collective bargaining

  • May 5, 2015
    Guest Post

    by Bill Lurye, General Counsel, and Matt Stark Blumin, Associate General Counsel, at American Federation of State County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME)

    On February 9, less than a month into his first term as governor of Illinois, Bruce Rauner issued an executive order barring state employee unions from collecting fair share fees, thus unilaterally transforming Illinois into a right-to-work state for state employees.  He justified this extreme act by arguing that, in his opinion – though contrary to Supreme Court precedent dating to 1977 – such fees violate the First Amendment.  Rauner’s anti-union executive order is a blatantly illegal power grab, and unions have filed suit to overturn it.

    As is the case in many states, Illinois’ public sector labor relations statute expressly authorizes collective bargaining agreements allowing unions to collect fair share fees, and over 40,000 state employees are covered by collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) that include fair share fee provisions.  Yet, despite strong separation of powers language in the Illinois Constitution that prevents him from legislating, Governor Rauner has declared that he will not turn over any of the contractually owed fair share fees to unions, no matter what the duly enacted state labor law statute says.

    First, some background on fair share fees in Illinois.  Just like a private sector union under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), a public sector union under Illinois law is required to represent every employee in a unionized bargaining unit whether or not the employee is a member of the union.  This means that the unions have to do lots of costly work on behalf of nonmembers, like negotiating the CBA fairly on the nonmembers’ behalf and handling any grievances they have.  Fair share fees represent the cost to the union of providing those services to nonmembers, and nothing more.  (Members who pay full union dues additionally fund other work by the union, such as lobbying or political donations, that fair share fees don’t cover.)  As even Justice Scalia has recognized in his concurrence in Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Association, fair share fees “allow the cost of . . . the union’s statutory duties to be fairly distributed; they compensate the union for benefits which ‘necessarily’ – that is, by law – accrue to the nonmembers.”

  • May 1, 2015
    Guest Post

    by Ann C. Hodges, Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law

    In a blog post following the Supreme Court’s decision last term in Harris v. Quinn, I predicted that the constitutionality of union fair share fees would soon be back at the Court. It took little prescience to make such a prediction and indeed, the plaintiffs in Friederichs v. California Teachers’ Association worked mightily to get the case on the Court’s docket as quickly as possible. The Court will decide whether to grant cert in the near future.

    Although this issue will no doubt return repeatedly to the Court, it should decline to hear the case. The 1977 decision of the Court in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education correctly concluded that fair share fees are constitutional, and the decision should not be disturbed. Abood allows the union to charge for its mandated representational duties, but not for political expenditures. In this context, the objectors’ first amendment interests are reduced and the interests of the government employer that has entered into an agreement with the union enhanced. Justice Alito suggested in Harris, however, that all union activity in the government sector implicates the highest first amendment interests. This is at odds with the Court’s cases on the first amendment interests of public employees following Abood.

    In recent years, the Court has held that the government has stronger interests in restraining speech when it acts as an employer. Accordingly, when employees speak pursuant to their job duties, their speech is unprotected. Additionally, when an employee’s speech is about an internal workplace grievance, it is similarly unprotected by the first amendment. It is precisely these grievances that the union is obliged to handle for all employees regardless of membership.  If speaking about the grievance is unprotected, why is compelling the unwilling employee to pay for this otherwise unprotected speech an interference with first amendment rights?  Further, Justice Alito’s Harris opinion suggests that when one employee asks for a raise, the speech is unprotected but when the union asks for a raise on behalf of all employees, it is high order political speech which the employee cannot be compelled to support.  As Justice Kagan pointed out in the Harris dissent, the fact that it takes more money to pay multiple employees does not transform the character of the speech when the substance, asking for a raise, is the same.

    There are many other reasons for the Court to deny cert. Abood has been settled law for almost 40 years, Justice Alito’s efforts notwithstanding. As Justice Kagan ably pointed out in Harris, principles of stare decisis, including the reliance interests of thousands of employers and unions and millions of employees, counsel restraint. Moreover, as I have argued in earlier posts, fair share agreements are an essential pillar of the system of labor relations that has served our country well for 80 years.  And finally, as pointed out in the opposition to cert, the record in this case has not been developed, as the plaintiffs rushed to accept Justice Alito’s invitation for an opportunity to overrule Abood.

  • July 11, 2014
    Guest Post

    by Catherine Fisk, Chancellor’s Professor of Law, University of California Irvine School of Law

    As I have argued elsewhere, in striking down an Illinois law authorizing the state to require unionized home care workers to pay their fair share of the cost of union representation, the Supreme Court in Harris v. Quinn disregarded its longstanding rule that it does not decide questions of state law and failed to reconcile the result with the First Amendment rights of government workers or the Court’s other cases on when compulsory fees constitute compelled speech. 

    First, under Illinois law, government-paid and government-regulated home health-care workers are state employees. Justice Alito’s majority opinion in Harris disregarded state law when it invented a vague new category of non-“full-fledged” government employees who have greater First Amendment rights than other workers to refuse to pay the costs of union representation.

    Second, if under Garcetti v. Ceballos, and United States Civil Service Commission v. National Association of Letter Carriers, government employees have no First Amendment rights to speak on the job on matters of public concern or to engage in political activity on their own time, why do some government employees have a First Amendment right to refuse to pay for services that their union is legally required to provide them?

    Third, the Court failed to explain why fair share fees differ from compulsory payment of lawyers’ bar dues, which the Court approved in Keller v. California State Bar.  To quote Keller, substituting only “home care workers” for “legal profession,” Illinois has an “interest in regulating [home health-care workers] and improving the quality of [home health-care] services.”

    Yet there is a way forward. As I argue with Ben Sachs, where unions are unable to require objecting workers to pay fees – whether it’s in right-to-work states or in work situations that fall under Harris v. Quinn – we should get rid of the rule of exclusive representation. Non-fee payers wouldn’t be subject to the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, they wouldn’t have to interact with their employer through a collective agent, and they wouldn’t be required to pay anything to a union they didn’t vote for. Unions, for their part, would be required to represent only those workers who actually want representation.  Another possibility is that governments wishing to bargain with a single representative on behalf of their workers could agree to pay the cost of the representational services on behalf of all workers. No worker would then be compelled to pay anything to a union and the dissenting workers’ First Amendment rights would not be violated.

  • January 21, 2014

    by Jeremy Leaming

    The U.S. Supreme Court in Harris v. Quinn may not overturn precedent, seriously disrupting public employee unions, but such a possibility was “at least on the table” during today’s oral argument in the case.

    In an argument recap, SCOTUSblog’s Lyle Denniston reported that “atmospherics” of today’s oral argument “suggested strongly that this case has very large potential.”

    The case involves Illinois recognizing a single union for its home health care workers. Health care workers are not forced to join the union (in this case SEIU), but all members are required to pay fees for the union to engage in collective bargaining. A few state health care workers represented by an anti-union outfit called the National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation are challenging that practice embodied in the National Labor Relations Act and supported by high court precedent.  

    Defending precedent on public employee unions was U.S. Solicitor General Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., who Denniston reported, “talked as if he, too, perceived the case to be a severe test of public worker collective bargaining.”

    Nearing end of oral argument, Verrilli urged the justices to uphold its 1977 precedent set in the case Abood v. Detroit Board of Education. That case has stood “for forty years, and is entirely consistent with the First Amendment jurisprudence regarding the government as employer,” he said.

    Representing Illinois and the union, Paul M. Smith, partner at Jenner & Block and a member of the ACS Board of Directors, discussed implications of the case with NPR before oral argument.

    If the high court were to upset precedent and decide, “You can’t have an exclusive representative union, that would be a stake in the heart of not just unions in the public sector but all unions,” Smith told NPR.

    For more analysis of the case see the ACSblog series on Harris v. Quinn.

  • December 11, 2013
    Guest Post

    by Charlotte Garden, an Assistant Professor at Seattle University School of Law, where she is co-advisor to the student ACS chapter.

    The past few Terms have been tumultuous for First Amendment doctrine, and this Term is shaping up to be another First Amendment blockbuster, with cases like Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius and McCutcheon v. FEC on deck. But for labor unions, another First Amendment case has potential to be the biggest game changer: In January, the Court will hear argument in Harris v. Quinn, a First Amendment case about union representation in the public sector. At stake are two important questions:  first, the extent to which states can allow homecare workers who are paid by the state to be represented by a union; and second, whether public employees have a constitutional right to refuse to pay for the costs of union representation. Thus, while Harris involves an Illinois statute that allows homecare workers to bargain collectively, it has the potential to affect the structure of public sector bargaining throughout the country. 

    Illinois is deeply vested in improving working conditions for homecare providers – not only do better wages and working conditions mean more stability in the profession (which is good for consumers), but the state also administers many of the programs that fund homecare workers. Under these programs, while consumers or their guardians choose their own homecare workers and direct their day-to-day work, Illinois determines the number of hours they can work, defines minimal standards, creates training opportunities, and sets the workers’ wages and issues their paychecks, among other job parameters. This division of responsibility between state and consumer sets the stage for Illinois’s decision to allow homecare workers to form a union, and is a primary reason for the legal challenge in Harris.

    Specifically, elected officials made the proprietary decision that homecare workers – a group that defies the traditional hallmarks of a centralized workforce – are entitled to the same right as myriad other workers: the right to choose whether to form a union. The scope of that right, however, is carefully circumscribed by statute. The majority-approved union may bargain only with the state (not with consumers), and only over the economic conditions that the state controls, such as wages, benefits, training, and certain other working conditions.