Common Law

  • June 10, 2009
    Guest Post


    By Heather Gerken, J. Skelly Wright Professor of Law, Yale Law School & former Clerk to Justice David Souter (1995-96)

    Adam Gopnik once observed that "Paris is a struggle between its pompous official culture and its matchless ... commonplace civilization." That description applies even more aptly to the Supreme Court. Officially, it is an institution cloaked in formality. It is also an institution that takes itself extremely seriously, with its strongest opinions pronounced when it thinks another institution - Congress in passing Commerce Clause legislation or the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, or the Florida Supreme Court in its rulings during the Bush v. Gore litigation - is treading on the court's privileges. Only the court's pompous official culture could explain why the majority in Bush v. Gore - in which the court shut down the Florida recount in an opinion now widely considered an embarrassment - could have claimed that their intervention was an "unsought responsibility." This is not an institution cursed with self-awareness.

    Justice Souter, however, is at the core of the court's matchless commonplace civilization, something that may explain why he dissented in each of those cases. He is a judge's judge, a courtly lawyer who manages to be both a serious intellectual and a pragmatic decision-maker. He reads everything, is open to new ideas and new arguments, and yet is not swayed by the political winds that waft through the court.

  • June 8, 2009
    Guest Post

    William D. Araiza, Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School & former Clerk to Justice David Souter (1991-92)

    To many Americans, David Souter reflects the perfect image of a judge: ascetic, bookish, removed from explicitly political tumult, a wearer of three-piece suits. Many of those who have read and thought about his body of work on the Supreme Court reach the same conclusion, but based on deeper criteria. Justice Souter really is a judge, in the deepest Anglo-American sense of the word - that is, a judge in the common law tradition.

    This is perhaps best illustrated by his most important personal statement on the Due Process Clause, his concurrence in the 1997 "right to die" case, Washington v. Glucksberg. As a case implicating the substantive, but unenumerated, rights that clause guarantees, Glucksberg presents the type of issue that is most susceptible to a common law approach. Justice Souter's opinion reflects perhaps the finest application of that approach in any opinion issued by a justice in the modern era.