by Samuel A. Marcosson, Professor of Law, University of Louisville Louis D. Brandeis School of Law
*This post is part of ACSblog’s symposium on the consolidated marriage equality cases before the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court’s forthcoming decision in Obergefell v. Hodges brings the issue of marriage equality once again to a place of prominence in the national conversation. Unsurprisingly, the intensity of opposition from those with religious convictions against “changing” the definition of marriage to include gay and lesbian couples has only grown, fueled by the prospect that the Court may extend its decision in United States v. Windsor and hold that the Constitution requires all 50 states to treat same-sex couples equally.
The gathering storm is easy to see. A federal court ruling striking down Alabama’s ban on marriage recognition was met with a furious, theologically-driven backlash led by state supreme court Chief Justice Roy Moore, who explained his opposition to marriage equality by saying, “It takes away the very definition ordained of God. A different definition destroys the definition of marriage.” On the legislative front, Indiana passed a “Religious Freedom Restoration Act” (RFRA) at the urging of anti-gay religious activists, carving out protection for those with religious objections aghast at even the potential they might be compelled by anti-discrimination laws to participate in marriage ceremonies. Assuming that the pure rejectionist camp is unsuccessful in trying to engage in 1950s-style “massive resistance” to a pro-equality ruling in Obergefell, the real issue comes down to what, if any, sort of religious exemptions should be considered for those who do not wish to participate in the weddings of same-sex couples.