August 2010

  • August 26, 2010
    A Florida pastor has found a way to garner attention - lots of it - for his otherwise unremarkable, but financially troubled evangelical church. The pastor of the fittingly named Dove World Outreach Center has planned a burning of Qurans to mark the forthcoming 9/11 anniversary. Pastor Terry Jones has dubbed the event "International Burn a Koran Day," and conceded to The New York Times that he doesn't know much about the religious text, and that the planned event is drawing donations at a time when his bank has demanded payment on the church's mortgage and its property insurance has been cancelled.

    Although, Jones says he has "no experience with it [the Quran]," and only knows "the Bible," he is nonetheless convinced that Islam is "full of lies," and a religion "of the devil." The pastor's actions have drawn attention worldwide. The Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) calls the planned burning an outrage. Watch video of some of CAIR's response here. Dr. Saeed Khan, a professor at the University of Florida, told The Times that Jones is "hijacking Christianity," much like "Al Qaeda hijacked Islam."

    As noted here, First Amendment scholar Charles C. Haynes has maintained that the rise of anti-Islam rhetoric is not only a danger to religious liberty in the country but also plays into the hands of extremists. "Such ill-informed statements must be music to al-Qaida's ears. After all, al-Qaida has worked hard to convince the Muslim world that its political and violent ideology is the true face of Islam - and America's ‘war on terrorism' is actually a ‘war on Islam,' Haynes wrote.

  • August 25, 2010
    Guest Post

    By Emily J. Martin, Vice President and General Counsel, National Women's Law Center
    Much like the Nineteenth Amendment itself these days, Women's Equality Day-the anniversary of the amendment's ratification-keeps a fairly low profile, sneaking in at the end of August, when much of the country is enjoying the last few days of summer vacation. But this August 26, the ninetieth anniversary of the constitutional guarantee of women's right to vote, it is worth stopping to reflect on the many years of labor that culminated in ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment and that work's relevance to women's progress going forward. One important way of honoring that history and continuing that progress would be ratification of the Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) , a landmark international agreement that affirms principles of fundamental equality for women and girls.

    In one of the few law review articles addressing the Nineteenth Amendment, Yale Law professor Reva Siegel describes it as "a constitutional amendment so rarely cited that reference to it prompts many, if not most, constitutional law scholars to ask: ‘Which one is that?'" In retrospect, its passage seems inevitable and the ground it broke has been largely forgotten. But ratification came in 1920 only after fifty years of fierce campaigning for a constitutional guarantee of full citizenship for women.

    As Siegel explains, opponents of women's right to vote saw suffragists' demands as deeply threatening. "The demand is for the abolition of all distinctions between men and women, proceeding upon the hypothesis that men and women are the same," one opponent asserted. "[This] attacks the integrity of the family; . . . it denies and repudiates the obligations of motherhood." Anti-suffragists asserted that a federal guarantee of women's right to vote represented a power grab for the federal government, which would "draw a line of political demarcation through a man's household, through his fireside, and to open to the intrusion of politics and politicians that sacred circle of the family." Given this history, it is ironic that last week a Washington Times op-ed invoked the anniversary of the Nineteenth Amendment to urge opposition to CEDAW, the women's rights treaty, in terms remarkably similar to those once used to oppose women's suffrage.

  • August 25, 2010
    Guest Post

    By Donna Lieberman, Executive Director, New York Civil Liberties Union, and Louise Melling, Deputy Legal Director, ACLU.

    Cross-posted at ACLU's Blog of Rights

    "Of course you have the right to build a mosque, but it is insensitive to build it there."

    This is the newest version of the call from critics of the proposed Islamic center in downtown New York City. The sentiment may at first blush seem sensitive: it recognizes the trauma of 9/11, the sacred nature of Ground Zero and the constitutional right to religious freedom. But the sentiment that the Islamic center can be built - just elsewhere - inevitably reflects a prejudice and intolerance that is in fact inconsistent with religious freedom.

    To conclude that building the Islamic center near Ground Zero is insensitive, one must, consciously or not, believe that the Muslims of downtown New York City who will come to the center to pray are - by virtue of their faith - all tainted by the terrorists who committed an atrocious act in the name of Islam. How else to explain the alleged "insensitivity"?

    Political leaders like Mayor Bloomberg in New York should be praised for standing up for religious freedom in the face of political pressure. But the voices of prejudice still fill the airwaves, and outright hostility toward mosques continues to flare up around the country in locations having no relation to any acts of terrorism.

  • August 25, 2010
    For the second time a federal appeals court panel rejected jury awards in favor of African-American plaintiffs who alleged discrimination against the poultry company Tyson. In a 2-1 decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found that a Tyson manager's use of the word "boy" to address a black man, John Hithon, did not amount to evidence of racial discrimination.

    Hithon denied a promotion at the Gadsden, Ala., poultry plant, argued that manager Tom Hatley had discriminated against him, citing, among other things, Hatley's derogatory usage of "boy." In 2002, Hithon and other employees of the plant lodged a lawsuit alleging racial discrimination and a jury found in their favor awarding hundreds of thousands in compensatory damages and $1.5 million in punitive damages. A federal magistrate judge invalidated the jury's verdict maintaining that racial discrimination was not proved, and in 2005 a panel of the Eleventh Circuit upheld that ruling. But the U.S. Supreme Court heard an appeal of the case and found that the use of the word boy could prove racial bias. "The speaker's meaning may depend on various factors including context, inflection, tone of voice, local custom and historical usage," the high court ruled in remanding the case to the Eleventh Circuit. The remand also produced another jury trial, which again found in favor of Hithon and the other black employee, Anthony Ash.

    But the Eleventh Circuit, in its recent ruling (pdf) in Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., refused to budge from its earlier decision, concluding that there was not new evidence to show the use of the word was discriminatory, Law.Com reported. But U.S. District Senior Judge David D. Dowd Jr., appointed to the bench by President Reagan, in a dissent said the jury verdicts should have been upheld.

    In a column for Daily Report, Stephen B. Bright, president and senior counsel of the Southern Center for Human Rights, wrote that the latest decision is a troubling reminder of the need for diversity on the Eleventh Circuit.

    Bright wrote:

    These two white judges [referring to Eleventh Circuit Judges Edward E. Carnes and William H. Pryor, Jr., of the majority in Ash], residing in their judicial palaces as far away from the lives of ordinary people as one can get, purport to know more about what it means when a white overseer calls an African-American man ‘boy' than 24 Alabamians selected for two federal juries.

    ...

    This march back to Jim Crow would surely be more difficult if there were more people of color on the federal bench. About a quarter of the population of three states that make up the 11th Circuit is made up of African Americans and Hispanics. Yet there have been only two black judges on the 12-member 11th Circuit in its history, and they have served one at a time. There is only one active African-American federal judge in all of Georgia today, Judge W. Louis Sands in the Middle District. The Northern District of Georgia, which includes Atlanta and has three African Americans representing it in Congress, has no African American judges in active status at this time.

     

  • August 25, 2010
    Guest Post

    Doug NeJaime is Associate Professor of Law at Loyola Law School - Los Angeles. He teaches in the areas of Ethical Lawyering and Law & Sexuality.
    The unwillingness of California's Attorney General and governor to defend Proposition 8 - and the corresponding presence of Proposition 8 proponents as the amendment's defenders - has yielded a procedural mess. But with all the discussion of Proposition 8 proponents' impact on procedure, it is easy to overlook their significant impact on substance: With the actual supporters of the proposition replacing the increasingly pro-gay state as the law's defender, the explicit connection between sex and sexual orientation discrimination has surfaced.

    When the California Attorney General defended California's (statutory) marriage restriction in the state litigation (In re Marriage Cases), he refused to rely on governmental interests related to procreation and dual-gender childrearing. As I have noted elsewhere, this refusal reflected the mainstreaming of a gay equality norm as both a political and legal matter. In the awkward position of defending the law without resort to its key substantive purposes, the Attorney General merely asked the court to defer to the voters' desire (as evidenced by Proposition 22) to preserve the traditional definition of marriage.

    With the shift toward more federal litigation on gay rights issues, we have seen a similar trajectory in the arguments offered by the (increasingly pro-gay) government in defense of anti-gay laws. For instance, the Justice Department has refused to stand behind rationales related to procreation and childrearing when defending the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) in federal litigation in Massachusetts. Indeed, in arguing that "the government does not believe that DOMA can be justified by interests in ‘responsible procreation' or ‘child-rearing,' " Justice Department lawyers admitted that "children raised by gay and lesbian parents are as likely to be well-adjusted as children raised by heterosexual parents." When Judge Tauro found DOMA unconstitutional as applied to married same-sex couples in Massachusetts, he noted the government's unwillingness to stand behind DOMA's actual purposes and rejected the government's newly manufactured rationale, which had no substantive content and amounted to a wait-and-see approach to marriage equality.

    In Perry v. Schwarzenegger, the federal litigation challenging Proposition 8, the California Attorney General resolved his earlier inconsistency (and unease) by moving wholeheartedly to the side of marriage equality and leaving no government lawyers to defend the amendment. Enter the Proposition 8 proponents as the party charged in the federal litigation with defending its constitutionality. Finally, the substantive reasons behind marriage restrictions get their day in court. The proponents urged Judge Walker to uphold Proposition 8 not merely based on deference to voter preferences and tradition, but also as part of the government's role in channeling procreation and childrearing into dual-gender, married households. Children, Proposition 8 proponents argued, need a mother and a father because mothers and fathers (wives and husbands, women and men) fulfill different and complementary roles. Through this lens, men function as breadwinners while women become homemakers and caretakers; men teach their children about ambition, hard work, and independence, while women nurture their children with love and encouragement. As Protect Marriage's Ron Prentice put it (in a statement that Judge Walker quoted in his opinion):