by J. Amy Dillard, Associate Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law
Early next year, the Court will hear argument in Hall v. Florida, a case that many practitioners have awaited since 2002. That year, the Court issued its opinion in Atkins v. Virginia, wherein it held that “the mentally retarded should be categorically excluded from execution.” The 6-3 decision in Atkins marked the great divide between those on the Court who embrace the concept of evolving standards of decency and those who eschew itfor determining which defendants may be put to death and which should be categorically excluded. The Court declined to define the parameters of mental retardation and left that task to the states. Some state legislatures, like Florida, have adopted a constrained definition of mental retardation, relying heavily on an I.Q. of 70 as a bright line.
A fact often overlooked in Atkins is that the majority and Justice Scalia, in dissent, agreed that some people, due to their lack of cognitive capacity, should be excluded from the penalty of death. The majority reached its conclusion after a careful examination of the trends in state legislatures to exclude mentally-retarded defendants from execution. Justice Scalia reached his conclusion after several paragraphs of constitutional hermeneutics, whereby he ascertained that profoundly mentally-retarded defendants were excluded from execution at the time of the framing of the Constitution and its Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. Where the majority and Justice Scalia were at odds was in defining which people fit into the category of defendants who should be categorically excluded from execution. But both the majority and Justice Scalia use the term “mental retardation” as a kind of marker to describe a group of people who must be excluded from the penalty of death.
In 2002, when the Court decided Atkins, the term “mentally retarded” had already fallen from favor among medical and educational professionals, who favored the term “intellectual disability” to describe a person with limited cognitive capacity and limited adaptive functioning. With the publication of the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders in May 2013, the American Psychiatric Association has jettisoned the now-pejorative “mental retardation” and replaced it with “intellectual disability disorder,” a subset of neurocognitive disorders, which include dementia. The APA first embraced the term “mental retardation” in 1961, in an effort replace older, pejorative terms such as “idiocy.”
Yet another appeals court has issued an opinion about a for-profit corporation’s challenge to the contraceptive mandate of the Affordable Care Act. The mandate requires employee health care plans to contain preventive care coverage that includes FDA-approved contraceptive methods and sterilization procedures. This time, the D.C. Circuit ruled in Gilardi v. HHS that the Gilardis, two Catholic brothers who own Freshway Foods and Freshway Logistics and oppose contraception, sterilization and abortion, are entitled to a preliminary injunction because they are likely to succeed on their claim that the mandate violates their free exercise rights as well as the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which prohibits the federal government from “substantially burden[ing] a person’s exercise of religion.” The D.C. Circuit’s action is consistent with the Tenth Circuit’s ruling that the arts-and-crafts chain Hobby Lobby demonstrated that the mandate substantially burdened its exercise of religion, but at odds with rulings against secular, for-profit companies and for the government by the Third and Sixth Circuits.
One aspect of Gilardi is distinctive. Although the Third and Sixth Circuits, ruling for the government, decided that for-profit, secular corporations cannot exercise religion under either the Free Exercise Clause or RFRA, the Tenth Circuit, in support of Hobby Lobby, determined that such corporations are persons who can exercise religion under RFRA. The D.C. Circuit offered a hybrid. Although two judges – Janice Rogers Brown and A. Raymond Randolph – ruled that the Freshway Companies are not persons under either the Free Exercise Clause or RFRA, they nonetheless held that the Gilardis could bring suit because the Freshway Companies are closely held corporations with only the two brothers as owners and shareholders. In that context, the court decided, the brothers suffered a concrete and personal injury and could likely prove that their religion was substantially burdened by the mandate.
The diverse circuit court rulings risk turning the contraceptive mandate issue into a debate over corporate form and institutional rights. If corporations engage in speech under the First Amendment – Citizens United – why can’t they exercise religion?
by Mark Tushnet, William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law, Harvard Law School
Editor’s Note: This Thursday, November 7, the ACS Pittsburgh Lawyer Chapter and the University of Pittsburgh School of Law Student Chapter will host a Supreme Court Preview featuring Professor Tushnet and Professor Jules Lobel of the University of Pittsburgh School of Law. To hear more from Professors Tushnet and Lobel about Bond and the rest of the Court’s October Term 2013, please RSVP here.
The Roberts Court is properly described as a business-friendly Court. It’s also a Court that is sort of friendly toward federalism, as the commerce clause holding in the Affordable Care Act decision – though thankfully not the ultimate outcome – shows. But, federalism and business interests sometimes come into conflict. Businesses operating on a national scale often hope that Congress will preempt state regulations, so that they face only a single national rule rather than fifty or more regulations different in every state and sometimes in a bunch of cities. And, when Congress doesn’t make it clear that its statutes preempt state regulations, businesses want the Court to interpret federal statutes to be preemptive.
On Tuesday, the Court heard oral argument in Bond v. United States, a bizarre case on its facts that raises important questions about the scope of Congress’s power to enact statutes implementing treaties. The arguments suggested that some of the Court’s conservatives, and perhaps Justice Breyer, were inclined to say that Congress couldn’t use its power to implement treaties to reach truly local activities (although the precise formulation of the restriction they might adopt wasn’t clear).
Everyone seemed to agree, though, that the Bill of Rights limited the power to implement a treaty. And, whatever you might say about the treaty power and federalism, that does indeed seem to be a consensus position.
The consensus might be on a collision course with business interests, though, for the same reason that businesses sometimes favor preemption and national regulation over state regulation. In a forthcoming article in the Harvard Law Review, Marvin Ammori describes what he learned from general counsels at major commercial disseminators of information over the internet. For them, Ammori reports, Congress is basically just one state legislature or city council trying to regulate their activity along with a whole bunch of other legislatures – parliaments in France and Japan, and everywhere else. And, just as with preemption, these businesses might want to replace a system of lots of different regulations with one regulatory system.
by Mark Tushnet, William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law, Harvard Law School
Editor’s Note: This Thursday, November 7, the ACS Pittsburgh Lawyer Chapter and the University of Pittsburgh School of Law Student Chapter will host a Supreme Court Preview featuring Professor Tushnet and Professor Jules Lobel of the University of Pittsburgh School of Law. To hear more from Professors Tushnet and Lobel about Noel Canning and the rest of the Court’s October Term 2013, please RSVP here.
Courts of appeals panels with majorities appointed by Republican presidents have teed up a problem for the Supreme Court: Are the Court’s Republican appointees devotees of originalism or executive power – or, will they use originalism as an excuse for supporting executive power when the executive is a Republican but for opposing it when the executive is a Democrat?
National Labor Relations Board v. Noel Canning involves the president’s power to make recess appointments. Filibusters over nominations to the National Labor Relations Board had paralyzed the NLRB (aided and abetted by a Supreme Court decision holding that the NLRB couldn’t act through panels of fewer than three members), when Republicans in the Senate refused to go forward with nominations to fill three vacancies on the five-member board. Republican Senators also refused to allow a vote on the nomination of Richard Cordray to head the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau because they opposed the Bureau’s existence (and by law, the Bureau’s powers were quite limited in the absence of an agency head). President Obama responded by seizing on a technical “recess” in the Senate – a series of days out of session punctuated by minutes-long “pro forma” sessions – as the basis for making recess appointments to the NLRB and the CFPB.
With its new “members” on board, the NLRB entered an order against Noel Canning, which appealed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that President Obama didn’t have the power to make the recess appointments because the recess appointment power allowed him to make appointments only when the Senate was between its major sessions – basically, between the adjournment of the House of Representatives pending an election and the new House’s convening. (A majority of the court of appeals also held that the recess appointment power extended only to vacancies that arose during that same period – not to vacancies that extended into a session of a sitting Congress.)
“[I]n our adversary system of criminal justice, any person hauled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him.” Fifty years ago this past March, Justice Hugo Black wrote those words for a unanimous Supreme Court in holding that the Sixth Amendment provided Clarence Earl Gideon with the right to counsel, despite his indigent status, as he stood trial in Florida for allegedly breaking and entering a Panama City pool hall.
Gideon v. Wainwright forever changed American jurisprudence, ensuring that guilt or innocence in a criminal matter would be fairly adjudicated, regardless of a defendant’s economic circumstance. But as states and the federal government have dramatically slashed their budgets over the last several years, the promise enshrined by Gideon has come under increased threat as public defenders have seen theirbudgets bear a significant brunt of these cuts.
Congressman Ted Deutch (D-Fla.) introduced this week a bill to help remedy the effect of these cuts and ensure the promise of Gideon. Entitled the “National Center for the Right to Counsel Act,” the measure would establish a private, non-profit center to provide “financial support to supplement…funding for public defense systems” as well as provide “financial and substantive support for training programs that aim to improve the delivery of legal services to indigent defendants.” The Act would also create geographically-based “regional backup service centers” which would provide public defenders with access to investigators and sentencing mitigation experts as well as information on available financial grants. A nine-person “State Advisory Council” would be formed in each state to monitor the quality of public defender services and ensure compliance with the Act.