June 2011

  • June 17, 2011
    Guest Post

    By Brandon L. Garrett, a professor at the University of Virginia School of Law. You can follow updates related to Garrett’s book, “Convicting the Innocent: Where Criminal Prosecutions Go Wrong,” at the book’s Facebook page here.


    The Court’s decision in J.D.B. v. North Carolina provides the latest window into the troubled world of juvenile interrogations. The Court ruled that police questioning of a thirteen-year-old boy about residential robberies, without giving the famous Miranda warnings or allowing him to call his grandmother, may have rendered his confession inadmissible. If he in fact should reasonably have felt “free to leave” then the questioning was not custodial, and the Miranda warnings need not have been given. However, the Court said that the trial judge should have examined whether his age was a factor when deciding whether he should have actually felt free to leave. He was in a classroom with the door closed and school officials present, not in an interrogation room in a police station.

    But the Court described how a thirteen-year-old might very well not feel free to leave under the circumstances. The thirteen-year-old confessed in thirty to forty-five minutes. He was told he could not call his grandmother, his legal guardian, and that he would end up in juvenile detention. The Court called it a “commonsense reality” that juveniles should be treated differently because, as the Court has recognized in many other opinions dealing with punishment of juveniles, they are more “vulnerable” and “susceptible to outside pressures than adults.” 

    Not only are juvenile interrogations under-regulated, in a juvenile justice system that makes a fetish of confession, but false confessions are a deep concern.

  • June 17, 2011
    Guest Post

    By Martin Magnusson. Mr. Magnusson is an associate at Day Pitney LLP.


    Yesterday, the United States Supreme Court unanimously held that criminal defendants have standing to challenge the constitutionality (vis-à-vis the Tenth Amendment) of federal criminal statutes under which they are charged.  The Tenth Amendment reinforces federalism, providing that “[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”

    The Supreme Court’s ruling on individuals’ Tenth Amendment standing came in Bond v. United States, an appeal brought by a microbiologist who had been married for several years but couldn’t bear a child. When Ms. Bond’s best friend announced that she was pregnant, Ms. Bond was excited. When Ms. Bond discovered that her husband was the child’s father, though, her mood understandably soured. She vowed to get revenge against her one-time best friend and tried to poison her with lethal chemicals that she stole from work and ordered online.

    Ms. Bond was ultimately charged with possessing and using a chemical weapon in violation of a federal criminal statute that implemented the United States’ treaty obligations under an international chemical-weapons treaty. At the district court, Ms. Bond argued that when Congress passed this statute, it exceeded its powers under the Constitution. The district court rejected that argument, but Ms. Bond has pursued it on appeal all the way to the United States Supreme Court.

    The argument against the constitutionality of the law at issue in Bond has several points in its favor. Unlike other federal statutes that address assaults, the law under which Ms. Bond was prosecuted includes no requirement that the alleged assault occur within the special jurisdiction of the United States, that the assault have an effect on interstate commerce, that the victim be a person or institution with recognized federal status, or that some other federal interest be involved. The law also includes no requirement that the government prove a federal interest as an element of the offense. As such, the law potentially criminalizes conduct with very little connection to a legitimate federal interest.

  • June 16, 2011
    BookTalk
    Losing Twice
    Harms of Indifference in the Supreme Court
    By: 
    Emily M. Calhoun

    By Emily M. Calhoun, Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law


    In Gonzales v. Carhart, a challenge to the federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act, Justice Kennedy had an opportunity to reaffirm that women are persons of full constitutional stature, possessing the capacity to make responsible choices about spiritual imperatives.  This was how women were portrayed in an opinion joined by Kennedy in Planned Parenthood v. Casey. Instead, in Carhart, Kennedy described women as vulnerable persons needing State protection against decisions they might come to regret. Moreover, while the capacity for regret is generally associated positively with moral agency, Kennedy defined the regret that women might experience after deciding to have an abortion as a psychological phenomenon associated solely with depression and low self-esteem, psychological states that might justify state regulation of women’s liberty. 

    The Supreme Court’s refusal to entertain a facial constitutional challenge to the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act was an obvious loss for women seeking to preserve their right to make choices about pregnancy. That refusal, however, was based on an assertion that there was, as yet, no evidence that the statute would prohibit “the vast majority of D&E abortions,” or would be “a substantial obstacle to late-term, but previability, abortions,” or would subject women to significant health risks. Far more significant was Kennedy’s framing of regret as a sign of vulnerability rather than as evidence of a capacity for moral agency that undergirds and should be protected as a key component of personal liberty.  His suggestion that protecting women from regret is a legitimate basis for state incursions on women’s liberty inflicts a serious harm. (Imagine, for example, the likely uproar were the Supreme Court to suggest that government has a legitimate interest in regulating guns because of the possibility that a gun owner might suffer regret – defined as low self-esteem and depression – after lawfully using his weapon to shoot another.) Carhart thus serves up a second loss, to all women.  

  • June 16, 2011

    An article in Politico today suggests U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder is reemerging as a liberal voice reports that he will “showcase many of those left-leaning positions” during his address tonight at the ACS Tenth Anniversary National Convention, “Constitution at the Crossroads: Progress Imperiled?”

    The article notes that the location of the 9/11 trials had “defined much of his tenure,” and with that behind him, he has been freed to focus on other issues close to his heart, such as fair drug crime sentencing.

    Holder will deliver keynote remarks during the opening gala dinner tonight, following the final round of the ACS Constance Baker Motley Moot Court Competition, and an opening panel on nontraditional lawyers and their impact on the law, featuring Slate’s Dahlia Lithwick, cartoonist Ruben Bolling and former ACS Executive Director Lisa Brown, who runs a new White House government reform initiative.

    The full schedule for the three-day convention is available here and general information about the convention is here. For those who have not yet registered but are interested in attending, on-site registration at the Capital Hilton begins at noon today.

  • June 16, 2011
    Guest Post

    By Rochelle Bobroff, Directing Attorney, Herbert Semmel Federal Rights Project, National Senior Citizens Law Center


    In what now sometimes seem like the good old days, when five conservative Justices closed the courthouse doors on plaintiffs seeking to enforce progressive statutes, Justice Stevens could be counted on to protest loudly.  None of the present members of the Court have taken on his role of objecting to the conservative assault on court access to enforce civil rights, consumer protection, and safety net statutes.  Their relative silence on the issue of court access is worrisome. 

    Ever since the conservatives garnered a five vote majority in the early 1990s, the conservative Justices have systematically eroded the ability of private individuals to enforce progressive federal and state laws.  While the four liberals were powerless to stop it, at least Stevens’ dissents understood the destructive force of the denial of court access.  The liberals presently on the Court are not following his lead.  Their opinions are missing the big picture of the importance of preserving the private enforceability of progressive federal laws.

    On Monday in Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, by a vote of 5 to 4, the Court threw out a suit to hold a corporation accountable for lies to stockholders, on the grounds that the corporation only advised and did not have complete control over the corporate entity that published the lies.  Justice Thomas, writing the majority opinion, made no bones about seeking to get rid of citizen suits.  He explicitly stated that because the securities statute had an implied, rather than an express, right of action, the Court would give the right to sue “narrow dimensions.”  He instructed courts to exercise “caution” against the “expansion” of court access.  In addition, he disparaged the federal government for standing up for investors.  He ridiculed the government agency, saying the SEC’s “presumed expertise” was of “limited value” when the government advocated for a right to sue.