Administrative Law

  • February 26, 2016
    Guest Post

    by Lisa Heinzerling, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. This post draws from Heinzerling’s article, "The Supreme Court's Clean-Power Power Grab," to be published in the Georgetown Environmental Law Review in May 2016.

    The Environmental Protection Agency's "Clean Power Plan" establishes emission guidelines for states to follow in regulating carbon dioxide from existing power plants. Many states and industry groups have challenged the rule in the D.C. Circuit. Some of the challengers asked the D.C. Circuit to stay the rule pending the court's review, but the D.C. Circuit declined, explaining that the challengers had not met the strict requirements for such relief. The challengers then moved on to the Supreme Court, filing five separate applications to stay EPA's rule pending judicial review in the D.C. Circuit. The applicants for a stay did not file petitions for certiorari or indicate that they intended to file petitions for certiorari, and they did not challenge the D.C. Circuit's decision denying a stay. Instead, they challenged the Clean Power Plan itself and asked that it be stayed pending initial judicial review of the rule in the D.C. Circuit. No party weighing in on the applications for a stay, either in favor or opposed, was able to identify any previous case in which the Supreme Court had stayed the application of a nationally applicable agency rule before any court had reviewed it. Nevertheless, the Court granted the stay.

    The unique posture of the case creates uncertainty about the jurisdictional basis for the Court's action. In its terse, identical orders granting the five applications for a stay, the Court did not identify the source of its power to hear the case. Moreover, the five different sets of applicants for a stay did not agree among themselves about the source of the Supreme Court's authority to hear the case and issue a stay. The applicants' disarray reflects the uncertain jurisdictional basis for the Court's orders.

    The applicants for a stay cited, in varying configurations, four different statutory provisions which, they asserted, gave the Supreme Court jurisdiction to hear the case: 5 U.S.C. § 705 (Administrative Procedure Act's provision on stays of administrative action), 28 U.S.C. § 2101(f) (on stays pending the filing of petitions for writs of certiorari), 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (on certiorari jurisdiction), and 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (All Writs Act).

    Did one of these statutory provisions give the Supreme Court the power to stay the Clean Power Plan? I don't think so. Let's take them one at a time.

  • November 13, 2015
    Guest Post

    by Samuel A. Marcosson, Professor of Law, University of Louisville Louis D. Brandeis School of Law

    On November 6, the Supreme Court granted cert in seven cases (which it promptly consolidated for briefing and argument as Zubik v. Burwell) to resolve the issue it left open when it ruled in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby that private, for-profit companies are entitled to a religious exemption from the Affordable Care Act’s mandate to provide contraceptive coverage to their employees. At issue is whether the accommodation the government provides to nonprofit employers satisfies the requirements of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). If it doesn’t, employees of these nonprofits will, like their counterparts at Hobby Lobby, lose their contraceptive coverage. A decision exempting the nonprofits from the contraceptive mandate would make Zubik one of the landmarks of the Term, and a disaster in the Court’s religion jurisprudence.

    Zubik tests the limits of the dangerous path the Court began to walk in Hobby Lobby. The majority opinion there departed from the Court’s long-standing approach in religious accommodation cases of carefully considering the impact of a proposed accommodation on third parties who would be burdened by it. In Hobby Lobby, of course, those third parties were the employees who lost coverage for contraceptive care that, under the ACA, is an essential element of comprehensive health insurance and which, for many, avoids enormous expense and “helps safeguard the health of women for whom pregnancy may be hazardous, even life threatening.” The Court gave almost no weight to the interests and needs of those employees who would be deprived of the essential coverage the ACA had mandated.

    The Court faces an even starker choice in Zubik because the claim on the other side of the scale, the burden claimed by the employers to their religious exercise, is more attenuated than it was in Hobby Lobby. A nonprofit that objects to providing contraceptive coverage receives an accommodation simply by certifying to HHS that it has a religious objection. As Justice Alito admitted in Hobby Lobby, a nonprofit which files the certification is “effectively exempted . . . from the contraceptive mandate.” In other words, to be accommodated under the ACA regulations, all the objecting nonprofits must do is tell HHS exactly what they are telling the Supreme Court: that they have a religious objection to providing contraceptive coverage.

  • October 8, 2015
    Guest Post

    by J. Paul Oetken, U.S. District Judge for the Southern District of New York

    Judge Richard D. Cudahy, who served for 36 years on the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, died last month at the age of 89. He was beloved by his family and friends, his colleagues, and his many law clerks. He was also admired as a brilliant and influential jurist whose opinions shaped the development of the law in myriad ways.

    I served as one of Judge Cudahy’s law clerks from 1991 to 1992, and that year was one of the most rewarding and interesting of my career. The judge was not only a kind and generous boss; he was also a great teacher and mentor. We discussed every case in detail, and through that process I gained great insight into how he thought about law and justice.

    Judge Cudahy’s approach to the law was humanistic and pragmatic; he was neither formalistic nor result-oriented. He cared deeply about the judicial craft, taking great care to write opinions that were well-reasoned and principled, while always being particularly sensitive to how legal doctrine affects people’s lives. His sense of fairness and even-handedness pervaded his evaluation of every case, regardless of the background of the litigants involved.  In a prisoner’s appeal in a civil rights case, Judge Cudahy wrote (in response to a colleague’s economic analysis):  “Since the financial net worth of most prisoners is zero and their economic value while incarcerated perhaps less than zero, it is not surprising that efforts to take them seriously as human beings are sometimes scorned. They are not all Jean Valjean, but they are people.”

    The judge was modest as a jurist, just as he was modest as a person. He did not pretend that an outcome was obvious when it was not, nor did he construct fancy theories to dictate results of cases.  He was an honest judge who practiced his craft straightforwardly.

    He was also extraordinarily hard-working and well-prepared. Every night he would carry a heavy stack of briefs home with him.  When we discussed our cases, he had always read the briefs thoroughly and had his own views (and questions) about each of the issues presented.  He had high standards for his written opinions, going over drafts repeatedly until he was satisfied that an opinion was right, both in its result and in its explanation.

  • September 1, 2015
    Guest Post

    by Reuben Guttman, partner, Guttman, Buschner & Brooks, PLLC; member, ACS Board of Directors

    For a union-side labor lawyer, identifying the employer for the purposes of bargaining and unfair labor practices is akin to a search for the Holy Grail. Three years of law school and courses in labor and employment law ― from excellent professors at Emory Law ― could not prepare me for the challenge of this search which consumed virtually all of my time when I was a Washington, D.C.-based attorney for the Service Employees International Union from 1985 to 1990.

    The search began for me in the winter of 1985. SEIU had negotiated a city-wide contract covering its Pittsburgh janitors. Rather than allowing its union contractor to continue to service its buildings under the new labor agreement, Mellon Bank terminated its janitorial vendor and its union workforce. Nearly 70 workers lost their jobs and the benefits that went with them. They were replaced by low-wage, part-time workers who were not accorded nearly the same level of benefits. I was challenged to find a legal solution.  

    In the late hours of the night, poring through the case reporters at the University of Pittsburgh Law Library, I came across the Supreme Court’s decision in Boire v. Greyhound which established the joint employer doctrine. To my delight, I learned that an entity could be considered an employer even where employees were paid by another company. I also came across a Third Circuit case, NLRB v. Browning-Ferris Industries of Pennsylvania, Inc., which ― in my mind as a young lawyer ― made things quite clear: Two or more employers can be co-employers “if they share or codetermine those matters governing the essential terms and conditions of employment.” If only the analysis were that simple.

  • July 1, 2015
    Guest Post

    by Justin Pidot, Associate Professor of Law, University of Denver Sturm College of Law

    In its last decision of the 2014 term, the Supreme Court decided Michigan v. EPA, ruling that EPA must consider costs before deciding to regulate toxic air pollutants from power plants.  Lisa Heinzerling has identified the many questions that remain open in the wake of the Court’s decision.  And Dan Farber and Ann Carlson also provide insightful commentary on the meaning of the decision. As all three suggest, the lasting practical effect of the Court’s decision on mercury and other toxic emissions from power plants remains to be seen.

    Without retreading ground that has been well-covered already, I want to offer two observations.  First, I want to offer some (very cautious) optimism that the legal rule provided by the Michigan v. EPA decision has little effect.  Read broadly, the decision could require agencies in many contexts to consider costs before regulating.  I’m not convinced, however, that the decision necessarily tells us anything about when agencies must consider costs. 

    The Court offers several reasons that EPA unreasonably interpreted its authority to regulate power plants without accounting for the billions of dollars of costs such regulation might impose: 

    First, the Court explains that the toxic air pollution provisions of § 112 of the Clean Air Act differentiate between power plants and other stationary sources.  For sources other than power plants, the Act essentially allows EPA to consider, at most, health and environmental effects.  In contrast, the Act requires EPA to regulate power plants only if “necessary and appropriate.”  This contrast, the Court offers, must mean something.

    Second, the Court opines that appropriate regulation generally requires an agency to think about both the benefits of regulation and its cots.  This suggests, that could be read to presumptively require agencies to consider costs in making regulatory decisions.