June 2012

  • June 25, 2012
    Guest Post

    By Alan B. Morrison, Lerner Family Associate Dean for Public Interest & Public Service at George Washington University Law School.*


    The issue before the Supreme Court in Knox v. SEIU, decided June 21, 2012, was what procedures the union had to follow in order to allow non-members, who are required by law to support the union’s collective bargaining activities, to object to a special assessment that was going to be used in large part for political and other advocacy work that non-members claim they had a right not to support with their money. 

    To know what side Justice Samuel Alito and his four colleagues were going to take, a reader only had to go to page 3 where he discusses the budget battle in California that prompted the special assessment that was challenged in Knox. He describes the debate “and in particular the consequences of growing compensation for public employees backed by powerful public sector unions” like SEIU (emphasis added).  If the issue is whether a “powerful” public-sector union or dissenting individuals will prevail, the smart money would not be on the union.

    The conclusion that the union had to do more than it did was supported by seven Justices, and thus a ruling against it would not have been particularly noteworthy on its own. But the holding of the majority and how it got there are quite remarkable. First a little background. It is now an accepted part of labor law that, except in so-called right-to-work states, individuals who are not union members must pay their share of the costs of collective bargaining that results in contracts that benefit them as well as union members. But the Supreme Court has ruled that not every dollar that a union collects from its members as dues is properly attributable to collective bargaining, and over the years a system has developed under which non-members can object to paying those additional amounts. Thus, each year non-members have a right to opt-out and pay less than members pay, without having to give any reason for doing so, with the amount based on a formula derived from last year’s audited union expenses. Knox involved a special assessment, rather than a regular payment, and the issue was what were the rights of the would-be dissenters in that situation, where there was at least the possibility that some of those who did not dissent from the annual payment, might want to opt-out of the special assessment.

  • June 23, 2012
    Guest Post

    By Nicole Austin-Hillery, the Director and Counsel of the Brennan Center for Justice’s Washington, D.C. office


    This week, the Supreme Court helped move our nation one step closer toward creating a fairer criminal justice system. In its ruling for Dorsey v. United States, the Court confirmed what advocates have long known: Under the Fair Sentencing Act (FSA), signed into law by President Obama in 2010, it is unjust to sentence individuals under the onerous guidelines that existed prior to enactment of the law. To do so, would, in the words of the Court, "create disparities of a kind that Congress enacted the Sentencing Reform Act and the Fair Sentencing Act to prevent." In effect, these individuals were charged and convicted but not yet sentenced before the new law took effect only by sheer coincidence of timing.

    Such cases are commonly known as "pipeline" cases. The five justice majority ruled plainly that the less draconian sentencing provisions under the FSA apply for individuals sentenced after the new law's enactment but whose offense occurred before. This decision is not, however, simply about the correct application of the FSA. More importantly, it speaks to the work that remains to be done to ensure the complete eradication of a hideous disparity in our criminal justice system, which has disproportionately harmed poor and minority communities.

  • June 22, 2012

    by Nicole Flatow

    Saturday marks one year since Rosemary Marquez was nominated to fill a judicial emergency seat in the District of Arizona, a jurisdiction so overwhelmed with immigration and drug cases that the chief judge has said it might be difficult to find anyone willing to accept a nomination.

    But as Cronkite News reports, Marquez’s nomination has not moved one inch since June 2011, thanks to the Arizona senators’ refusal to submit the required “blue slips.”

    Withholding these blue slips has increasingly become a means of imposing a de facto veto on Obama nominees, with similar blocks causing longtime freezes on nominees in Georgia, Nevada, Kansas and Oklahoma.

    And threatening to withhold blue slips has prevented President Obama from even making nominations or re-nominations in many other instances, The National Law Journal reports.

    In Wisconsin, nominees once supported by both senators were sent back to the President after newly elected Sen. Ron Johnson refused to support Obama’s nominees. In Kansas, Sens. Pat Roberts and Jerry Moran withdrew their support for a nominee they originally backed. And in Georgia, Sens. Saxby Chambliss and Johnny Isakson have refused to submit blue slips on a circuit court nominee they supported for the district court.

    Perhaps one of the most disturbing examples of this trend was the failed nomination of Arvo Mikkanen, who would have been only the third Native American federal judge in American history.

  • June 22, 2012

    by Samantha Berkovits

    Mary Geiger Lewis was confirmed to the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina by a 64-27 vote. The votes of South Carolina’s Republican Senators were split, with Sen. Graham voting for her nomination and Sen. DeMint against. Lewis is the first woman from South Carolina to be confirmed to the federal bench during President Obama’s term and she received the support of all five female Republican Senators.

     
    Judge Brian Davis has been reported out of the Senate Judiciary Committee. He currently sits on the Fourth Judicial Circuit of Florida and has been nominated to the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida. Senator Grassley (R-Iowa) has, as he has for many recent nominees, opposed Davis’s nomination. Grassley has cited specific remarks referring to race that the African American judge has made in the past as reason to believe that Davis will bring a bias in favor of African Americans to the bench and his nomination should be blocked, though he admits that “I am not accusing Judge Davis of violating any Canon or of unprofessional conduct.”
  • June 22, 2012
    Guest Post

    By Lolita Buckner Inniss, a professor at Cleveland-Marshall College of Law. This is a cross-post from the blog, Ain’t I a Feminist Legal Scholar Too?


    This June marks the 40th anniversary of Title IX. Its principal provision reads as follows:

    No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.

    Educational institutions from primary schools to universities who receive federal funding are subject to the law. Title IX is best known for having transformed the arena of women’s sports. Title IX, however, has a much broader reach: it applies also to sexual violence and sexual harassment. One of the more controversial aspects of Title IX jurisprudence is that sexual harassment is not only defined by persistent behavior but may also be found in a single episode. This latter fact is the subject of numerous critiques. But what is sometimes missed in such criticism is the full nature of even a “single episode” of harassment, especially within educational institutions.