March 2012

  • March 28, 2012
    Guest Post

    By Sergio Eduardo Muñoz, Senior Policy Analyst, Health Policy Project, Office of Research, Advocacy, and Legislation, National Council of La Raza. This post is part of an ACSblog online symposium on oral argument in HHS v. Florida.


    Yesterday’s Day 2 Affordable Care Act (ACA) arguments at the Supreme Court involved the centerpiece of both health care reform and its legal challenges by examining whether the individual responsibility requirement to carry health insurance exceeds Congress’s powers under the Constitution. And unfortunately, it didn’t take long for it to become painfully clear that this question of enormous consequence may very well split down ideological lines. During his confirmation hearings, Chief Justice Roberts used the analogy that a federal judge is like an umpire, objectively calling balls and strikes under commonly accepted rules. If anything good came out of Tuesday’s acrimonious argument, maybe we can finally put that misleading visual to rest. The Justices’ sharp comments on the constitutionality of the responsibility requirement made clear that not only are the Court’s ideological wings calling these pitches differently, it’s not even clear they’re playing the same game.

    Before describing today’s fireworks, however, some cold facts underlying today’s arguments and what the responsibility requirement does and does not do. If the responsibility requirement was in effect today, also referred to as the “individual mandate,” only 7% of the country under-65 would have to newly buy insurance or pay the tax penalty for non-compliance. Of those, over half would receive generous subsidies to assist in the purchase of insurance in newly-regulated markets. The vast majority of Americans would not have to decide how to satisfy the responsibility requirement because they already have insurance or would be exempt from purchase because of the economic strain. Take the Hispanic community, for example. Considering uninsured Latino children in comparison to other groups are disproportionately underenrolled in Medicaid and CHIP, despite the fact that Hispanics are about two times more likely than Whites to qualify for public health insurance, the odds are slim that this community would have to choose between new insurance and the assessment. This truth, unfortunately, has not been successfully communicated.

  • March 28, 2012
    Guest Post

    By Brandon L. Garrett, a professor at the University of Virginia School of Law and Lee Kovarsky, an associate professor at the University of Maryland School of Law. Together they are writing a habeas corpus casebook, forthcoming next year from Foundation Press. Garrett is the author of Convicting the Innocent: Where Criminal Prosecutions Go Wrong. Professor Kovarsky was a primary author of the American Bar Association’s Amicus brief in Martinez.


    Last week, the Supreme Court’s two opinions requiring competent plea-bargaining counsel justifiably received considerable public and scholarly attention. A 7-2 decision in favor of the prisoner in a third case, Martinez v. Ryan, may nonetheless have a greater long-term impact on criminal process — with perhaps the most surprising outcome of the three. Martinez will improve the representation of prisoners at a downstream phase of criminal adjudication: during the murky process of state “post-conviction” review, often called “state habeas.”

    An Arizona jury had convicted Louis Martinez of sexually abusing his eleven-year-old stepdaughter. His trial lawyer did not challenge DNA evidence the State presented, never called a rebuttal expert, and never objected to the prosecutor’s expert. Arizona — like many states — required Martinez to file his first Sixth Amendment challenge to the effectiveness of his trial lawyer in a state habeas proceeding. However, Martinez’s habeas lawyer filed a statement saying that Martinez had no viable Sixth-Amendment claim. After the time to file the claim elapsed, Martinez obtained a new lawyer, who filed a state habeas petition challenging the trial lawyer’s representation. The Arizona courts held that the claim had been forfeited. The lower federal courts also refused to consider the claim, citing to the state procedural default. (Federal habeas review is usually unavailable to a prisoner that has not complied with applicable state procedural rules.) In short, the inadequacy of his state habeas lawyer made it impossible for Martinez to enforce his right to an effective trial lawyer. The Supreme Court reversed, and held Martinez should have been given a chance to present the claim that his trial lawyer was ineffective. His inadequate representation excused his untimely state habeas filing.

    What is state habeas review? It is a phase of criminal process that is usually sandwiched between direct state review of the conviction and federal habeas review. (We say “usually” because sometimes the direct review and state post-conviction phases overlap.) There is enormous variation in state post-conviction law, including the circumstances under which a prisoner is entitled to state post-conviction counsel. Prisoners must navigate an extraordinarily complex body of state criminal process either pro se or without a federal guarantee of effective representation. Moreover, some claims, such as ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel challenges, are not usually raised on appeal. The facts demonstrating a trial lawyer’s ineffectiveness usually lie outside the four corners of the trial transcript. Moreover, there is also often a conflict of interest on appeal — the trial lawyer and the appellate lawyer are often the same representative. State habeas process allows state courts to review the effectiveness of trial counsel without such problems, all before federal habeas process becomes necessary. Yet state habeas process, which usually produces nothing more than a summary order, is notorious for lacking procedural safeguards.

  • March 27, 2012
    Guest Post

    By Adam Winkler, professor of law, UCLA School of Law. This post is part of an ACSblog online symposium on oral argument in HHS v. Florida.


    The two days of oral argument into President Obama's health care reform law have been notable for their lack of surprises.

    On the first day, the Court considered whether the Anti-Injunction Act barred the lawsuits challenging the individual mandate. Although this was always considered the sleeper issue of the case, there are few stronger trends in the Supreme Court these days than judicial assertiveness. A Court that could decide a disputed presidential election in Bush v. Gore; unleash Citizens United; and repeatedly wade into presidential war powers should have little hesitancy reaching out to decide the fate of the Affordable Care Act. So when the Justices breezily ignored the plain language of the AIA, it was predictable. The Court wants to decide all of the major issues in American politics, including this.

    On day two, the Court looked at the individual mandate. One thing that always seemed beyond the pale to me was the idea that, when it came to the mandate, the votes of Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Roberts were in play. Just because Scalia voted to uphold the federal drug laws in Gonzalez v. Raich should never have fooled anyone into thinking he'd vote to uphold the mandate, and his aggressive questioning of the government on the mandate indicated he's likely to vote to strike it down. The same can be said for Roberts, who for seven years now has been confounding the expectations of those who believed he'd really push for unanimous, narrow rulings that avoided constitutional questions, as he promised in his confirmation hearings. His voting record is strongly conservative and his desire to protect the institutional legitimacy of the Court is remarkable mainly for its lack of manifestation.

  • March 27, 2012

    by Jeremy Leaming

    The spin is in on today’s health care law oral arguments – Paul Clement, the attorney for the state’s challenging the law’s minimum coverage provision, is awesome, and the provision is in trouble.

    But, as noted yesterday by constitutional law professor Garrett Epps you’re on wobbly ground when predicting Supreme Court opinions based on oral argument theatrics. Sure, Clement is an outstanding high court litigator -- we’ll take it from SCOTUSblog founder Tom Goldstein who lavished praise on Clement at an oral argument preview last month, calling him one of the greatest attorneys of his generation.

    What we can tell from today’s oral argument is that the Solicitor General Donald Verrilli, Jr., largely focused on Congress’s constitutional authority to regulate interstate commerce. The government has also argued that Congress’s constitutional power to tax and spend also supports the minimum coverage provision. Most of the justices, however, we're glued to the commerce clause question.

    SCOTUSblog’s Lyle Denniston, a veteran Supreme Court correspondent, wrote of today’s oral argument that Justice Anthony Kennedy, “after first displaying a very deep skepticism,” provided toward the end of oral argument “the impression that he might yet be the mandate’s savior."

    Additionally, the high court’s four moderate to left-of-center justices appear inclined to vote in favor of the ACA provision, which requires many to start carrying a minimum amount of health care insurance in 2014.

  • March 26, 2012
    Guest Post

    By Alan B. Morrison, Lerner Family Associate Dean for Public Interest and Public Service Law; Professorial Lecturer in Law. Morrsion filed a brief on behalf of former IRS Commissioners Mortimer Caplin & Sheldon Cohen urging the Supreme Court to dismiss the challenges to the individual mandate in the Affordable Care Act on the ground that the Anti-Injunction Act deprived the courts of jurisdiction to hear the case. This post is part of an ACSblog online symposium around oral arguments in the Affordable Care Act case.


    There was one thing that was clear on opening day of the battle over the Affordable Care Act:  all of the Justices seemed to want to reach the merits of the constitutionality of the individual mandate.  Their problem was how to get there and how to write an opinion justifying that result.

    Before getting to the argument, there was one surprise: there was no line for seats in the lawyers section as late as 9:15.  Apparently, everyone thought that everyone else would be there, and so almost no one showed up.  But that is almost certainly not going to be the case when the merits come up at 10:00 a.m. on Tuesday.

    Listening to the whole 90 minutes, not a single Justice expressed any concern that prudence would caution against deciding a case in which no taxpayer would owe a penny until 2015, perhaps because they saw the enormity of the issues and how important the Government says it is to decide these issues now.  It surely can’t be because the merits issues are easy or not politically-charged.  Rather, the Court seems to assume that it will have to decide the issues some time, and it might as well do it now, with all the arguments made in more than 100 briefs filed on all sides.