Brown v. Board of Education

  • October 4, 2011

    by Nicole Flatow

    In the third session of the American Constitution Society’s webcast series, “What the Constitution Means and How to Interpret It,” former NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund President Theodore M. Shaw will delve into the Constitution’s principle of equality.

    During a 30-minute live-streamed discussion, Shaw, a law professor at Columbia University and of counsel at Fulbright & Jaworski, will discuss the seminal case Brown v. Board of Education, gender equality, and congressional enforcement of civil rights. Following a 15-minute presentation, Shaw will take questions for 15 minutes.

    Other webcasts in the nine-part series on understanding the Constitution will focus on democracy, criminal justice and liberty. Each session, led by a preeminent scholar, mirrors a chapter in the ACS-published book, Keeping Faith with the Constitution, by Pamela Karlan, Goodwin Liu and Christopher H. Schroeder.

    Both lawyers/law students and non-lawyers are encouraged to participate and interact with questions, tweets and Facebook comments. If you are on Twitter, please join ACS both during and after tomorrow’s session at the hashtag #ACSclass.

    The Oct. 5 webcast will occur at 12 p.m. EDT and is free and open to everyone.  To see the full schedule and accompanying readings, visit the web page for “What the Constitution Means and How to Interpret It.”

  • April 15, 2010
    BookTalk
    Mendez v. Westminster
    School Desegregation and Mexican-American Rights
    By: 
    Philippa Strum

    By Philippa Strum, Senior Scholar, Woodrow Wilson Center

    In 1943, a decade before Brown v. Board of Education was decided by the Supreme Court, Soledad Vidaurri walked up to a schoolhouse door in Orange County, California. Mrs. Vidaurri had come to the Westminster Main School, in the heart of citrus-growing country, to enroll her two daughters and her niece and two nephews-Sylvia, Gonzalo Jr. and Jerome Méndez -in the neighborhood public school.

    The Vidaurri girls were welcomed to the school. They were light-skinned and their part-French father's last name sounded acceptably European. The Méndez children, however, were visibly darker and had a Mexican name. They would have to go to the "Mexican" school a few blocks away.

    "No way," an outraged Mrs. Vidaurri exclaimed, and marched all the children home to the farm on which they lived. Her brother and sister-in-law, Gonzalo and Felícitas Méndez, after petitioning school authorities unsuccessfully, brought suit against the school district. Mendez v. Westminster became the first case in which a federal court declared that "separate but equal" was not equal at all.

  • February 3, 2010

    Largely premised on the unanimous Brown v. Board of Education decision, which galvanized the civil rights movement, the U.S. Supreme Court's reputation for protecting minorities' rights is not often challenged. But, according to Harvard Law Professor Michael Klarman, that conventional wisdom is a myth.

    In "Has the Supreme Court Been Mainly a Friend or a Foe to African Americans?" at SCOTUSblog, Klarman argues that, over the course of its history, the Court has repeatedly proven to be "regressive force on racial issues."

    By way of example, Klarman observes: 

    Before the Civil War, the Court sustained the constitutionality of federal fugitive slave laws, invalidated the laws of northern states that were designed to protect free blacks from kidnapping by slavecatchers, voided Congress's effort to restrict the spread of slavery into federal territories, and denied that even free blacks possessed any rights "which the white man was bound to respect." After the Civil War, the Court freed the perpetrators of white-on-black lynchings and racial massacres, and it invalidated a federal law designed to secure blacks equal access to public accommodations. Well into the twentieth century, the Court sustained the constitutionality of state-mandated racial segregation and various southern state measures for disenfranchising African Americans. 

  • November 11, 2009

    Adam Liptak revisits a recent discussion between Supreme Court Justices Stephen Breyer and Antonin Scalia, which included debate over methods of interpreting the Constitution. During an event at the University of Arizona, Scalia defended "originalism" as the proper way to interpret the Constitution and Breyer countered that the Constitution would likely prove useless in today's society if it were so rigidly interpreted. Liptak maintained in his article that the two "know how to get under each other's skin, and they punctuated their debate with exasperation, eye-rolling and venomous sarcasm." (C-SPAN has video of the debate here.)

    But what really irks Scalia and other supporters of his brand of originalism, is, Liptak reports, discussion of Brown v. Board of Education, the high court decision that concluded that school segregation violated the 14th Amendment. Brown, Liptak writes, is "hard to square with Justice Scalia's commitment to originalism, the theory of constitutional interpretation that says judges must apply the original understanding of the constitutional text." 

    Liptak continued:

    Brown presents originalists with a problem. The weight of the historical evidence is that the people who drafted, proposed and ratified the 14th Amendment from 1866 to 1868 did not believe themselves to be doing away with segregated schools.

    Yet Brown is widely thought to be a moral triumph. A theory of constitutional interpretation that cannot account for Brown is suspect if not discredited.

    As Liptak reported, not too long into their discussion at the University of Arizona, Breyer prodded Scalia to square originalism with the outcome of Brown.

    "Where would you be with school desegregation?" Breyer asked Scalia.

    But Scalia, Liptak reports, failed to provide a direct answer and instead turned his attention to the earlier high court decision in Plessy v. Ferguson, saying he would have sided with the dissent in that case. The majority in Plessy ruled that legalized segregation did not violate the Constitution.

    Breyer maintains, as he did during the Arizona debate, that the words of the Constitution, if they are to have relevance today, cannot be interpreted in the framework of the 18th century. In a 2007 dissent in Parents Involved v. Seattle School District 1, Justice Breyer wrote:

    For much of this Nation's history, the races remained divided. It was not long ago that people of different races drank from separate fountains, rode separate buses, and studied in separate schools. In this Court's finest hour, Brown v. Board of Education challenged this history and helped to change it. For Brown held out a promise. It was a promise embodied in three Amendments designed to make citizens of slaves. It was the promise of true racial equality - not as a matter of fine words on paper, but as a matter of everyday life in the Nation's cities and schools. It was about the nature of a democracy that must work for all Americans. It sought one law, one Nation, one people, not simply as a matter of legal principle but in terms of how we actually live.

    In their book, Keeping Faith with the Constitution, published by ACS earlier this year, authors Goodwin Liu, Pamela Karlan and Christopher Schroeder write in Chapter Three:

    The unanimous Brown opinion authored by Chief Justice Earl Warren provides a rich account of constitutional interpretation and the meaning of equality as a constitutional value. What stands out in the Court's reading of the Fourteenth Amendment is its explicit rejection of originalism in favor of an interpretative approach sensitive to historical change and social context. Through Brown, we come to understand the constitutional equality not as an abstract formula or a narrow idea limited to by history, but as a moral principle that guides our public values and responds to the lived reality of contemporary social practices.

    See more from Keeping Faith here.