July 2009

  • July 17, 2009

    By Howard M. Wasserman, Associate Professor of Law, Florida International University College of Law 

    In no particular order, some final thoughts on the Sotomayor hearings. Start with the obvious: There will not be a filibuster and she will be confirmed handily (65-67 votes).

    First, what are the chances that some GOP House member (likely a far-right backbencher looking to make a name for himself) argues that the House should impeach Justice Sotomayor? Might it happen just after she writes an opinion (probably within the next two years) that cites to foreign or international law or that supports an affirmative action program or that refuses to recuse from the non-Maloney Second Amendment incorporation case? This seems like the next step in the evolution of nasty confirmation politics. The hearings no longer provide any check on the President’s appointment authority; after Bork (and to a lesser extent Thomas), no nominee ever says anything beyond the sorts of bland platitudes we heard from Roberts and now Sotomayor; no one will say anything controversial (or meaningful) enough to give a critical mass of Senators (including Senators from the nominating President’s party) grounds to vote against her. And getting "tough" (or nasty) in questioning has become popularly counter-productive--as Republicans saw this week and as Democrats saw in 2005.

  • July 16, 2009
    Guest Post

    By Walter J. Kendall III, Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School. This is Kendall's second blog on the Sotomayor confirmation hearings. His first is here.

    Georgetown University Law Professor Louis Michael Seidman comments in today's New York Times that Judge Sonia Sotomayor adopted, during her confirmation hearings, the "official ideology" about judging. James R. Copland, of the Manhattan Institute, more or less says the same thing when he describes her remarks as "traditionalist."

    I wonder if they are both mistaken.

    I heard Judge Sotomayor say repeatedly that the policies and values underlying and supporting the legal text before the Court were key to understanding its meaning and reach. Coupled with her insistence on fully understanding the facts, especially so she could explain to the parties the why-and-how of her analysis and holding, suggests to me an approach that could be most like that of Justice Thurgood Marshall. As I wrote in a brief essay in the John Marshall Law Review, Justice Marshall "considered the gory details of trial records in the light of his own experience and saw things other Justices would overlook, misunderstand, or undervalue."

    It sounded to me that Judge Sotomayor approached the facts in the same way with the same concern (dare I say empathy).

     

  • July 16, 2009
    Guest Post

    By Howard M. Wasserman, Associate Professor of Law, Florida International University College of Law 

    There is blame all around for the utter inanity of these hearings on the issue of the actual work of judging. An exchange yesterday between Sen. Coburn and Judge Sotomayor on the subject of using foreign and international is a case in point.

    At one point, Coburn asked whether anything in the Constitution granted judges permission or power to rely on foreign and international law. Coburn asked the judge to "cite for me the authority either given in your oath or in the Constitution that allows you to utilize laws outside of the country."

    The premise underlying these questions is silly. Of course neither the oath nor the Constitution says anything about utilizing laws outside of the country. But the Constitution also does not say anything about Originalism, Textualism, Living Constitutionalism, social science, canons of construction, precedent, interpretive methodology, history and purpose, or any other of the ordinary methods of judicial analysis. Article III vests the "judicial power" in the Courts of United States; enveloped within that term are all the tools by which judges interpret legal sources and find meaning, including resort to persuasive legal sources. The fact that nothing grants judges permission or power to use foreign law is meaningless, since nothing grants judges permission to look to state law (in federal cases) or to look at law review articles or to look at legislative history or to do anything that will help them interpret and determine applicable law. There is a nice question whether Congress could prohibit courts from relying on foreign or international law (Justice Scalia has emphatically said hell no; I argue the answer is different in constitutional and statutory cases). But absent a ban, judges don't need permission to do the ordinary work of judging.

  • July 16, 2009
    Guest Post

    David Kairys, a law professor at Temple University, is the author of Philadelphia Freedom, Memoir of a Civil Rights Lawyer. Kairys' other books include a leading progressive critique of the law, The Politics of Law.

    It's hard for me to watch the Sotomayor confirmation hearings, not only because of the Senators' generally unfocused, rambling questions. Conservatives and many of their most cherished values and ideas were just resoundingly defeated in an election. Congress is overwhelmingly Democratic, with 60 Democrats in control of the Senate, which will vote on the nomination. Yet, the hearings and the media coverage of them are dominated by conservatives and conservative ideas about law and justice, and a lack serious criticism of the last three decades of conservative dominance of the courts.

    I am aware of and share the priority of getting Sonia Sotomayor seated on the Supreme Court. But there is a big gap of possibility between safely doing that and the surrender we're watching.

    The senators of both parties and Judge Sotomayor often seem to be in a debate over who has the most passive vision of judging. Listening to them, one might think judges don't make decisions at all but simply write down legally required results, and have no apparent need for judgment or experience.

  • July 16, 2009

    Following his participation in a panel discussion on judicial elections at the 2009 ACS National Convention, Bert Brandenburg, executive director of the Justice at Stake Campaign, talked with ACSblog about the potential impact of the recent Supreme Court decision in Caperton v. A.T. Massey on state judicial elections. In Caperton, the high court ruled that a West Virginia Supreme Court justice should have disqualified himself from hearing a case involving a campaign contributor. Watch Brandenburg's interview below or download a podcast here.