To hear more from Professors Tushnet and Lobel about Bond and the rest of the Court’s October Term 2013, please RSVP here.
     
    The Roberts Court is properly described as a business-friendly Court. It’s also a Court that is sort of friendly toward federalism, as the commerce clause holding in the Affordable Care Act decision – though thankfully not the ultimate outcome – shows. But, federalism and business interests sometimes come into conflict. Businesses operating on a national scale often hope that Congress will preempt state regulations, so that they face only a single national rule rather than fifty or more regulations different in every state and sometimes in a bunch of cities. And, when Congress doesn’t make it clear that its statutes preempt state regulations, businesses want the Court to interpret federal statutes to be preemptive.
     
    On Tuesday, the Court heard oral argument in Bond v. United States, a bizarre case on its facts that raises important questions about the scope of Congress’s power to enact statutes implementing treaties. The arguments suggested that some of the Court’s conservatives, and perhaps Justice Breyer, were inclined to say that Congress couldn’t use its power to implement treaties to reach truly local activities (although the precise formulation of the restriction they might adopt wasn’t clear).
     
    Everyone seemed to agree, though, that the Bill of Rights limited the power to implement a treaty. And, whatever you might say about the treaty power and federalism, that does indeed seem to be a consensus position.
     
    The consensus might be on a collision course with business interests, though, for the same reason that businesses sometimes favor preemption and national regulation over state regulation. In a forthcoming article in the Harvard Law Review, Marvin Ammori describes what he learned from general counsels at major commercial disseminators of information over the internet. For them, Ammori reports, Congress is basically just one state legislature or city council trying to regulate their activity along with a whole bunch of other legislatures – parliaments in France and Japan, and everywhere else. And, just as with preemption, these businesses might want to replace a system of lots of different regulations with one regulatory system.