July 2012

  • July 25, 2012
    Guest Post

    By Laura Abel, Deputy Director of the National Center for Access to Justice at Cardozo Law School


    If Congress leads the country over the “fiscal cliff,” people are going to have a tough time using the courts to protect their most basic rights. Pretty much everyone agrees that imposing across-the-board cuts is a bad way to make public policy. When the cuts affect the Third Branch of government, they tread on dangerous constitutional ground.

    The fiscal cliff is the popular name for the package of federal budget cuts and tax increases that Congress agreed to in the Budget Control Act of 2011. The idea at the time was that a committee, optimistically dubbed the “supercommittee,” would come up with a long-term plan to reduce the federal deficit before the package took effect. But the supercommittee was unable to come up with a solution. Now, most federal agencies face budget cuts of as much as 9% on January 1, unless Congress can agree on an alternative plan.

    The federal courts have warned that the cuts “would have a devastating and long-lasting impact on the federal courts and the administration of justice in this country.” Even without the fiscal cliff, the federal judiciary is a lean operation. In the past year alone, 1,000 court staff positions have been cut. Judge Julia S. Gibbons has testified before Congress that additional Budget Control Act cuts would limit the ability of court clerks to help members of the public with court filings. This would make the federal courts more inaccessible than ever to “pro se” litigants seeking to enforce their civil rights or file for bankruptcy. Staff shortages would also result in significant delays in processing cases, providing an unfortunate demonstration of the principle that “justice delayed is justice denied.”

    The so-called budget cuts will cost the taxpayers far more money in the long run. Judge Gibbons warns that the courts will have to furlough public defenders and reduce pretrial supervision services for low-risk offenders. The likely result is that more defendants will spend more time in prison awaiting trial, driving up prison costs.

  • July 24, 2012

    by Jeremy Leaming

    All too often proponents of ridiculously rigid voter ID laws cite voter fraud as justification. It is, those supporters argue, the integrity of the nation’s elections that need to be protected. But the argument is not only tired, it’s wobbly. It also masks the pernicious impact these laws have on low-income voters, minority voters, and the elderly.

    As noted in this post last week, Viviette Applewhite, a 93-year-old Philadelphian is fighting back against Pennsylvania’s new voter ID law. Represented by the ACLU of Pennsylvania, the Advancement Project, the Public Interest Law Center of Philadelphia and the D.C. law firm Arnold & Porter LLP Applewhite is challenging the law as a violation of the Pennsylvania Constitution. The lawsuit argues the voter ID act subverts the state’s constitution “by depriving citizens of their most fundamental constitutional right – the right to vote.”

    Reporting for TPM, Ryan J. Reilly notes that as the lawsuit proceeds to trial, state officials have “formally acknowledged that there’s been no reported in-person voter fraud in Pennsylvania.”

    The state officials, Reilly continues, “signed a stipulation agreement with lawyers for the plaintiffs which acknowledges that there ‘have been no investigations or prosecutions of in-person voter fraud in Pennsylvania; and the parties do not have direct personal knowledge of any such investigations or prosecutions in other states.” Moreover, Reilly notes that the state acknowledges in the stipulation agreement that it “will not offer any evidence in this action that in-person voter fraud has in fact occurred in Pennsylvania and elsewhere.”

    For proponents of the harsh voter ID laws, the state's stipulation is likely disappointing. It should not be surprising, however, to anyone paying attention to the machinations behind the creation of the onerous laws.  

    In a recent ACS Issue Brief, Loyola Law School Profess Justin Levitt examines the new restrictions on civic participation, highlighting the numerous studies and examinations that undermine claims of voter fraud.

    “There have been credible allegations of impersonation at the polls,” Levitt says. “But they are notable for their rarity. In the most prominent forum to date for collecting such allegations [a 2008 case before the Supreme Court], proponents of these rules cited nine votes since 2000 that were caused by fraud that in-person identification rules could possibly stop … or by mistake. During that same period, 400 million votes were cast, in general elections alone. Even assuming that each of the nine voters were fraudulent, that amounts to a relevant fraud rate of 0.000002 percent.”

  • July 23, 2012

    by Nicole Flatow

    Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid succeeded in pushing through yet another noncontroversial judicial nominee Monday night, after filing the 29th motion to invoke cloture on a judicial nominee since President Obama took office.

    Senators never voted on the motion -- they agreed by unanimous consent to consider the nomination of Michael A. Shipp to the New Jersey federal district court and then voted overwhelmingly 91-1 to confirm him. But the fact that Reid’s cloture motion was even necessary is the latest evidence of the degraded process for confirming judicial nominees.

    Shipp was the first African American magistrate in the District of New Jersey, and was approved in the Senate Judiciary Committee by a voice vote without any stated opposition. His nomination was blocked when Sen. Rand Paul refused to consent to a vote on Shipp – a political move to push for a vote on wholly unrelated legislation to halt aid to Pakistan.

    This is not the first time Sen. Paul has exploited a nomination for political capital.

  • July 23, 2012

    by Nicole Flatow

    In spite of a stated commitment to gender equality at the nation’s largest law firms, the number of women equity partners has held flat at 15 percent, a new National Law Journal study reveals.

    The equity partner rate has been stuck at that same exact level for 20 years now, according to a 2011 National Association of Women Lawyers report cited by NLJ.

    The overall partner percentages are slightly more encouraging -- the percentage of both equity and nonequity women partners increased to 18.8 percent from 16 percent from 2003. And it is at the largest and most profitable firms where women have made the greatest gains, according to NLJ.

    On the state and federal bench, the percentage of women judges increased a slight 0.5 percent between 2011 and 2012 to 27.1 percent, although the percentage of federal women judges actually declined 0.1 percent, according to data from the Center for Women in Government & Civil Society at the State University of New York-Albany.  

  • July 23, 2012
    Guest Post

    By Stephen I. Vladeck, professor of law and associate dean for scholarship at American University Washington College of Law


    There’s quite a lot to say about the damages suit filed last week by the American Civil Liberties Union and the Center for Constitutional Rights on behalf of the family of Anwar al-Aulaqi and his 16-year-old son Abdulrahman, both of whom were killed (along with a third U.S. citizen) in a pair of drone strikes in Yemen in the fall 0f 2011. And although the suit raises a host of important and thorny legal questions of first impression, including whether a non-international armed conflict existed in Yemen at the time of the strikes and whether a U.S. citizen can claim a substantive due process right not to be collateral damage in an otherwise lawful military operation, I suspect my Lawfare colleague Ben Wittes is quite correct that this case won’t actually resolve any of them. Instead, as Ben suggests, it seems likely that the federal courts will refuse to recognize a “Bivens” remedy — a cause of action for damages arising directly out of the constitutional provision allegedly offended (e.g., the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause), and that the plaintiffs will therefore be unable to state a valid cause of action.

    As I explain below, such a result would unfortunately perpetuate a fundamental — and increasingly pervasive — misunderstanding of Bivens. Moreover, even if plaintiffs will ultimately lose suits like Al-Aulaqi because of various defenses — including qualified immunity, the state secrets privilege, and the political question doctrine — getting the Bivens question right still matters. To the extent that the specter of judicial review deters governmental misconduct down the road, Bivens suits can and should have a salutary effect on the conduct of U.S. national security policy — so long as they’re properly understood in the first place.