Affirmative Action

  • August 16, 2012
    Guest Post

    By David H. Gans, Director of the Human Rights, Civil Rights and Citizenship Program at the Constitutional Accountability Center. This is a cross-post from CAC's Text & History Blog.


    On Monday, Constitutional Accountability Center filed an amici curiae brief in the Supreme Court in Fisher v. University of Texas, urging the Court to reaffirm that the Fourteenth Amendment permits the sensitive use of race to foster equality in education and to uphold the University of Texas’ use of race as one factor in its holistic admissions policy. The brief is available here. Our brief, filed on behalf of CAC and six of the nation’s most prominent constitutional scholars – Bruce Ackerman, Vikram Amar, Jack Balkin, Burt Neuborne, James Ryan, and Adam Winkler – demonstrates that the text and history of the Fourteenth Amendment permit government to take race into account in certain circumstances in order to ensure equality of opportunity for all persons regardless of race.

    For the last four decades, the fight over the constitutionality of race-conscious measures to foster equality has been reduced to a sound-bite – whether the Fourteenth Amendment is “color-blind” – with conservatives claiming the mantle of Justice Harlan’s dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson to argue that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits virtually all use of race by the government. Progressives, all too often, have missed their most powerful rejoinder: the Fourteenth Amendment’s text and history. As our brief explains, not only does the Amendment’s text permit government to enact race-conscious policies to fulfill the Constitution’s promise of equality, but the Framers of the Amendment themselves enacted many such measures.

    The Constitution is certainly color-blind to a certain extent. In writing the broadest textual guarantee of equality in our Constitution, the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment very deliberately rejected limitations on the scope of the Equal Protection Clause, sweeping men and women of all races and classes into its coverage. As the text of the Equal Protection Clause makes clear, every person can invoke its universal guarantee of equality. It was precisely for this reason that Justice Harlan declared in Plessy that the “Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.” But color-blind does not mean blind to reality.  Both in writing the text and in enacting race-conscious measures to foster equality, the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment resoundingly rejected the notion that the government could not take race into account in order to ensure equality of opportunity for all persons regardless of race. Faced with the task of fulfilling President Lincoln’s promise of a “new birth of freedom” and integrating African Americans into the civic life of the nation, the Framers recognized that the Constitution could not be simplistically colorblind. 

  • February 24, 2012
    Guest Post

    By Emily Martin, vice president and general counsel at the National Women’s Law Center. This commentary is cross-posted at NWLC's blog. 


    On Tuesday, the Supreme Court agreed to hear Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, a challenge to the affirmative action plan used by the University of Texas at Austin. Currently, the university allocates over 80 percent of its slots to students who graduate in the top ten percent of their public high school. For the final 20 percent, the university considers many factors, including grades, a personal essay, character, special talents, socio-economic circumstances, and race. As the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held last year in upholding the constitutionality of the plan, UT-Austin carefully crafted its plan to comply with the Supreme Court’s 2003 ruling in Grutter v. Bollinger, which held that consideration of race in public university admissions could properly forward the compelling interest in diversity in education.

    One of the great promises of public education, at every level, is its potential to create a student body drawn from a wide variety of backgrounds and perspectives, enhancing the educational experience of all students. As the Supreme Court recognized in Grutter, “Numerous studies show that student body diversity promotes learning outcomes, and better prepares students for an increasingly diverse workforce and society, and better prepares them as professionals.”

    Racial diversity within schools breaks down stereotypes that feed and perpetuate inequality. This is particularly important for women because many of the most poisonous racial stereotypes are also gender stereotypes — for example, that black women are promiscuous, that Asian women are subservient, or that Latina women are domestics. Membership within a diverse student body challenges gender stereotypes that harm women (and men) of color: when a student’s classrooms are full of numerous exceptions to every stereotypical rule, the rules lose their power to define people for that student. Moreover, racial diversity may also help break down gender stereotypes more broadly. Studies indicate that diverse schools encourage students to reject stereotypes in general, and to view individuals as individuals, rather than as representatives of particular group characteristics.

  • February 21, 2012

    by Jeremy Leaming

    The U.S. Supreme Court’s conservative majority is seemingly preparing to provide a potentially fatal blow to affirmative action policy. After the high court announced earlier today that it would consider Fisher v. Texas, a white college student’s challenge to the University of Texas’ affirmative action policy, The Huffington Post’s Mike Sacks wrote, that affirmative action was heading back to the high court “and this time its prospects for survival are poorer than ever.”

    As Sacks notes, in 2003 the Supreme Court upheld by a 5-4 vote in Grutter v. Bollinger that the University of Michigan law school’s affirmative action program was constitutional. The law school’s policy, in part, was based on a longstanding commitment to “one particular type of diversity,” that is, “racial and ethnic diversity with special reference to the inclusion of students from groups which have been historically discriminated against, like, African-Americans, Hispanics and Native Americans, who without this commitment might not be represented in our student body in a meaningful manner.”

    The lower federal court in the Grutter case found Michigan’s use of race as a factor in admissions was unconstitutional. The federal appeals court, however, overruled that opinion.

    Retired Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor wrote the majority opinion in Grutter. She noted that part of the reason Michigan used race as a factor in higher education admissions policies was to create a richer educational experience. She said the majority would defer to the school’s “educational mission.” O’Connor noted that the briefs supporting the school “substantiated” the “educational benefits” of its affirmative action policy. Those friend-of-the-court briefs, O’Connor wrote included “expert studies and reports entered into evidence at trial,” and “numerous studies show[ing] that student body diversity promotes learning outcomes, and ‘better prepares students for an increasingly diverse workforce and society, and better prepares them as professionals.’”

    O’Connor, moreover, said the law school had not employed a rigid quota system in trying to achieve its goal of bringing underrepresented minorities into the fold. “The Law School’s current admissions program considers race as one factor among many, in an effort to assemble a student body that is diverse in ways broader than race,” she wrote.

  • August 26, 2011
    Guest Post

    This post is part of an ACSblog symposium in honor of the unveiling of the Martin Luther King Jr. National Memorial. The author, Theodore M. Shaw, is of counsel at Fulbright & Jaworski, a professor at Columbia Law School, and an American Constitution Society Board Member. He was director-counsel and president of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund between 2004 and 2008.


    On August 28, 2011, forty-eight years to the day Martin Luther King, Jr. delivered from the steps of the Lincoln Memorial his famed speech known for its “I have a dream” refrain, Americans are honoring him with a statue on the National Mall. Already honored with a national holiday, King will be forever enshrined with Washington, Jefferson, and Lincoln on some of our nation’s most hallowed ground. This high honor is a special point of pride for black Americans, given Dr. King’s role in the Civil Rights Movement of the fifties and sixties, and his stature as a martyr in the struggle for racial and economic justice.  

    For most Americans, King’s iconic status has grown over the years to the point that it obscures the realities of who he was, and for what he stood. In spite of his many admirers, King did not enjoy universal support during his lifetime. Now that he is safely dead, his legacy is often misappropriated by those who were or who would be opposed to his life’s work. Ideological conservatives opposed to affirmative action in higher education and voluntary elementary and secondary school desegregation have shamelessly and dishonestly distorted his legacy and invoked his name in support of their agenda. For many, his hopeful vision of an America in which his children would no longer be ”judged by the color of their skin but by the content of their character” means an adherence to a kind of color-blindness that would block all efforts targeted at helping African Americans. For them, color-blindness is the sum total of all he said and did. Yet King’s dream was not of a simplistic color-blindness; he was a strong advocate of affirmative action and supporter of school desegregation. While King’s powerfully eloquent articulation of his dream for America has resounded over the decades since the August, 1963 March on Washington, he said and stood for so much more.

  • July 13, 2009
    Guest Post

    By Lawrence F. Keller, Associate Professor, Cleveland State University

    The upcoming confirmation hearings on Sotomayor highlight three trouble issues. I share my assessment of the issues to understand better both the process of judicial appointments and the person qua judge.

    First, confirmation hearings need to deal more substantively with the nature of law in a republic than with specific legal decisions. I realize these are partisan appointments but a hearing is an opportunity to educate the public. Ideally, such an approach could expose the fallacy that judicial activism is contrary to the nature of our legal system. The beauty and strength of the common law was how judges crafted law, often involving the community and certainly building on community norms. They did this while dealing with real cases and real people. As a result their law was often more thoughtful than the work of partisan legislators. Moreover, judges also dealt seriously with both precedence and coherence for the body of the law itself. When the law became rigid and needed reform, legislators had a coherent body of rules and regulations developed over time from community based principles from which to craft remediation. This helped sharpen the legislative process itself.