Administrative law

  • July 1, 2015
    BookTalk
    Under the Bus
    How Working Women Are Being Run Over
    By: 
    Caroline Fredrickson

    by Caroline Fredrickson, president of the American Constitution Society for Law & Policy

    When she was 18, my great-grandmother Mathilda Olafsson left Sweden to escape poverty, sailing alone in steerage to Boston where she was lucky to find a job as a maid. Like countless immigrant women, Mathilda was subject to sexual harassment, underpayment, and abusively long hours. As she endured backbreaking labor and meals consisting of her employers’ scraps, she hoarded her meager earnings, working toward a better life.

    Growing up, I found Mathilda’s story ‒ so far in the past, so different from today ‒ inspirational. But sadly, even after the enactment of various labor laws and worker protections, many working women are still enduring the abuses that my great-grandmother suffered. The truth is, domestic workers and workers in other undervalued, female-dominated professions have little more legal protection than Mathilda and her peers had.

    Americans tend to think working conditions aren't so bad today; the U.S. has prohibited discrimination against women, mandated equal pay for equal work, and adopted family leave legislation. But few Americans know that the progressive laws designed to improve wages and working conditions left out large portions of the working population. That’s because during the New Deal, President Franklin Roosevelt struck bargains with “Dixiecrats,” trading the rights of African American and female workers for votes in support of a minimum wage, overtime, and the right to join a union.

    As a result, certain workers – including nannies, housekeepers, farmworkers, small business employees, part-time workers, independent contractors, and temporary workers – have almost zero protection under U.S. law. Not coincidentally, these workers are disproportionately female and people of color.

  • July 1, 2015
    Guest Post

    by Justin Pidot, Associate Professor of Law, University of Denver Sturm College of Law

    In its last decision of the 2014 term, the Supreme Court decided Michigan v. EPA, ruling that EPA must consider costs before deciding to regulate toxic air pollutants from power plants.  Lisa Heinzerling has identified the many questions that remain open in the wake of the Court’s decision.  And Dan Farber and Ann Carlson also provide insightful commentary on the meaning of the decision. As all three suggest, the lasting practical effect of the Court’s decision on mercury and other toxic emissions from power plants remains to be seen.

    Without retreading ground that has been well-covered already, I want to offer two observations.  First, I want to offer some (very cautious) optimism that the legal rule provided by the Michigan v. EPA decision has little effect.  Read broadly, the decision could require agencies in many contexts to consider costs before regulating.  I’m not convinced, however, that the decision necessarily tells us anything about when agencies must consider costs. 

    The Court offers several reasons that EPA unreasonably interpreted its authority to regulate power plants without accounting for the billions of dollars of costs such regulation might impose: 

    First, the Court explains that the toxic air pollution provisions of § 112 of the Clean Air Act differentiate between power plants and other stationary sources.  For sources other than power plants, the Act essentially allows EPA to consider, at most, health and environmental effects.  In contrast, the Act requires EPA to regulate power plants only if “necessary and appropriate.”  This contrast, the Court offers, must mean something.

    Second, the Court opines that appropriate regulation generally requires an agency to think about both the benefits of regulation and its cots.  This suggests, that could be read to presumptively require agencies to consider costs in making regulatory decisions. 

  • June 29, 2015
    Guest Post

    by Lisa Heinzerling, the Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center

    In Michigan v. EPA, the Supreme Court reviewed the Environmental Protection Agency's decision to regulate power plants under section 112 of the Clean Air Act. Section 112 is the provision regulating toxic air pollutants, such as mercury. The question before the Court was whether EPA reasonably interpreted the Clean Air Act to allow EPA to decline to consider costs in deciding whether to regulate power plants under section 112. The Court held that it was not reasonable to interpret the Act in this way. Thus, from the Court's decision, we know that EPA must consider costs in deciding whether to regulate power plants under section 112. There are, however, important questions that remain:

    1. We do not yet know what happens to EPA's rule while EPA does the analytical work the Court has required of it. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the D.C. Circuit and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The case will go back to the D.C. Circuit for it to figure out how to address the Supreme Court's ruling. Certainly the case will eventually have to return to EPA; the D.C. Circuit itself will not attempt to undertake the consideration of costs the Supreme Court has ordered. But what happens between the time the case goes back to EPA and the time EPA makes a decision in light of the Supreme Court's ruling? That depends on the D.C. Circuit. The court will need to decide whether to remand or to vacate and remand; that is, whether to simply send the matter back to EPA while leaving the rule in place, or undo the rule in the interim. The D.C. Circuit has lately remanded quite a few agency rules, especially environmental rules, without vacating them. Given the amount of discretion left to the agency by the Supreme Court's decision (see below), and the fact that EPA has previously stated that the rule is justified even in light of its costs, I believe there is a strong case for remand without vacatur.

    2. We do not yet know how EPA will or should take costs into account in revisiting the issue of whether to regulate power plants under section 112. The Court left this matter to EPA, with the qualification that the agency's treatment of costs must be, "[a]s always, within the limits of reasonable interpretation." The Court emphasized that it was not holding that the agency must conduct "a formal cost-benefit analysis in which each advantage and disadvantage is assigned a monetary value." Beyond that, the Court gave little hint of the kind of analysis it would approve. At times, it seemed to be looking for a judgment about whether costs were disproportionate to benefits; at other points, it seemed to highlight cost-effectiveness analysis. These are different inquiries, and it will now be up to EPA – at least in the first instance – to decide which of several cost-sensitive frameworks to use. My sense from the Court's opinion is that as long as EPA considers costs in some fashion, whether through formal cost-benefit analysis or something far more qualitative, it will be sufficient.

    3. We do not yet know which benefits EPA may consider for purposes of the additional analysis the Court has required. Although EPA conducted a formal cost-benefit analysis of the rule for purposes of White House regulatory review, and that analysis included billions of dollars in "ancillary" benefits due to reductions in air pollutants not covered by the air toxics program, the Court did not decide whether these ancillary benefits may be included in the analysis yet to come. That is, the Court said, "a point we need not address." Several justices seemed skeptical of these benefits at oral argument, and there is some (small but discernible) textual basis for excluding them. A number of commentators have argued that EPA must be able to consider such benefits because they are included in standard economic practice and because an OMB circular on cost-benefit analysis, dating from the George W. Bush administration, admits them in the cost-benefit framework. I don't think economic practice and an OMB circular will decide this question, but I do think it would be quite aggressive for a court to tell EPA which regulatory benefits count.

  • April 15, 2015
    Guest Post

    by Lisa Heinzerling, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center

    Most would agree that the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) is one of our least effective federal environmental laws.  It is a welcome development, then, that Congress has begun seriously to consider legislation to reform this statute.  However, a prominent TSCA reform bill now circulating in Congress – the Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st Century Act, sponsored by Tom Udall and David Vitter – may stymie meaningful federal regulation of chemicals while preempting the state laws that have stepped into the breach opened by the failure of TSCA.  This would leave us even worse off than we are today.

    It is common ground among experts in the law of toxic substances control that a major reason for the failure of TSCA is the paralyzing effect of a 1991 federal court decision – Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA – invalidating the Environmental Protection Agency’s ban on asbestos.  There, the court piled on stifling analytical requirements as prerequisites for regulatory action on toxic chemicals and applied strikingly strict scrutiny to EPA's evaluation of the costs and benefits of banning asbestos.  So large does this decision loom in the failed history of TSCA that any law aiming to reform TSCA will almost certainly be viewed with close attention to how the law purports to change the features of TSCA that spelled doom for EPA's ban on asbestos in Corrosion Proof Fittings.

    Here is the rub: In two significant respects, the Udall-Vitter bill does not change the features of TSCA that undid EPA’s asbestos ban.  The bill retains the same overall formulation of the safety standard to be achieved (protection against “unreasonable risks”) and the same standard for judicial review (“substantial evidence”) that together brought down the ban on asbestos.  To retain these features of TSCA even though they proved so damaging in the litigation over asbestos is to signal that the Udall-Vitter formula for TSCA reform is not so reformative after all.

    For the safety standard, the Udall-Vitter bill pairs a standard of "no unreasonable risk of harm to health or the environment" with an instruction to EPA not to consider "cost or other nonrisk factors" in determining whether a risk is “unreasonable.”  For many years, courts have interpreted “unreasonable,” when used in health, safety and environmental statutes, to permit a balancing of costs and benefits.  It is thus confusing to pair the term “unreasonable risk” with an injunction not to consider costs and other factors besides risk.  Yet the Udall-Vitter bill does not provide further clarity; it nowhere defines “unreasonable risk.”

    Legal confusion has consequences.  When a statute is ambiguous, courts will defer to an agency's reasonable interpretation of that statute.  The juxtaposition of language signaling a desire for cost-benefit balancing and language signaling a hostility to such balancing may be unclear enough to allow the EPA ultimately to exercise its discretion to choose which approach – cost-benefit balancing or no cost-benefit balancing – to adopt.  Whatever EPA's present inclinations in this regard might be, there is no guarantee they will remain fixed in future administrations.

  • April 3, 2015
    Guest Post

    by Nicole Huberfeld, H. Wendell Cherry Professor of Law, University of Kentucky

    The Supreme Court recently decided Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, a low-profile case that could strike at the heart of the Medicaid program, a federal program that provides funding to states to facilitate mainstream medical care for low-income Americans. The Medicaid Act contains requirements that states must obey to receive federal funding, one of which is called the equal access provision, or "30(A)".  This provision requires states to ensure that “payments . . . are sufficient to enlist enough providers so that care and services are available under the plan at least to the extent that such care and services are available to the general population in the geographic area.” Historically, Medicaid payment rates are lower than private insurance or Medicare rates, despite the 30(A) requirement for sufficient payment.

    Additionally, the Medicaid Act does not provide explicit remedies for state failures in the program, other than authorizing the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to withdraw federal funding.  Thus, over the years, health care providers and patients have brought private enforcement actions under the civil rights statute known as Section 1983 or under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution to enforce statutory rights under the Medicaid Act.  Section 1983 actions have been limited by the Supreme Court.  Consequently, health care providers and Medicaid beneficiaries turned to the Supremacy Clause, seeking injunctive relief against states under the theory that states violate federal law when they fail to pay sufficient reimbursement rates to ensure equal access.  Two years ago, the Court nearly eliminated Supremacy Clause actions in Douglas v. Independent Living Center, but deference to agency decision making ultimately stayed the Court’s hand.

    Armstrong has done what the dissent in Douglas would have.  Justice Scalia’s majority opinion pointedly began by noting that states agree to spend federal funds "in accordance with congressionally imposed conditions."  The majority asserted that the Supremacy Clause provides a "rule of construction" but does not "create a cause of action" unless Congress "permits the enforcement of its laws by private actors."  The Court then determined that Congress intentionally excluded private enforcement from the Medicaid Act, and therefore providers cannot seek injunctive relief under the Supremacy Clause.

    This conclusion is incorrect.  Congress did not "foreclose" or "exclude" private enforcement from the Medicaid Act, either in 1965 when Medicaid was enacted, or when 30(A) amended the Act.  In fact, Congress debated preventing providers and beneficiaries from seeking relief in federal court but never added such language to the Medicaid Act.  Nevertheless, the majority concluded that the Secretary of HHS is solely responsible for enforcing 30(A) pursuant to her authority under 42 U.S.C. §1396c to withhold Medicaid funds from non-compliant states.  The Secretary is reluctant to withhold funds because it could harm beneficiaries, but the majority did not engage this quandary.  Instead, the majority called 30(A) judicially unmanageable – even though lower federal courts have guided states under 30(A) for years – and held that HHS must directly engage the states without federal courts’ interference.

    The majority circled back to Medicaid's status as a spending program in Part IV of its opinion, which may resurrect a dormant theory of spending programs as being like contracts and unlike other federal laws.  The Court often analogizes federal conditional spending programs to contracts under the Pennhurst decision, but in some cases (e.g. Barnes v. Gorman), Justices have suggested that the "third party beneficiaries" of federal spending programs have no enforceable rights.  The majority opinion reiterated this view of conditional spending statutes, noting that "contracts between two governments" cannot be enforced by beneficiaries of those contracts.  Not even the historical vision of strict dual sovereignty in federalism would have claimed that the federal government and the states are co-equal sovereigns, yet this dicta seems to embrace a vision of federalism that offers much more power to the states.  The majority opened the courthouse doors to further eroding of conditional spending statutes in the context of the Medicaid Act and perhaps beyond.