Administrative law

  • November 13, 2015
    Guest Post

    by Samuel A. Marcosson, Professor of Law, University of Louisville Louis D. Brandeis School of Law

    On November 6, the Supreme Court granted cert in seven cases (which it promptly consolidated for briefing and argument as Zubik v. Burwell) to resolve the issue it left open when it ruled in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby that private, for-profit companies are entitled to a religious exemption from the Affordable Care Act’s mandate to provide contraceptive coverage to their employees. At issue is whether the accommodation the government provides to nonprofit employers satisfies the requirements of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). If it doesn’t, employees of these nonprofits will, like their counterparts at Hobby Lobby, lose their contraceptive coverage. A decision exempting the nonprofits from the contraceptive mandate would make Zubik one of the landmarks of the Term, and a disaster in the Court’s religion jurisprudence.

    Zubik tests the limits of the dangerous path the Court began to walk in Hobby Lobby. The majority opinion there departed from the Court’s long-standing approach in religious accommodation cases of carefully considering the impact of a proposed accommodation on third parties who would be burdened by it. In Hobby Lobby, of course, those third parties were the employees who lost coverage for contraceptive care that, under the ACA, is an essential element of comprehensive health insurance and which, for many, avoids enormous expense and “helps safeguard the health of women for whom pregnancy may be hazardous, even life threatening.” The Court gave almost no weight to the interests and needs of those employees who would be deprived of the essential coverage the ACA had mandated.

    The Court faces an even starker choice in Zubik because the claim on the other side of the scale, the burden claimed by the employers to their religious exercise, is more attenuated than it was in Hobby Lobby. A nonprofit that objects to providing contraceptive coverage receives an accommodation simply by certifying to HHS that it has a religious objection. As Justice Alito admitted in Hobby Lobby, a nonprofit which files the certification is “effectively exempted . . . from the contraceptive mandate.” In other words, to be accommodated under the ACA regulations, all the objecting nonprofits must do is tell HHS exactly what they are telling the Supreme Court: that they have a religious objection to providing contraceptive coverage.

  • October 8, 2015
    Guest Post

    by J. Paul Oetken, U.S. District Judge for the Southern District of New York

    Judge Richard D. Cudahy, who served for 36 years on the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, died last month at the age of 89. He was beloved by his family and friends, his colleagues, and his many law clerks. He was also admired as a brilliant and influential jurist whose opinions shaped the development of the law in myriad ways.

    I served as one of Judge Cudahy’s law clerks from 1991 to 1992, and that year was one of the most rewarding and interesting of my career. The judge was not only a kind and generous boss; he was also a great teacher and mentor. We discussed every case in detail, and through that process I gained great insight into how he thought about law and justice.

    Judge Cudahy’s approach to the law was humanistic and pragmatic; he was neither formalistic nor result-oriented. He cared deeply about the judicial craft, taking great care to write opinions that were well-reasoned and principled, while always being particularly sensitive to how legal doctrine affects people’s lives. His sense of fairness and even-handedness pervaded his evaluation of every case, regardless of the background of the litigants involved.  In a prisoner’s appeal in a civil rights case, Judge Cudahy wrote (in response to a colleague’s economic analysis):  “Since the financial net worth of most prisoners is zero and their economic value while incarcerated perhaps less than zero, it is not surprising that efforts to take them seriously as human beings are sometimes scorned. They are not all Jean Valjean, but they are people.”

    The judge was modest as a jurist, just as he was modest as a person. He did not pretend that an outcome was obvious when it was not, nor did he construct fancy theories to dictate results of cases.  He was an honest judge who practiced his craft straightforwardly.

    He was also extraordinarily hard-working and well-prepared. Every night he would carry a heavy stack of briefs home with him.  When we discussed our cases, he had always read the briefs thoroughly and had his own views (and questions) about each of the issues presented.  He had high standards for his written opinions, going over drafts repeatedly until he was satisfied that an opinion was right, both in its result and in its explanation.

  • September 1, 2015
    Guest Post

    by Reuben Guttman, partner, Guttman, Buschner & Brooks, PLLC; member, ACS Board of Directors

    For a union-side labor lawyer, identifying the employer for the purposes of bargaining and unfair labor practices is akin to a search for the Holy Grail. Three years of law school and courses in labor and employment law ― from excellent professors at Emory Law ― could not prepare me for the challenge of this search which consumed virtually all of my time when I was a Washington, D.C.-based attorney for the Service Employees International Union from 1985 to 1990.

    The search began for me in the winter of 1985. SEIU had negotiated a city-wide contract covering its Pittsburgh janitors. Rather than allowing its union contractor to continue to service its buildings under the new labor agreement, Mellon Bank terminated its janitorial vendor and its union workforce. Nearly 70 workers lost their jobs and the benefits that went with them. They were replaced by low-wage, part-time workers who were not accorded nearly the same level of benefits. I was challenged to find a legal solution.  

    In the late hours of the night, poring through the case reporters at the University of Pittsburgh Law Library, I came across the Supreme Court’s decision in Boire v. Greyhound which established the joint employer doctrine. To my delight, I learned that an entity could be considered an employer even where employees were paid by another company. I also came across a Third Circuit case, NLRB v. Browning-Ferris Industries of Pennsylvania, Inc., which ― in my mind as a young lawyer ― made things quite clear: Two or more employers can be co-employers “if they share or codetermine those matters governing the essential terms and conditions of employment.” If only the analysis were that simple.

  • July 1, 2015
    Guest Post

    by Justin Pidot, Associate Professor of Law, University of Denver Sturm College of Law

    In its last decision of the 2014 term, the Supreme Court decided Michigan v. EPA, ruling that EPA must consider costs before deciding to regulate toxic air pollutants from power plants.  Lisa Heinzerling has identified the many questions that remain open in the wake of the Court’s decision.  And Dan Farber and Ann Carlson also provide insightful commentary on the meaning of the decision. As all three suggest, the lasting practical effect of the Court’s decision on mercury and other toxic emissions from power plants remains to be seen.

    Without retreading ground that has been well-covered already, I want to offer two observations.  First, I want to offer some (very cautious) optimism that the legal rule provided by the Michigan v. EPA decision has little effect.  Read broadly, the decision could require agencies in many contexts to consider costs before regulating.  I’m not convinced, however, that the decision necessarily tells us anything about when agencies must consider costs. 

    The Court offers several reasons that EPA unreasonably interpreted its authority to regulate power plants without accounting for the billions of dollars of costs such regulation might impose: 

    First, the Court explains that the toxic air pollution provisions of § 112 of the Clean Air Act differentiate between power plants and other stationary sources.  For sources other than power plants, the Act essentially allows EPA to consider, at most, health and environmental effects.  In contrast, the Act requires EPA to regulate power plants only if “necessary and appropriate.”  This contrast, the Court offers, must mean something.

    Second, the Court opines that appropriate regulation generally requires an agency to think about both the benefits of regulation and its cots.  This suggests, that could be read to presumptively require agencies to consider costs in making regulatory decisions. 

  • June 29, 2015
    Guest Post

    by Lisa Heinzerling, the Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center

    In Michigan v. EPA, the Supreme Court reviewed the Environmental Protection Agency's decision to regulate power plants under section 112 of the Clean Air Act. Section 112 is the provision regulating toxic air pollutants, such as mercury. The question before the Court was whether EPA reasonably interpreted the Clean Air Act to allow EPA to decline to consider costs in deciding whether to regulate power plants under section 112. The Court held that it was not reasonable to interpret the Act in this way. Thus, from the Court's decision, we know that EPA must consider costs in deciding whether to regulate power plants under section 112. There are, however, important questions that remain:

    1. We do not yet know what happens to EPA's rule while EPA does the analytical work the Court has required of it. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the D.C. Circuit and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The case will go back to the D.C. Circuit for it to figure out how to address the Supreme Court's ruling. Certainly the case will eventually have to return to EPA; the D.C. Circuit itself will not attempt to undertake the consideration of costs the Supreme Court has ordered. But what happens between the time the case goes back to EPA and the time EPA makes a decision in light of the Supreme Court's ruling? That depends on the D.C. Circuit. The court will need to decide whether to remand or to vacate and remand; that is, whether to simply send the matter back to EPA while leaving the rule in place, or undo the rule in the interim. The D.C. Circuit has lately remanded quite a few agency rules, especially environmental rules, without vacating them. Given the amount of discretion left to the agency by the Supreme Court's decision (see below), and the fact that EPA has previously stated that the rule is justified even in light of its costs, I believe there is a strong case for remand without vacatur.

    2. We do not yet know how EPA will or should take costs into account in revisiting the issue of whether to regulate power plants under section 112. The Court left this matter to EPA, with the qualification that the agency's treatment of costs must be, "[a]s always, within the limits of reasonable interpretation." The Court emphasized that it was not holding that the agency must conduct "a formal cost-benefit analysis in which each advantage and disadvantage is assigned a monetary value." Beyond that, the Court gave little hint of the kind of analysis it would approve. At times, it seemed to be looking for a judgment about whether costs were disproportionate to benefits; at other points, it seemed to highlight cost-effectiveness analysis. These are different inquiries, and it will now be up to EPA – at least in the first instance – to decide which of several cost-sensitive frameworks to use. My sense from the Court's opinion is that as long as EPA considers costs in some fashion, whether through formal cost-benefit analysis or something far more qualitative, it will be sufficient.

    3. We do not yet know which benefits EPA may consider for purposes of the additional analysis the Court has required. Although EPA conducted a formal cost-benefit analysis of the rule for purposes of White House regulatory review, and that analysis included billions of dollars in "ancillary" benefits due to reductions in air pollutants not covered by the air toxics program, the Court did not decide whether these ancillary benefits may be included in the analysis yet to come. That is, the Court said, "a point we need not address." Several justices seemed skeptical of these benefits at oral argument, and there is some (small but discernible) textual basis for excluding them. A number of commentators have argued that EPA must be able to consider such benefits because they are included in standard economic practice and because an OMB circular on cost-benefit analysis, dating from the George W. Bush administration, admits them in the cost-benefit framework. I don't think economic practice and an OMB circular will decide this question, but I do think it would be quite aggressive for a court to tell EPA which regulatory benefits count.