Caperton v. A.T. Massey

  • April 18, 2011

    In light of increasingly “ugly” and “expensive” judicial elections such as the recent Wisconsin Supreme Court justice race, states should be permitted to impose more limits on judicial campaign spending than they do on other types elections, write University of California, Irvine law school dean Erwin Chemerinsky and Hofstra law professor James J. Sample in The New York Times.

    “More than 7 in 10 Americans believe campaign cash influences judicial decisions. Nearly half of state court judges agree. Never before has there been so much cash in the courts,” the op-ed explains.

    Chemerinsky and Sample urge advocates for abolishing judicial elections to “come to terms” with the reality that “judicial elections are here to stay,” and instead focus their energy on “incremental changes” that will reduce the influence of money on judges. (A New York Times editorial published last week urged the use of a merit panel rather than election to select Wisconsin’s judges.)

    They explain that while states are permitted to impose limits on direct contributions by persons to candidates, states are not permitted to set restrictions on outside spending. Such indirect spending to candidates is ever-increasing: In 2008 for the first time, spending by non-candidate groups nationally exceeded spending by candidates on the ballot.

    “In the legislative and executive offices, it is accepted that special-interest lobbying and campaign spending can influence votes; but that is anathema to our most basic notions of fair judging,” they write. “Thus, the Supreme Court should hold that the compelling interest in ensuring impartial judges is sufficient to permit restrictions on campaign spending that would be unconstitutional for nonjudicial elections.”

    Read the full article here. For more on judicial selection, see an ACSblog video interview with Justice at Stake Executive Director Bert Brandenburg on Caperton v. Massey, a 2009 Supreme Court decision on judicial conflict of interest referenced in the op-ed.

  • June 8, 2009
    The Supreme Court has ruled that an elected West Virginia judge should have disqualified himself from hearing a case involving a campaign contributor. In Caperton v. A.T. Massey, the Court ruled 5-4 that, "Under our precedents there are objective standards that require recusal when ‘the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable. Applying those precedents, we find that, in all the circumstances of this case, due process requires recusal."

    In the case, the coal company A.T. Massey was fighting a West Virginia verdict that found the company liable for fraudulent actions involving contracts and awarded the plaintiffs in the case $50 million in compensatory and punitive damages. Before Massey's challenges to the verdict reached the West Virginia Supreme Court, its chief executive, Don Blankenship, donated to Brent Benjamin's campaign for a seat on the state's high court.

    Today's majority opinion, written by Justice Anthony Kennedy, noted Blankenship's extensive efforts on behalf of Benjamin. "In addition to contributing the $1,000 statutory maximum to Benjamin's campaign committee, Blankenship donated almost $2.5 million to ‘And For The Sake Of The Kids,' a political organization formed" to help elect Benjamin. Blankenship, the high court noted, spent more than $500,000 on "independent expenditures - for direct mailings and letters and soliciting donations as well as television and newspaper advertisements" in support of Benjamin.

    Benjamin was successful and was a West Virginia Supreme Court justice when Massey's appeal of the jury verdict reached the court. Justice Benjamin, however, refused to disqualify himself from presiding in the case and in fall 2007 voted to reverse the $50 million verdict against the coal company. Benjamin subsequently voted to uphold the reversal, again refusing to recuse himself from the case.

    Writing for the majority in Caperton, Kennedy concluded "that there is serious risk of actual bias - based on objective and reasonable perceptions - when a person with a personal stake in a particular case had significant and disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the case by raising funds or directing the judge's election campaign when the case was pending or imminent. The inquiry centers on the contribution's relative size in comparison to the total amount of money contributed to the campaign, the total amount spent in the election, and the apparent effect such contribution had on the outcome of the election. Applying this principle, we conclude that Blankenship's campaign efforts had a significant and disproportionate influence in placing Justice Benjamin on the case."

    Chief Justice John Roberts filed a dissent joined by Justices Scalia, Thomas and Alito. Roberts accused the majority of fashioning a new rule to guide elected judges on recusal that "provides no guidance to judges and litigants about when recusal will be constitutionally required. This will inevitably lead to an increase in allegations that judges are biased, however, groundless those charges may be."

    Richard L. Hasen, a law professor at Loyola Law School, analyzes Caperton in a blog post for ACSblog and the Election Law Blog.