August 2009

  • August 19, 2009
    George Washington University Law School Professor Orin Kerr adds some texture to today's New York Times piece on Ted Olson, the prominent conservative Supreme Court litigator, who has attracted a great deal of attention for his involvement in a lawsuit intended to advance marriage equality. Olson, as The New York Times points out, has been a prominent figure in the Federalist Society, "a hothouse for conservative legal theory." So why, The Times story asks in part, is Olson (right) now representing same-sex couples in a challenge to California's Proposition 8, which stripped lesbians and gay men of the right to marry? Kerr says the question while interesting and a "significant part of the story" needs some fleshing out.

    Kerr writes:

    What makes Olson's involvement in the same-sex marriage litigation so interesting - and among right-of-center lawyers, controversial - is that his position is relying on the kinds of constitutional arguments that Olson is personally so closely identified with rejecting. The Times story touches on this, but I would add a bit more detail. Those who have watched Olson's annual Supreme Court Roundups for the Federalist Society know how harsh Olson tends to be about judges who Olson thinks are constitutionalizing their policy views, especially when that means constitutionalizing social policies popular among elites. Olson hasn't just been critical of those who take a broad view of constitutional meaning in this setting: he has been dismissive and sometimes even brutal.

    The surprising aspect of the new case is that it has Olson making same kinds of constitutional arguments that he has specialized in ridiculing for so long. It's the juxtaposition that is surprising. Of course, different people will disagree on which Ted Olson is right. Some will say he was wrong before and right now; others will he was right then and wrong now. But however you look at it, it seems hard to reconcile the two.

    Olson's lawsuit is not the only one filed this year that seeks to advance marriage equality. Early this year, the Gay and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders (GLAD) lodged a lawsuit against the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), saying the federal law deprives legally married same-sex couples in Massachusetts and Connecticut of economic benefits that go to heterosexual couples. More on GLAD's lawsuit is here.

     

     

  • August 19, 2009
    The Google Book Search settlement continues to draw critics, The New York Times reports. The Times notes a new challenge to the class action lawsuit settlement, which if approved by a federal court, will grant Google expansive digital publishing rights.

    James Grimmelmann, an associate professor of the Institute for Information and Law at New York Law School and author of an ACS Issue Brief on the settlement, told The Times that the new filing "may be the most fundamental challenge to the settlement yet."

    Scott Grant, a partner at the law firm Boies Schiller & Flexner, is preparing to lodge the filing in federal court today. Grant, who is preparing the filing on his own behalf, told the newspaper, "This is a predominantly commercial transaction and one that should be undertaken through the normal commercial process, which is negotiation and informed consent." He added that Google and supporters of the settlement are "trying to ram this through so that millions of copyright holders will have no idea that this happening."

    In his Issue Brief, The Google Book Search Settlement: Ends, Means, and the Future of Books, Grimmelmann examined public interest concerns that have arisen from the settlement, such as who will control copyright ownership of "orphan works," which are books whose authors or rights holders cannot be found.

    Grimmelmann asserts in his brief that dealing with "orphan works" is best solved by legislation, not litigation.

  • August 19, 2009
    Guest Post

    By Maha Jweied, Senior Attorney-Advisor, Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights; former law clerk, Appeals Chamber, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia; 2009-2011, Young Lawyers Division Liaison, ABA Section of International Law; 2009 ACS Public Interest Fellow. The views expressed below are those of the author alone.
    I had the extraordinary opportunity of working on a juvenile death penalty case when the U.S. Supreme Court ruled the practice unconstitutional in the 2005 decision of Roper v. Simmons. With our client's 28th birthday just days away, there was no better gift than to let him know that as a result of this decision, his life would be spared. We felt victorious-although it was clear that the luck of timing had more to do with the good outcome than our lawyering skills.

    While over four years have passed since that fateful day, the case remains meaningful to me for many reasons, not least of which was the opportunity to work with colleagues dedicated to securing justice for our client. But the case was also meaningful because our client was spared in good measure due to international law. In reaching its decision, the Court reviewed the status of the juvenile death penalty in other nations and stated that "[i]t is proper that we acknowledge the overwhelming weight of international opinion against the juvenile death penalty." As a student of U.S. civil rights law and public international law, I always knew that these two areas of law were interrelated. But I had not anticipated that a case with facts which were purely domestic in nature-a criminal case in rural Alabama-would be directly affected by a consideration of international state practice. I felt proud of the U.S. legal system and thought back to my classmates in London, where I studied public international law, and their criticism of the theory of American exceptionalism. Surely, their criticisms had to be checked. But of course, a countervailing set of criticisms from domestic jurists immediately surfaced. These criticisms-which appeared more like xenophobia than American exceptionalism-gave me pause. How could looking outward and considering other countries' practices be considered a weakness when we pride ourselves in being a country of immigrants?

  • August 18, 2009

    "There's been a trend towards an increasingly powerful presidency throughout American history," says Prof. Peter M. Shane in a video just released by Ohio State University's Moritz College of Law. "[S]tarting with the Reagan administration, you began to see ... an accelerating expansion of really unprecedented claims of presidential authority."

    Prof. Shane is the author of Madison's Nightmare, recently featured here on ACS Book Talk.

  • August 18, 2009
    Guest Post

    By Matt Kelley, who writes about prisoners' rights and criminal justice reform issues at change.org, where this piece was initially published. He also works as the Online Communications Manager at the Innocence Project. Views expressed here are his own and do not represent any organization.

    In an extremely rare move for the U.S. Supreme Court, the justices yesterday issued an order directing a federal judge to hold an evidentiary hearing in the case of Troy Anthony Davis, who has sat on Georgia's death row for nearly two decades for a crime he says he didn't commit. A pile of convincing evidence suggests that Davis is indeed innocent, and the court's move points to the strength of this evidence.

    This decision also confirms that Davis' attorneys - and the army of activists who have worked tirelessly on his behalf - are making themselves heard. The justices don't live in a vacuum, and at least six of them found yesterday that allowing a man to be executed before possible evidence of his innocence is fully considered would be a grave injustice and a violation of due process.

    Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas were the lone dissenters, and new justice Sonia Sotomayor didn't participate. Scalia wrote a frightening dissent suggesting that he may consider the execution of an innocent person completely constitutional.

    He wrote: "This Court has never held that the Constitution forbids the execution of a convicted defendant who has had a full and fair trial but is later able to convince a habeas court that he is ‘actually' innocent." That's a scary sentence. But let's focus on the positive for a moment: