June 2012

  • June 20, 2012

    by Jeremy Leaming

    Rep. Darrell Issa (R-Calf.), one of Congress’ wealthiest members and one who still oversees his business empire, worth hundreds of millions of dollars, while attempting to represent his congressional district, has advanced his attack on U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder.

    The House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, which Issa chairs, today voted along party lines to recommend the chamber find the attorney general in contempt of Congress for allegedly failing to provide enough documentation about the federal government's operations to curb drug smuggling and violence along the southern border, which was launched during the administration of George W. Bush.

    The vote followed President Obama’s assertion of executive privilege to withhold the documents, the first time the administration has taken such action. The administrations of George W. Bush and Bill Clinton invoked the privilege numerous times.

    Issa, who as The New York Times has reported juggles “dual careers, a meshing of public and private interests rarely seen in government,” came under sharp criticism from Democratic members of the House.

    U.S. Rep. Elijah E. Cummings (D-Md.) told The Times the administration was forced into invoking privilege because of the Issa-led committee’s “unreasonable insistence on pressing forward with contempt despite the attorney general’s good faith offer.”

    The Department of Justice has provided Issa’s committee nearly 8,000 documents for the congressional investigation into the tactics used in the federal government’s efforts to stop violence related to drug smuggling along the southern border.

    But Issa and other Republican members on the committee have feigned disbelief, arguing that much more is needed to complete their work.

    Holder responding to the vote on a contempt recommendation said Issa’s actions are all about election-year politics.

  • June 20, 2012
    Guest Post

    By Sarah Crawford, Director of Workplace Fairness, National Partnership for Women & Families


    Fairness and equal opportunity are among our nation’s most basic values. They are especially critical in the workplace due to families’ increasing dependence on the wages of both men and women. That’s why Congress has passed landmark civil rights laws designed to protect workers’ right to hold jobs and provide for their families free from harmful discrimination. Yet, just last year, the United States Supreme Court eroded that right with its decision to deny more than one million women the ability to join together to challenge the discriminatory practices of the nation’s largest private employer. Fortunately, Congress now has the chance to undo the damage. 

    The Supreme Court’s decision in Wal-Mart v. Dukes was a devastating blow to the right of all workers to combat systemic discrimination in the workplace. In short, the Court said that Betty Dukes – a female greeter at Wal-Mart who received lower pay and fewer promotion opportunities than her male co-workers – could not join with other female Wal-Mart workers to hold the company accountable for unlawful widespread discrimination through a class action lawsuit. In doing so, the decision created significant barriers to justice for future victims of discrimination.

    Now, workers who seek to challenge the widespread discriminatory practices of their employers must meet stringent new standards to show that their claims are similar enough to be joined together. This makes it more difficult for workers to challenge discrimination that occurs through the subjective judgments that often factor into personnel decisions. And it opens the door for companies to hide behind the existence of written nondiscrimination policies, despite evidence that discrimination exists in practice.

    It should not be so difficult for workers who suffer discrimination to combat unlawful employer practices and have their day in court. The Equal Employment Opportunity Restoration Act of 2012, which was introduced today, would reverse the damage done by the Wal-Mart decision and restore the right of workers to join together to challenge systemic discrimination. It is critical legislation that would give workers who suffer from unlawful practices a fighting chance.

  • June 19, 2012

    by Jeremy Leaming

    Almost 50 years ago this month the U.S. Senate overcame a filibuster that stretched from March to June of 1964 to pass the Civil Rights Act.

    The filibuster led by a southern bloc of lawmakers was aimed at saving political lives and continuing the brutal oppression of African Americans nationwide. But pressure from civil rights groups, such as the NAACP as well as many other civil rights leaders, such as Martin Luther King Jr., helped to doom the filibuster, which was vociferously fueled by Sens. Strom Thurmond, Richard Russell and Robert Byrd. (Other organizations that helped build pressure to end the filibuster included the AFL-CIO, the ACLU, the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, as well as religious groups.)

    The southern bloc had an aversion to civil rights legislation in general. But the bloc was seriously bent on scuttling the civil rights measure’s provisions that yanked federal funding from groups and projects that discriminated against African Americans and barred private and public workplace discrimination.

    Sens. Everett Dirksen and Hubert Humphrey pushed a compromise bill, lessening federal enforcement mechanism, which also helped put an end to the filibuster in early June. The debate over the civil rights legislation lasted more than 80 days.

    On July 2, President Lyndon Johnson signed the bill into law, saying in part, “We believe that all men are created equal. Yet many are denied equal treatment. We believe that all men have certain unalienable rights. Yet many Americans do not enjoy those rights.”

  • June 19, 2012
    Guest Post

    By Brandon L. Garrett, a professor at the University of Virginia School of Law. Garrett’s book, Convicting the Innocent: Where Criminal Prosecutions Go Wrong, is coming out in paperback later this summer, and updates are at the book’s Facebook page here.


    Yesterday the Supreme Court Justices splintered over the meaning of the Confrontation Clause in cases involving forensic DNA testing – making a muddle of an important problem and with few discernible arguments that hold much water. The case involved a sexual assault, but the Illinois State Police did not test crime scene evidence – they tested a sample of blood from the suspect and obtained his DNA profile. The evidence from the rape kit was DNA tested by an outside lab, Cellmark. The prosecutor did not call the Cellmark technician at trial, the one who did the most important DNA testing in the case, the testing that identified the DNA profile from the semen of the assailant. Instead, the prosecutor called the crime lab technician who described the defendant’s profile – and sneaking the match in through the back door, by having that technician say how it matched the profile identified in the Cellmark report. The DNA was central evidence at trial, although the victim also identified the defendant in a line-up. The defense had no opportunity to cross-examine the Cellmark analyst who did the crucial DNA work.

    The case called for a straightforward application of the Court’s recent precedents in the Confrontation Clause area. Just last year, the Court held in Bullcoming v. New Mexico, a case where DUI test results were not presented by the technician who did the tests, that this was a Confrontation Clause problem. The defense must have an opportunity to cross-examine the person who did the relevant work. That decision reinforced the Court’s 2009 decision Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, stating that the Confrontation Clause requires live testimony, not merely introduction of a certificate stating the conclusion of a forensic test used to identify drugs. 

    The new answer to the question of whether a forensic DNA analyst must testify is “maybe.” 

  • June 18, 2012

    by Jeremy Leaming

    We likely shouldn’t be surprised by Justice Antonin Scalia’s “flip-flop,” as TPM puts it, on precedent supporting modern understanding of the Constitution’s commerce clause.

    TPM’s Sahil Kapur reports that in his forthcoming book, Scalia says the Supreme Court’s 1942 opinion in Wickard v. Filburn wrongly construed the scope of the commerce clause. As Kapur and many others have noted, including the Obama administration, Scalia cited Wickard in a 2005 opinion concluding that a law barring personal cultivation of marijuana for medical use was not beyond the scope of the commerce clause.

    In that case, Gonzales v. Raich, Scalia lodged a concurring opinion, citing precedent in holding, “where Congress has the authority to enact a regulation of interstate commerce, ‘it possesses every power needed to make that regulation effective.’”

    In an e-mail to TPM, constitutional law expert Adam Winkler wrote, “This is typical Scalia.”

    Winkler, a law professor at UCLA, continued:

    He respects precedents when they fit his conservative ideology and disregards them when they don’t. He claims that history should guide judges. But nothing about the history of the commerce clause has changed. What’s changed is the political implications of the commerce clause. When it’s being invoked for law and order conservatives, he favors Wickard. When invoked by liberals to support healthcare reform, he thinks Wickard is bad law.

    Once again, we see that Scalia’s orginalism is a charade.

    There is also the spectacle of oral argument, where Scalia not only revealed a wobbly understanding of the health care insurance system but affinity for the simplistic, but radically libertarian arguments lobbed against the Affordable Care Act’s minimum coverage provision. The minimum coverage provision is integral to the health care reform law, requiring those who can afford to do so to obtain a minimum amount of the health care coverage starting in 2014.