Adam Winkler

  • September 1, 2011
    BookTalk
    Gunfight
    The Battle over the Right to Bear Arms in America
    By: 
    Adam Winkler

    By Adam Winkler, a professor at UCLA School of Law.


    I’ll never forget the scene outside the Supreme Court building the day of oral argument in District of Columbia v. Heller. Scores of reporters and camera crews were there to cover the hundreds of protestors who turned First Street into a lively theatre of debate over the meaning of the Second Amendment. A man with a bullhorn boomed, “More guns!” In response, gun rights supporters in the crowd hollered, “Less crime!” “More guns!” “Less crime!” A group of gun control proponents whispered among themselves and the next time the man with the bullhorn chanted “More guns” they yelled, “More crime!” As in the gun debate more generally, however, the gun controllers were easily drowned out by the more numerous and vocal gun rights advocates. 

    Although the language of the Second Amendment has confused generations of lawyers, the protestors in front of the famous marble steps of the Supreme Court knew exactly what it meant. To gun rights supporters, the amendment clearly guaranteed individuals the right to own guns and placed strict limits on gun control. To proponents of gun control, the amendment merely provided for state militias and had little relevance for ordinary gun laws. Although the two sides reached very different conclusions, they shared a common view of the right to bear arms. Both sides believed an individual right to have guns was fundamentally incompatible with gun control. We must choose one or the other.

    Gunfight: The Battle over the Right to Bear Arms in America shows that, contrary to the extremists on both sides, we’ve always had both a right to bear arms and gun control. The founding fathers who wrote the Second Amendment had gun laws that the modern gun lobby would never accept. Not only did they prohibit free blacks and slaves from owning guns to promote public safety, they also restricted the gun rights of political dissenters. They required ordinary citizens to buy military style firearms — an early version of an “individual mandate”—and ordered them to appear for mandatory “musters” where their guns would be inspected and registered on public rolls. To them, the Second Amendment was not a libertarian license. We the people were the militia, but that militia was required to be “well regulated.”

  • August 15, 2011

    by Nicole Flatow

    Justice Antonin Scalia may be the Supreme Court’s “ultimate originalist,” but when it comes to the Second Amendment, he has recently embraced a living Constitution, UCLA law professor Adam Winkler suggests in a column for The Atlantic adopted from his forthcoming book, Gunfight: The Battle Over the Right to Bear Arms in America.

    In his article, Winkler traces the surprising and contradictory history of the U.S. right to bear arms, starting with the Founding Fathers’ own version of an “individual mandate” that required many citizens to purchase guns, while forbidding gun ownership for slaves, free blacks, and “law-abiding white men who refused to swear loyalty to the Revolution.”

    The National Rifle Association, founded as an organization to improve American soldiers’ marksmanship, was “at the forefront of legislative efforts to enact gun control” in the 1920s and 1930s, and only shifted to become a “lobbying powerhouse committed to a more aggressive view of what the Second Amendment promises to citizens” in 1977, Winkler explains.

  • May 19, 2011
    Guest Post

    By Adam Winkler, Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law


    Does Goodwin Liu’s stalled nomination to the federal bench signal the end of judicial nominations for academics? Law professors have never been the darlings of the Senate Judiciary Committee – or even of presidents considering appointments to the federal courts. What’s happening with Goodwin Liu may yet further reduce the likelihood of law professors receiving nominations in the future.

    Law professors aren’t natural choices for federal judgeships to begin with. Nominations for the lower federal courts often come from the senators in the state in which the vacancy arises, and law professors don’t tend to be politically connected players close with elected officials. As a general matter, we don’t make much money, contribute much to campaigns, or raise much for candidates. So when senators recommend nominees to the president, they are more likely to be partners at big firms than professors from big schools. (The Supreme Court is an obvious exception; over the past century, the Court was filled with law professors, from Frankfurter and Douglas to Scalia and Kagan.)

    Even if a law professor scores a nomination, today’s highly polarized confirmation process, coupled with new technologies, make confirmation very difficult. Any law professor that writes on a politically contentious issue like abortion, affirmative action, or same-sex marriage will have those writings used against him. This isn’t unique to law professors; any writings of any nominee will be scrutinized. A sitting judge, however, can explain away controversial opinions by saying they don’t reflect her personal views but were required by precedent. Law professors don’t have that easy out – as Liu’s case shows. Republicans have refused to allow Liu to win confirmation because of his writings in favor of affirmative action and against torture.

    Of course, not all law professors will face the same difficulty. Elena Kagan was confirmed despite being a former law professor. Kagan, however, had written only a handful of scholarly articles and most of them argued for broad free speech rights – a position that both Republicans and Democrats could accept. When staffers went out to search her articles for statements they could use against her, the only “gotcha” they found was her criticism of judicial nominees who refuse to discuss their views. 

    It’s no longer just the nominee’s writings that matter. Before Kagan was named, ACS Board member Pamela Karlan, of Stanford Law School, was one name bandied about as a potential nominee. But it was easy to go on YouTube and find videos of Karlan, who speaks at numerous events, making sarcastic, biting remarks on nearly every hot-button issue of the day. Though those who see her in person know that her most outrageous statements are meant to be humorous -- Karlan gets more laughs than any other law professor I know -- they are easy fodder for opponents.

    The message for law professors from these examples is clear: if you want to become a judge one day, don’t write too much, write on non-controversial topics, and watch what you say at speaking events. The world is watching.

  • March 23, 2011
    Guest Post

    By Adam Winkler, a constitutional law professor at UCLA School of Law. This post is part of an ACSblog symposium marking the one-year anniversary of the Affordable Care Act.  
    The public debate over the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act's minimum insurance requirement has an Alice in Wonderland feel about it. In a reversal of their usual positions, conservatives have embraced popular constitutionalism and liberals are the ones touting original meaning.

    Opponents of the new national health care law were quick to recognize that the debate over the constitutionality of the minimum insurance provision would be fought not only in court but also in the street. While supporters of the law were brushing aside the legal arguments against the mandate, secure in the view that decades of case law put the reform on a firm doctrinal foundation, opponents immediately took to the blogs, newspaper editorials, and talk radio programs across the nation. Their argument was simple: Congress can't regulate "inactivity" and if it could there would be no more limits to federal power under the Constitution.

    Notably absent from their arguments was the traditional basis for conservative constitutional critique: originalism. After three decades of insisting that the only way to properly interpret the Constitution was to rely on the original public meaning, conservatives all of sudden were making what can only be described as a constitutional policy argument. They didn't argue that the Framers thought the Constitution prevented Congress from regulating "inactivity." Rather, opponents of health care reform insisted that allowing Congress to reach inactivity was a bad idea whose acceptance would lead to a parade of horribles. Congress is going to make you buy an American car! Or, perish the thought, make you eat broccoli!

  • February 1, 2011
    Guest Post

    By Adam Winkler, a constitutional law professor at UCLA School of Law. 
    Judge Vinson's opinion striking down the Affordable Care Act was remarkable for the ease with which it jettisoned two centuries of settled law. Ever since McCulloch v. Maryland, the Supreme Court has held that the Necessary and Proper Clause gives Congress the authority to reach matters otherwise beyond the strict confines of Congress's enumerated powers. Yet Judge Vinson - like Judge Hudson in the Virginia decision several weeks ago - effectively reads the Necessary and Proper Clause out of the Constitution.

    Vinson's logic goes like this. The minimum insurance requirement, he says, falls outside of Congress's power to regulate "commerce . . . among the several states" because it regulates inactivity, rather than activity. Of course, nowhere in the text of the Constitution is Congress's authority limited to regulating activity, but ignore that for the moment. Because Congress doesn't have power under the Commerce Clause to require taxpayers to purchase insurance, the Necessary and Proper Clause can't be used to justify the law either.

    The judge's decision can't deny that the insurance requirement is necessary. Indeed, it is so central to this comprehensive health insurance regulation that he held the whole law had to be struck down. The problem, he says, is that the minimum coverage provision isn't "proper" because it falls outside of Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause.

    If Vinson's tautology were applied to past Necessary and Proper Clause cases, they would come out the other way. In McCulloch, the law chartering a federal bank would be invalidated because Congress doesn't have any explicit power to charter a bank. In Gonzales v. Raich the Court upheld a federal ban on homegrown marijuana because, Justice Scalia's influential concurring opinion explained, it was an essential piece of a comprehensive regulation of a market - even though the growing of marijuana for personal use was beyond the reach of the Commerce Clause. Vinson's reasoning would mandate the opposite result. And just last term, the Supreme Court held in United States v. Comstock that the Necessary and Proper Clause empowered Congress to detain certain sex offenders even though, again, doing so was outside of any other enumerated powers.

    The basic purpose of the Necessary and Proper Clause is to give Congress the choice of means it can use to make a regulation of, say, interstate commerce effective. That is exactly what the minimum coverage requirement does. There's no doubt that the Affordable Care Act is a broad, comprehensive regulation of the health insurance market. Requiring individuals to finance their own medical expenses is closely and directly tied to the viability of that broader regulation. That's why it is both necessary and proper, however those terms are defined.