Anwar al-Awlaki

  • July 23, 2012
    Guest Post

    By Stephen I. Vladeck, professor of law and associate dean for scholarship at American University Washington College of Law


    There’s quite a lot to say about the damages suit filed last week by the American Civil Liberties Union and the Center for Constitutional Rights on behalf of the family of Anwar al-Aulaqi and his 16-year-old son Abdulrahman, both of whom were killed (along with a third U.S. citizen) in a pair of drone strikes in Yemen in the fall 0f 2011. And although the suit raises a host of important and thorny legal questions of first impression, including whether a non-international armed conflict existed in Yemen at the time of the strikes and whether a U.S. citizen can claim a substantive due process right not to be collateral damage in an otherwise lawful military operation, I suspect my Lawfare colleague Ben Wittes is quite correct that this case won’t actually resolve any of them. Instead, as Ben suggests, it seems likely that the federal courts will refuse to recognize a “Bivens” remedy — a cause of action for damages arising directly out of the constitutional provision allegedly offended (e.g., the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause), and that the plaintiffs will therefore be unable to state a valid cause of action.

    As I explain below, such a result would unfortunately perpetuate a fundamental — and increasingly pervasive — misunderstanding of Bivens. Moreover, even if plaintiffs will ultimately lose suits like Al-Aulaqi because of various defenses — including qualified immunity, the state secrets privilege, and the political question doctrine — getting the Bivens question right still matters. To the extent that the specter of judicial review deters governmental misconduct down the road, Bivens suits can and should have a salutary effect on the conduct of U.S. national security policy — so long as they’re properly understood in the first place.

  • October 10, 2011
    Guest Post

    By Joanne Mariner, Director, Hunter College Human Rights Program


    Anwar al-Awlaki, recently killed by a drone strike in Yemen, was a talented terror propagandist. “Intelligent, sophisticated, Internet-savvy, and very charismatic” is how a Yemeni counterterrorism official described him last year.

    The real question, though, is whether his role was much more than that, as the U.S. government has claimed. Al-Awlaki, President Obama said on the day of the strike, “was the leader of external operations for al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula,” a man who had taken charge of “planning and directing efforts to murder innocent Americans.” It was al-Awlaki’s operational responsibilities, not simply his oratorical skills, which were said to have sealed his fate.

    But it’s worrying that no one without access to classified information can meaningfully respond to the president’s assertions. Whatever evidence supported the government’s decision to kill al-Awlaki is secret; indeed, even the process by which this evidence was assessed has not been officially explained.

    Unlike the verdict in a criminal case, where the evidence against the defendant has been subject to challenge in adversarial proceedings before a court, the decision to kill al-Awlaki rested on undisclosed and untested grounds. For the American public, with no access to the underlying intelligence, this essentially means taking the administration’s claims on faith.

    One doesn’t have to reflect long on recent history to conclude that this is a problem. It was untested and erroneous intelligence that purported to justify the 2003 invasion of Iraq. It was also, though somewhat less notoriously, faulty intelligence that led the CIA in 2004 to kidnap German-Lebanese citizen Khaled el-Masri and hold him for five months in a secret prison in Afghanistan. And according to several federal judges it was shaky and unreliable intelligence that underlied the Bush administration’s decision to hold innocent men like Turkish citizen Murat Kurnaz in military detention at Guantanamo for years.

  • May 14, 2010

    The Obama administration's inclusion of Anwar al-Awlaki, an American citizen and terrorism suspect, on a target list for killing by the CIA, is garnering attention from legal experts and media.

    The New York Times reports:

    The notion that the government can, in effect, execute one of its own citizens far from a combat zone, with no judicial process and based on secret intelligence, makes some legal authorities deeply uneasy.

    To eavesdrop on the terrorism suspect who was added to the target list, the American-born radical cleric Anwar al-Awlaki, who is hiding in Yemen, intelligence agencies would have to get a court warrant. But designating him for death, as C.I.A. officials did early this year with the National Security Council's approval, required no judicial review.

    "Congress has protected Awlaki's cellphone calls," said Vicki Divoll, a former C.I.A. lawyer who now teaches at the United States Naval Academy. "But it has not provided any protections for his life. That makes no sense."