June 2010

  • June 11, 2010

    The arrest of the Harvard University professor Henry Louis Gates, Jr., last year was illegal and similar "unlawful" arrests happen far too often throughout the country, writes Christy E. Lopez in an ACS Issue Brief.

    In "Disorderly (mis)Conduct: The Problem with ‘Contempt of Cop' Arrests," Lopez maintains that the facts as asserted by Cambridge Police Department Sergeant James Crowley about the arrest of the preeminent Harvard scholar was "unlawful." Lopez, a civil rights attorney with a practice focusing on police and criminal justice reform, maintains, "Professor Gates behavior, as described by Sergeant Crowley, falls squarely in the realm of speech protected by the First Amendment. Not surprisingly, the City of Cambridge and the Cambridge Police Department jointly recommended to the Middlesex County District Attorney that the criminal charges against Professor Gates be dropped, and they were."

    Gates' situation caught nationwide attention, not just because of his prominence but because President Obama weighed in with criticism of the arrest. But Lopez says such arrests are not unusual, that they're abusive and typically "impact communities of color disproportionately and exacerbate tensions between these communities and law enforcement."

    Lopez's Issue Brief, citing Supreme Court precedent, details why many so-called "contempt of cop" arrests are abusive and illegal. First of all, she notes that "objectionable speech directed towards law enforcement is frequently a critique of police action, however inartfully expressed, and the individual's right to criticize government action is at the very heart of the purpose of the First Amendment's speech protections."

    In her Issue Brief, Lopez provides examples of illegal arrests across the nation, such as Washington, Maryland and the District of Columbia, and concludes such police actions not only harm the victims but undermine the effectiveness of law enforcement.

    Lopez writes:

    Police departments need community support to effectively deter crime. Community members who trust the police are more likely to report corner drug dealing, the sighting of a dangerous suspect, and even knowledge about a crime being planned. When a community sees police officers abuse their authority - and experiences or observes the direct harm of that abuse - that trust is undermined and the relationship between police and the communities they work for suffers.

    Such arrests also "drain resources," she writes. "In Washington D.C., for example, the Metropolitan Police Department made 10,600 disorderly conduct arrests in one year, accounting for more than one in five arrests," she writes. And, "In Baltimore, Maryland, in 2008, there were 9,983 arrests that did not lead to charges after prosecutors declined to prosecute the cases. Many of these arrests were for violations such as loitering, trespassing, and drinking a beer - arrests that a federal lawsuit alleges show a pattern of abuse."

    Lopez provides a number of suggestions for eliminating unlawful "contempt of cop" arrests, such as updating and modifying laws, better training of police officers, stronger supervision, documentation and accountability.

    See Lopez's Issue Brief here.

  • June 11, 2010
    Guest Post

    By Alex Kreit, assistant professor of law and director of the Center for Law and Social Justice at the Thomas Jefferson School of Law in San Diego, Calif. Kreit is author of an ACS Issue Brief, "Toward a Public Health Approach to Drug Policy."
    With the recent release of the Obama administration's National Drug Control Strategy, and drug policy increasingly making headlines with California's marijuana legalization measure set to appear on the ballot in the fall, now is a useful time to take a quick look at where our nation's drug policy appears to be heading. Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) Gil Kerlikowske assumed his job a little over a year ago on a promising note by saying that the time had come to discard the outdated and unhelpful terminology of a "war on drugs."

    Since that time, the Obama administration has made a number of noteworthy policy shifts. The administration announced that they will no longer arrest and prosecute medical marijuana patients and caregivers in compliance with state medical marijuana laws (though it bears mentioning that some local offices may not always be faithfully abiding by this policy). Obama's Justice Department has worked to reduce the "100-to-1" sentencing disparity between powder and crack cocaine. It has also lifted the ban on federal funding of syringe exchange programs.

    In announcing its new drug control strategy last month, the administration emphasized the importance of shifting away from the "war on drugs" mentality and treating drug abuse primarily as a public health issue. Kerlikowske (pictured) told The Associated Press, for example, that "[i]n the grand scheme, [the current strategy] has not been successful" and that forty years after Nixon began the drug war "the concern about drugs and the drug problem is, if anything, magnified, intensified."

    Unfortunately, at least for the time being, the strategy does not quite match the administration's vision and continues to fund many of the very same programs that have "not been successful" at the same or greater levels as in previous years. As Ethan Nadelmann, head of the Drug Policy Alliance, has pointed out, contrary to the administration's effort to paint the strategy as a major step toward treatment and away from incarceration-oriented policies, 64 percent of the $15.5 billion federal drug control budget will be spent on interdiction and law enforcement while only 36 percent will go to treatment and prevention. This is virtually the same supply-and-demand allocation as under President Bush's final drug control strategy. And, if we go back further, we find that the percentage of President Obama's budget earmarked for demand reduction is actually less than in recent past. In 2002, 46 percent of the total drug control budget was spent on demand reduction efforts, a full 12 percent higher than under Obama's budget.

  • June 11, 2010
    The Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), which is charged with providing the administration legal analysis on potential executive branch actions and policies has gone too long without a leader, writes Dawn Johnsen, an Indiana University law school professor, whose nomination to head the OLC was defeated by Republican opposition, in an op-ed for The Washington Post.

    Johnsen maintains that her criticism of the OLC's legal analysis regarding torture during the Bush years played a part in her nomination's demise. But, she writes, that it "is long past time to halt the damage caused by the ‘torture memo' by settling on a bipartisan understanding of the proper role of this critical office and confirming an assistant attorney general committed to that understanding."

    Johnsen, acting assistant attorney general in the OLC during the Clinton administration, and a former ACS Board member, continues:

    After the torture memo came to light, I led 19 former OLC lawyers in developing 10 "Principles to Guide the Office of Legal Counsel." We called for a return to long-standing, nonpartisan practice. The results were not flashy proposals for change but the carefully considered consensus of experience. The first principle, from which the others follow: "When providing legal advice to guide contemplated executive branch action, OLC should provide an accurate and honest appraisal of applicable law, even if that advice will constrain the administration's pursuit of desired policies."

    Put plainly, the OLC must be willing to say no to the president under any circumstances. The office does the president no favors by allowing its legal analysis to be twisted by policy or partisan preferences, even in the midst of crisis, as the months after Sept. 11 undoubtedly were.

    Her entire op-ed is available here.

    Johnsen will provide remarks on the first day, June 17, of the 2010 ACS National Convention, "The Constitution, Congress, and the Courts," before a Gala Dinner at which Senator Al Franken will be the featured speaker. Today is the last day for early registration for the Convention. Click here to register and obtain a full schedule.

  • June 10, 2010
    Guest Post

    By Mimi Marziani, Counsel/Katz Fellow, Democracy Program, Brennan Center for Justice
    On Tuesday, the Supreme Court issued an order that can only be described as irresponsible. About two months from the primary election and five months from the general, the Court blocked the state of Arizona from providing its publicly-funded candidates with so-called trigger funds - additional public grants triggered by the high spending of nonparticipating opponents or hostile third parties. The Court, ruling on an emergency motion, offered no explanation with its three-sentence order. And, the Court breaks for the summer in two weeks, so there is virtually no chance that this case will be decided on its merits until fall. By that time, of course, it will be too late for many of Arizona's candidates, who - in some cases - will have to wage hyper-competitive electoral contests on one-third of the funding they originally anticipated.

    In the aftermath, some are proclaiming the end of public funding programs writ large. The New York Times, for example, has sounded a death knell, predicting that "state finance programs [will] be the [C]ourt's next conquest." This story of demise is, however, greatly exaggerated.

    Clearly, there is good reason to condemn the Court's actions. But to decry the death of public financing is simply alarmist - and inaccurate. In fact, public funding of elections remains the constitutionally optimal way to curb political corruption. As the Supreme Court explained long ago in its famous Buckley v. Valeo decision, providing public money to finance campaigns "facilitate[s] and enlarge[s] public discussion and participation" and thus "furthers, not abridges, pertinent First Amendment values."

  • June 10, 2010
    BookTalk
    Kennedy vs. Carter
    The 1980 Battle for the Democratic Party's Soul
    By: 
    Timothy Stanley

    By Timothy Stanley, Leverhulme Early Career Fellow, Department of History, University of London.
    Kennedy vs. Carter is a re-evaluation of the 1980 Democratic primaries, when the late Senator Edward Kennedy tried to take his party's nomination away from incumbent president Jimmy Carter. Contrary to orthodox historical opinion, I argue that Kennedy stood a good chance of winning both the nomination and the presidency, and that his campaign was undermined by historical accidents beyond his control. This interpretation has consequences for politics today, particularly for those interested in protecting the legacy of the legal revolutions of the 1970s.

    Edward Kennedy was an unreconstructed liberal, and that is generally believed to be why he lost. When the senator died last year, many commentators seized upon the 1980 elections as the moment when liberalism was finally rejected by an increasingly conservative public. Jimmy Carter, a first-term president elected on a vague platform of "change," faced crisis in the Middle East, recession, and a revived right-wing. Kennedy thought Democrats should respond to these problems with a return to core liberal principles: spend more and throw the moral weight of the White House behind the legal fight for sexual, gender, and racial equality. He was the first ever major US presidential candidate to hold a rally in a gay bar. The moderate Jimmy Carter's defeat of Kennedy - and Reagan's defeat of Carter in the general election - seemed to end the post-war era of social reform.

    But Kennedy ran much better than he ought to, considering his political and personal reputation (the senator was involved in the death of an intern at Chappaquiddick Island in 1969). Throughout 1979 he led Carter and Reagan 2-1 in trial heats. Pollsters reported that the public were tired of Carter's failure to stem rising inflation and unemployment, and were prepared to accept Kennedy's radical package of tax and spend measures as an alternative. However the capture of US hostages at the Tehran embassy in November and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December gave Carter the necessary momentum to carry Iowa and New Hampshire in 1980. He built up an early lead in delegates that the senator could never catch. Despite this, as the economy worsened voters returned to Kennedy and he won impressive victories in states as diverse as New York, California, Michigan, New Jersey, New Mexico and South Dakota.